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
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TOLSTOI'S VISION

Composed in 1910 for the Czar of Russia, the King of
England, and the Emperor of Germany.

I see floating upon the surface of the sea of human fate the huge silhouette of a nude woman. She is—with her beauty, her poise, her smile, her jewels—a super-Venus. Nations rush madly after her, each of them eager to attract her especially. But she, like an eternal courtesan, flirts with all. In her hair-ornament of diamonds and rubies is engraved her name—"Commercialism." As alluring and bewitching as she seems, much destruction and agony follow in her wake. Her breath, reeking of sordid transactions, her voice of metallic character like gold, and her look of greed are so much poison to the nations who fall victims to her charms.

And behold! she has three gigantic arms with three torches of universal corruption in her hand. The first torch represents the flame of war that the beautiful courtesan carries from city to city and country to country. Patriotism answers with flashes of honest flame, but the end is the roar of guns and musketry.

The second torch bears the flame of bigotry and hypocrisy. It lights the lamps only in temples and on the altars of sacred institutions. It carries the seed of falsity and fanaticism. It kindles the minds that are still in cradles and follows them to their graves.

The great conflagration will start about 1912, set by the torch of the first arm in the countries of southeastern Europe. It will develop into a destructive calamity in 1913. In that year I see all Europe in flames and bleeding. I hear the lamentations of huge battlefields. But about the year 1915 a strange figure from the north—a new Napoleon—enters the stage of the bloody drama. He is a man of little militaristic training, a writer or a journalist, but in his grip most of Europe will remain till 1925. The end of the great calamity will mark a new political era for the old world. There will be left no empires and kingdoms, but

the world will form a federation of the United States of Nations. There will remain only four great giants—the Anglo-Saxons, the Latins, the Slavs, and the Mongolians.

After the year 1925 I see a change in religious sentiments. The second torch of the courtesan has brought about the fall of the church. The ethical idea has almost vanished. Humanity is without the moral feeling. But then a great reformer arises. He will clear the world of the relics of monotheism and lay the cornerstone of the temple of pantheism. God, soul, spirit, and immortality will be molten in a new furnace, and I see the peaceful beginning of an ethical era. The man determined to this mission is a Mongolian-Slav. He is already walking the earth—a man of active affairs. He himself does not now realize the mission assigned to him by a superior power.

And behold the flame of the third torch, which has already begun to destroy our family relations, our standards of art and morals. The relation between woman and man is accepted as a prosaic partnership of the sexes. Art has become realistic degeneracy. Political and religious disturbances have shaken the spiritual foundations of all nations. Only small spots here and there have remained untouched by those three destructive flames. The anti-national wars in Europe, the class war of America, and the race wars in Asia have strangled progress for half a century. But then, in the middle of this century, I see a hero of literature and art rising from the ranks of the Latins and purging the world of the tedious stuff of the obvious. It is the light of symbolism that shall outshine the light of the torch of commercialism. In place of the polygamy and monogamy of to-day there will come a poetogamy—a relation of the sexes based fundamentally upon poetic conceptions of life.

And I see the nations growing wiser, and realizing that the alluring woman of their destinies is after all, nothing but an illusion. There will be a time when the world will have no use for armies, hypocritical religions, and degenerate art. Life is evolution, and evolution is development from the simple to the more complicated forms of the mind and the body. I see the passing show of the world-drama in its present form, how it fades like the glow of evening upon the mountains. One motion of the hand of commercialism and a new history begins.

INTRODUCTION

The Handbook of the European War presents, in convenient size, the most important facts of the great conflict. Few subjects have touched more varied human interests; and none has been more widely discussed. But the chief result of the enormous number of written and spoken words has been to confuse rather than clarify the greater issues.

Practically all of the huge volume of material published in America and abroad has been sifted, and that which seemed to have unusual literary, statistical or historical value selected with a view, however, of making the exhibit of each country as nearly representative as possible. The historical summaries have been added solely to furnish background for the reprinted matter.

As stated before, the Handbook is a book of fact, and not an argument for any warring nation. The contentions of all are set forth without favor, as far as the material at hand permits. It has been impossible to allot as much space to Germany and Austria-Hungary as to the combination of the allied nations, because the statements and documents from the Dual Alliance which had reached the American press at the time of publication were very few. To avoid the appearance of favoring any of the combatants, the arrangement, wherever feasible, has been made according to the alphabet.

November 20, 1914.

EUROPE BEFORE THE WAR

The sovereignty of a nation over territory is not like the individual property claim which can be upheld in a court of law; nor is it pretended that one nation will hold permanent control of it save by the superior assertion of the will of that nation. In the past the will has been shown only by force of arms, and as wars were frequent the map of Europe has often been changed.

Europe as is well known was first settled by Asiatic immigration in two well-defined racial routes: the southern or Mediterranean movement, and the northern or interior plains movement. The latter took place from the barren steppes of middle Asia which fall away from the northern slope of the Himalayas, and thence came the Slavs, the great but little known masses now living in Eastern Europe and Western Central Asia. The southern movement, with which we are more familiar, came from the lands of ancient history, probably Egypt, Arabia or some part of Asia Minor.

The first known European civilization settled on the three peninsulas bordering the northern slope of the Mediterranean, Italy, Greece and Spain. It came by way of the peninsula of Asia Minor. When it had culminated in Rome, it came into contact with the Celtic and Teutonic races which overran Italy and moved the scenes of empire north and west. Meanwhile the Slav races had conquered the northeastern part of Europe and come into conflict with the Teutons on the borders of the River Vistula. Again, in the fifteenth century, Europe experienced another wave of invasion when the Turk captured Constantinople, rapidly spread his dominion over what is today known as the Balkan States, and pressed with his victorious arms even up to the very gates of Vienna.

The wars among these four elements, the Teuton, Celt, Slav and Turk, all of which are engaged in the present day struggle under the guises of various nationalities, beginning in the western

part of Europe, that is modern France, have gradually driven the race tides to the eastward as one western nation after another has been claimed from the maelstrom of races, and amalgamated into a unified mass. The French were the first to form a nation free of the fear of an offensive war from the east; they were followed by the Germans within the memory of those now living, and the seething cauldron of Europe, where the Turk, the Slav, the Teuton and indirectly the Celt, now meet, rests in the Balkans. Austria, caught in the ebb of the receding race tides, has been disintegrated on her western frontier, and is in constant danger as a neighbor to the Balkan States of being drawn into the turmoil and shorn of her eastern provinces. Turkey has been slowly crumbling for the last century, her sway in Europe must be short, and all the nations of greater Europe (particularly England, Russia, Germany and Austria), anxious for spoil, are either meddling or have meddled in her affairs. Crises in the Balkans have caused three great wars and a number of smaller ones in the past sixty years. After each of them different boundaries have been fixed, and the Balkans divided according to a new idea. Yet so little has been accomplished that the slightest disturbance today causes apprehension to every European power. The quarrels have been fierce and continuous; the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand does not stand out as a startling event from the rest of Balkan history. No one who has read that history doubts that, from Austria's point of view, the ultimatum meant her final decision that this culminating act of bloodshed should be treated as the point past which she would not endure. Her state papers specifically declare that there was a far wider significance than the mere demand for reparation of a royal death. It should be noticed in the official correspondence that every nation at once realized its vital and conflicting interests in the crisis that ensued.

This is the racial side, and, as if these conflicting interests were not enough cause for quarrel, there is the theory of the balance of power, which was designed to preserve Europe's peace. When, at the close of the Napoleonic wars, a division of Europe was made, the boundaries of the various states were fixed according to this principle: that the peace of Europe was

best served by stripping France of so much territory that she could never regain the overwhelming influence she once had, and threaten to annex the whole of Europe. Then, the conception was gradually extended so that no one state should acquire so much dominion or power that her ambitions might lead to universal conquest. When that became imminent all the endangered nations combined to overthrow her. The theory of the balance of power is the keystone of European politics to-day; its maintenance has been considered so important in the minds of the statesmen of Europe, that no moral scruples or considerations have ever been allowed to stand in the way when it was threatened.

In the early days the balance of power was upheld by the combination of all nations against any one of their number that grew too large and ambitious. They made occasional treaties to act jointly, but always the established precedent was that when the *status quo* existing at the time the treaties were signed had been destroyed, the treaties were void. If one state, however small, should change its territories, or should threaten to shift its boundaries, any state would freely violate all existing treaties, and form new treaties to establish a new balance of power.

This is what Mr. Gladstone had in mind in 1870 when he made the statement which has been quoted so often during the present trouble. "I am not able," says Mr. Gladstone, "to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. . . . The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we all must feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatsoever."

Even after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the influence of

France was still considered dangerous to the peace of continental Europe, and with such weak bonds, a so-called "Holy Alliance" between the empires of Russia, Prussia and Austria was formed. As this more than offset the power of France, England joined with her to counterbalance it.

But soon rival ambitions within the alliances dissolved them; England and France broke in 1840; and Russia became cold toward Austria when the latter supported England and France in the Crimean War of 1856; Prussia fought Austria for leadership of the German states in 1866.

This was the condition of Europe when Bismarck developed in his masterly fashion the modern and permanent series of alliances. The German states, which for centuries had been disrupted by the wars of central Europe, had at length gained freedom from external dangers by wresting the leadership of the continent from France in 1870, but Bismarck conceived that with the new Germany open on all sides to invasion by hostile neighbors, he must conciliate some of them. With his remarkable prevision, he had prepared for this by insisting that Austria should not endure the humiliation of having German armies enter her capital in 1866. He revived the Holy Alliance in 1871 under the name of the *Dreikaiserbund*, with the new German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Russia as members. But again Russia changed the *status quo* by her annexations of the Turk territory after the war of 1878, and again acting with England in what she conceived her own best interest in the Balkans, Austria proved false to her treaty. Russia notified Bismarck that she considered the *Dreikaiserbund* void.

It became obvious to Bismarck that the interests of Austria and Russia in the Balkans could not be permanently reconciled, and he invited Italy to take Russia's place. Italy, disappointed in its first quest after a colonial empire, consented, and the Triple Alliance had birth.

Originally intended as a defensive measure for the peace of Europe, the Triple Alliance has been strengthened by the present Emperor to such an extent that peace has been constantly menaced in the minds of the Powers outside of it. To preserve the balance of the power of Europe, the theory has arisen in

very recent times that Europe should be divided into two camps of about equal strength. Hence the Triple Entente has been created by an alliance between France and Russia in 1894, and an alliance between England and France in 1904. The argument advanced in favor of this arrangement was that each group of Powers would fear to attack the opposing group, and that no single sovereign would dare to bring upon himself the responsibility for the war that would follow when one Power attacked another. Also it made the preservation of peace the concern of every Power separately.

But with such tremendous increase in the dangers of war, the balance has been made more delicate and difficult, and every disturbance in the smallest state has sent cabinet ministers flying to their offices in the great capitals. War by one of them meant war by all. Three times in the last ten years the alliances as factors of peace have been tested—each time more severely—and three times they have stood the strain; they were hailed as successful instruments of peace. But in the present case they linked Austria to the rest of Europe, and what might have remained a purely local trouble between Austria, Servia and perhaps Russia, engulfed the whole of it.

As stated before, the Balkans with their mixed races and religions have been the common highway over which the east and west going tides have fought the battles of the centuries, and for the past seventy-five years they have been the sorest spot in Europe. They have suffered continuous riot, bloodshed and ruin, and the jealousies of the Great Powers, all of whom are interested either racially or commercially, have not permitted any one of their number to go in and set the house in order. That might have given one of them an overweening advantage, and so artificial makeshifts were adopted, chief among them the fiction of the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey. England, Russia and Germany each feared the other might get Constantinople, the gateway to the Orient, and so it was agreed that the Sultan should be permitted to rule, no matter to what conditions the agreement subjected the Balkan States.

Such a compromise was the treaty of Berlin in 1878, at the

close of the Russo-Turkish war. Until the Balkan wars of 1911 this was the latest rearrangement of the map of Europe by treaty; the modern era of Balkan trouble may conveniently be said to date from the dissatisfaction that arose with it. Russia had thoroughly beaten the Turks, and without consulting the other Powers, had determined to annex most of Asiatic and part of European Turkey. Her action brought protests from both England and Austria, who considered their interests involved, and after Disraeli had made his famous naval demonstration, Russia consented to submit her claims to the Congress of Berlin with Bismarck in the chair. As Germany was at this time an ally of Russia through the *Dreikaiserbund*, Russia thought she could trust Bismarck to favor her interests. Three important results ensued—Austria-Hungary, to satisfy her claims, was given a protectorate over the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the sanjak of Novibazar (a small strip of land between Serbia and Montenegro); Serbia was recognized as an independent kingdom, and Russia forced to disgorge half of the territory she had annexed, left the conference bitterly enraged at both Germany and Austria-Hungary. Six years later Bismarck was again able to wheedle Russia into signing the *Dreikaiserbund*, but finding that he favored the Austrian and English interests in the Balkans, she finally broke with Germany in 1889 and later formed an alliance with France.

The Berlin Treaty meanwhile had succeeded no better in reconciling the interests of the small states than of the Great Powers. Finding that the jealousies of England, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia did not permit them to police the Balkans properly, they were soon in revolt. Bulgaria quickly gobbled up the small state of Eastern Rumelia; Serbia declared war on her and was about to receive a thorough beating when Austria interfered and forbade Bulgaria to continue the war; there were troubles in Greece; and Turkey disregarded all treaties except when threatened. To augment the confusion, the Powers began individually to bid for the control of the Balkans, realizing that some day would come the test for the possession of Constantinople. England got control of the finances of Greece; Germany used her influence with King Charles of

Rumania (a Hohenzollern); and the Bulgarian army was organized by German officers. Austria tried to strengthen her influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Russia, to counteract these influences, began a violent agitation of Panslavism as head of the Greek Catholic church. She succeeded in getting the Crown Prince of Bulgaria to adopt the Orthodox Greek Catholic Faith and thus insure the favor of Bulgaria when he ascended the throne, and encouraged the ambition for separate government among the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In this aim she found her chief apostle in Servia with its ambition to re-establish the glory of the former Servian empire, which included present day Bosnia-Herzegovina. Think, therefore, of Servia's rage when at an opportune moment of disturbance in the Balkans in 1908, Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in violation of the Treaty of Berlin. Servia at once prepared for war, the Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized on the Servian frontier, and Russia protested against the action of Austria. Germany, as Austria's ally, sent a note to Russia saying that an attack on Austria would find Germany on the defensive. Russia, then being in no condition to fight, advised Servia to accept the fact as accomplished.

Though Servia signed a treaty with Austria in 1909 promising to abandon all agitation against the empire, her dream of a greater Servia was not forgotten. Conditions became continually worse.

The Balkan wars in 1911 again stirred not only the local zone of trouble, including Servia with her newly won military spurs and fresh dreams of conquest and Austria, but also the whole of Europe.

Frederic Harrison, a noted English student of international history, writing after the treaties of peace, outlines the situation at this time:

Next comes the intricate interlacing of the Balkan States (five, when we include Rumania); each with three forms of Christian religion, all usually jealous and hostile to each other, to say nothing of two non-Christian races, Mussulman and Jew-

ish, and even Gypsies and born desperadoes. Nowhere on earth are race ambition, race hatred, ancestral feuds, and bloodthirsty vendettas more rife. These petty kingdoms, these turbulent races, touch the frontiers of Russia, of Austria, and of Italy, and even stir the kindred races within these greater Powers by wild hopes and ferocious passions. Study a race map of Eastern Europe and see how Rumania, with a Hohenzollern dynasty and a very miscellaneous Vlach race, impinges on Russia and on Austria; how Bulgaria, with a Coburg Tsar, jostles Rumania and Servia; how Bulgaria and Servia lie along and control the Lower Danube; how Greece claims and is embedded in Macedonia; how Servia ranges with the Austrian frontier; how Rumania, Bulgaria, and Servia all rouse intense enthusiasm and rancorous jealousies among kindred or hostile races within the dominions of Russia, Hungary, and Austria. These three nations for generations have been kept in periodical ferments by the restless populations of the same race across their frontiers. How can Russia, Austria, Hungary remain unmoved, when the physical, material, and moral status of their Balkan neighbors is utterly transformed?

Add to this that Russia's very existence may be staked on its defending a Slavonic nationality; that Germany, by treaty, and in self-defence, is pledged to defend its Austrian ally; whilst France, for the same reasons, is bound to defend her Russian ally. And, again, add the fact that England, as the great trading and Mediterranean Power, and France and Italy, as hardly second to England in trade and Mediterranean interests, are all three deeply concerned in the issue of this war.

Thus, to Russia the defence of Slavonian interests, the freedom of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, is what sea-power is to England. To the Germans of Austria, to the Magyars of Hungary, the predominance of the Slav races is their deposition as ascendant peoples. To Germany, to allow the Germans of Austria to be deposed from Empire is an intolerable blow to Pan-Germanic dreams. To Magyars, to have the despised Servians prospering and advancing, whilst they are pinned between Germans, Poles, Russians, and Rumanians, is a sorry prospect for a proud race. To England it is of vital importance that the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, the Hellespont, and the Ægean coasts and islands, should not be in hostile hands. To France and Italy this is nearly as vital. Could the Powers of Europe, great and small, be knotted up together in a more intricate entanglement—a series of vicious circles more insoluble?

It is vain for worthy people, absorbed in the future of International Arbitration and Social Reform, to tell us that the Balkan settlement is nothing to us—only a petty local squabble, that Turkey has only herself to thank, that England has nothing to

lose or to gain in Eastern Europe. Let us get on here, they say, with our land reform and insurance benefits. That is the cry of ignorant faddism, of hidebound blindness.

Whatever may be the arrangements made at the close of this sensational war, they can be but temporary at best, and may only lay down the material for a struggle even more desperate and for changes even greater than those of this resettlement of international relations. What 1912 seems to have effected is a vast aggrandisement of the Slavonic races in their secular struggle against the Teutonic races. Even a local temporary triumph of Austria over Servia cannot cancel the fact that henceforth the way southeast to the Black Sea and the Ægean Sea is barred to the German.

Across the extreme southeast corner of Europe, and on the highway to Asia Minor, Syria, and the Nile, henceforth there will lie Slavonic races of surprising energy and ambition; and the natural and inevitable head of these races, by religion, tradition, and origin, is the enormous Russian Empire of 164,000,000. Until a few weeks ago the Teuton had a predominant prestige, a working entente, and immense interests from the Upper Danube, the Oder, and the Elbe, right away to the Marmora, the Ægean, and the Upper Euphrates. The prestige, the entente are gone. And across the path there now lies a big, warlike adventurous Slavonic Confederacy, looking to the Russian Tsar as its natural protector and head. This vast increment to the Slav world and decrement to the Teutonic world has taken place in a few weeks, without a shot being fired or a diplomatic ultimatum sent by any of the greater Powers. It seems automatic—a decree of Providence.

To Austria, to Germany, this may well seem to be an interest touching their national future. To England, or France, or Italy, it is hardly a vital concern, though it is of real importance to each of them, what is to be the Power that controls the Ægean Sea, its islands and shores, and the two straits which open on it from the North. For more than a century it has been the dream of the Russian to be master of all this; and for more than a century Western Europe has barred him back. He is not there yet. But how much more near to his dream—and your Slav is the most dreamy and most long-memoried soul in Europe—has the year 1912 brought him at last?

But will the Teuton see all this patiently and unmoved? No! How can he? We have seen how the Habsburg Emperor deals with his petty Servian neighbor, whose two or three millions of people, even with a few miles of the coast, can hardly *per se* trouble the Austro-Hungarian Empire. And we have seen how the Hohenzollern Emperor tells the world in plain terms: "Who attacks Austria, attacks me." We cannot say that this

is criminal—however terrible may be the consequences. It is not even unreasonable. Given the circumstances as they are, and apart from any question of responsibility for those circumstances, the warning seems such as the average German patriot, with the ideas now dominant, can hardly refuse to back. And yet withal, if we remember how passionate is the Russian's pride in his Slav race, how the Russian alliance is for the average Frenchman a necessity of national existence, we cannot shut our eyes to the awful prospect of conflict between the Triple Alliance and the Double Alliance to which all this seems to bring us face to face.

This, in the opinion of a close observer of international affairs was the condition of European affairs when the shooting of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand took place at Serajevo on June 29, 1914. In America it was regarded as an unusual event of passing interest and after a few days apparently died down; we do not hear of it again until July 23, when Austria suddenly sent her remarkable note to Serbia. But to European eyes it was immediately obvious that with Russia as protector of Servian interests, as in 1908, the peace of Europe was in grave danger. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* stated on July 26 that it would be a test of the existing system of European politics. Germany and England, knowing what such a war meant to them, were foremost in their efforts to compose the trouble. Two of the demands of Austria were admitted to be so unusual as to infringe on Servia's sovereignty, but Austria insisted that absolute compliance with her terms was a matter of life and death. Germany then informed Europe that if Francis Joseph would not yield, she was bound by her alliance to offer Austria her support. As if 1908 had been a dress rehearsal for the act that was staged in 1914, she stated her position to Russia in a note that might have been a copy of her note in 1908. But this time Russia would not retreat from her first position that interference with Servia would be an attack on her; the war followed.

Besides the alliances almost every natural interest of the Powers in western Europe tended to draw them into the war in their present alignment. The phenomenon of a modern Germany pressing for expansion and threatening British commercial supremacy and colonial possession, the fact that the Kaiser

had twice within the last ten years brought Europe to the verge of war by his aggressions against France in Africa, the spirit of *revanche* in France, the startling increase in armies and armaments, and the violation of Belgian neutrality, each played its part. The hub about which all events and all interests focused was Germany. She has been concerned some way in every international event in the last fifteen years. Her astounding growth had again threatened the balance of power and Europe had begun to view her with dismay and ask itself: "What are we to do with this astonishing and precocious child," or "if we delay, what will it do with us?"

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

The Triple Alliance, consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, is a product of the genius of Bismarck. It was first concluded in 1882, four years after the Congress of Berlin. Germany and Austria-Hungary had already been bound together by a Dual Alliance, a survival of the *Dreikaiserbund*, which included Russia. When, after the Congress of Berlin, Russia declared the *Dreikaiserbund* void, Bismarck asked Italy to take Russia's place, and his offer was accepted.

The treaty which binds the nations of the Triple Alliance together has never been made public, but many of its general terms have become known. It is signed for periods of from five to twelve years, and at the expiration of each period may be renewed or disregarded by any of its signatories. It has been regularly renewed, the last time in 1912.

The alliance is presumed to be purely defensive and does not bind its members together in all matters of policy. In brief, its proposition is that if any one of its members is attacked by two other powers the alliance will act as a unit, for the common defense of the balance of power in Central Europe, which threatens constantly to be broken up by the Russians in the east and the French in the west. Italy holds that in the present war she is not obliged to aid Germany and Austria-Hungary because the war is offensive.

Bismarck, himself, admitted that the adhesion of Italy to the alliance in time of war was questionable. Italy was to have received the support of Germany against the North African ambitions of France, but the Kaiser has left Italy to fight her own battles where the peace of Central Europe was not concerned, and now the case is reversed, the Italians do not feel obligated to enter an expensive war when it is not necessary.

Again, Italy is not exposed to the danger of being crushed between enemies, as she is south of the main current of invading armies, and is protected by the Alps, which could be scaled with difficulty. But she is chiefly opposed to entering the war because of hostility to Austria which still holds the Italian territories on the northern and eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea (*Italia Irredenta*). The clamor of her people to aid the Allies is made in hope that at the close of the war Italy, for good behavior, will receive from the Allies these lost lands.

Because of the Triple Alliance, the organization of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Italian armies has been harmonized to enable them to act as a defensive unit. Staff consultations are held frequently, and a yearly visit of each sovereign or his prime minister is made to the capitals of his two allies.

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

The Triple Entente is not really triple at all, consisting of an understanding between France and Russia to coöperate defensively, and a like understanding between France and England. But there is no known treaty between England and Russia. The terms of the entente are even more obscure than those of the alliance.

After Russia's refusal to renew the *Dreikaiserbund* in 1889, France and Russia were naturally drawn together. The French fleet visited Russian ports on the Black Sea, and the visit was returned by Russia. It became known that there was an agreement for military coöperation when French rifles were sent to the Russian army, and in 1894, it was publicly announced that France and Russia had an understanding. In return for the

alliance, many millions of francs of the French peasants were invested in Russia.

England is situated with reference to the Triple Entente somewhat the same as Italy with respect to the Triple Alliance. She is separated from the body of the continent and the constant fears of invasion by neighbors by a water barrier as is Italy by a land barrier. She was drawn into an understanding with France in 1904 for the mutual protection of their African interests against Germany. As her alliance was unwritten, and is in the nature of a gentlemen's agreement, the extent to which she would uphold France in the present war was at first doubtful, and from the official correspondence, it is evident that Germany's main effort was directed in an attempt to keep her neutral.

The weak point of the Triple Entente is that England's understanding with Russia springs only from their mutual fear of Germany, and with Germany out of the way, Russia becomes the chief menace to England's colonial policy. For the past half century Russia has been moving steadily toward Constantinople with the object of controlling the Straits of Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and hence the whole of the eastern Mediterranean. This would menace the English island of Cyprus, and the Suez Canal, through which communications are held with the British Asiatic possessions. To prevent this, England fought the war of the Crimea in 1856, and again threatened Russia after the Russo-Turkish war of 1878. Concerning the Russian danger, Sir Harry H. Johnston, a prominent English authority on foreign policy wrote in the *Nineteenth Century Magazine* two months before the declaration of war: "All I can add to my forecast of the inevitable struggle for the adjustment of interests and outlets between Teutonia and Slavdom is the fervent hope that Britain and France may remain neutral so long as their acknowledged rights and interests are untouched. Their foreign policy would indeed be fatuous if it landed them in a ruinous war to make Russia the mistress of the Balkans."

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Austria Hungary has been called the "whirlpool of nations." Its ruler Francis Joseph, who ascended the throne in 1848 at the age of 18, is not only the most aged sovereign in Europe, but has reigned the longest. He takes pride that the House of Habsburg, from the oldest line of which he comes, is the most venerable dynasty in Europe. The original Habsburg house came from the disputed province of Lorraine, and its greatness has never entirely waned since the time that Rudolph of Habsburg ascended the throne of Austria in 1306. From that time until the sixteenth century, when it blossomed forth in the fulness of its power, the Habsburgs steadily acquired dominion over most of Southern Europe, including what is now Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Hungary. They also became chief temporal lords of the Holy Roman Empire, the halo of which glory hangs about the court of Vienna until this later day. They were only rivaled in the west by the Bourbon Empire in France, and in the east by the Ottoman Empire.

Besides having the longest reign in Europe, Francis Joseph has had the most eventful. The present war is the sixth great conflict he has directed; two with Italy, one with Prussia, one with Russia, and one with Denmark. The minor interior disturbances of the empire, the suppression of which has required armed force, have been almost without number. The Emperor was stabbed in 1853, five years after ascending the throne; his brother met a violent death; his only son and heir killed himself in 1889; his wife was murdered in Geneva in 1897, and his nephew and second heir, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, at Serajevo in 1914. While other empires, like Germany and Italy, have built up about them and solidified, he has seen one part after another of his former dominion slowly melt away, and if he loses in the present war he will be shorn of half of

that which remains. Yet in spite of all this strife, Francis Joseph is noted as a man of peace. After the defeat at the battle of Solferino, in 1860, when he had lost the province of Lombardy to Italy, he said, "Better to lose a province than be present again at so awful a spectacle."

The history of modern Austria and the later Austro-Hungarian Empire is the history of Francis Joseph since his ascent to the throne of Austria on the abdication of his uncle Ferdinand in 1848. In that year of turmoil throughout Europe, Vienna was the storm center of the final attempt to overthrow the iron rule of the great premier Metternich, and the young Emperor stepped into two conflicts: Sardinia made her first attempt to throw the yoke of Austria from the Italian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and the Czechs, a Slavic race of Bohemia, rose in revolt, demanding a Slavic kingdom of their own.

Though neither uprising was successful, they give an indication of more to come from the violent rumbling crater of jealous races that would not fuse. For as Austria was then so is it now, divided into two opposing camps of German-Magyar against the Slav, each with constantly changing cliques within itself, like minor eddies of the main whirlpool, too numerous to count. The years have done little or nothing save to quiet the petty squabbles and to settle more firmly the two groups as the real issue of the Germans and the Magyars against the Slavs became more apparent. For during the entire period since 1848, the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary, in both cases a minority of the population, have controlled the government, a thing intolerable to the Slavic Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Serbs and Croats, each of whom clamored to be made a separate kingdom of the Empire, its own language and schools to have equal rights with the two official tongues, German and Magyar; or, failing that, the secret ambition has been to set up empires of their own or join with neighboring Balkan States of their racial kin. To prevent constant turmoil, the tactful Emperor has been obliged to make many ludicrous concessions. Professor William Milligan Sloane, writing in the *Independent* notes:

"Austria-Hungary is the most extraordinary congeries of

unrelated parts ever compacted into a nominal state. On every treasury note the denomination and value are printed in about twelve languages so that it may circulate thruout the monarchy, and there are some eighteen groups of population that lay claim to 'nationality.' Within Cis-Leithia, which we know as Austria, lies the kingdom of Bohemia, overwhelmingly Slav, and vociferous for recognition as such. Trieste is almost a pure Italian city, lower Tyrol is Italian, and the townsfolk of Dalmatia are Italians. The districts of Carniola and parts of Carinthia are Slav again. Trans-Leithia, which we know as Hungary, is ruled by Magyars, but within its limits are millions of Slavs; and Croatia, which is pure Slav, possesses a would-be autonomous local government standing by treaty in the same or a similar relation to the supreme Hungarian power as that in which Hungary stands to Austria. Yet the 'Hungarian' seaport of Fiume is a pure Slav city."

By its military power the house of Habsburg succeeded in surviving the disintegrating race struggles in 1848 apparently stronger than ever. The monarchy was then the leader of the Germanic states of south central Europe, though the power of the Hohenzollerns was steadily growing. But Austria's prestige was much lessened when by breaking her pledge during the Crimean War she gained a temporary victory in the Balkans, but lost the moral support of her ally Russia, which turned to Prussia for her future help.

In 1859 Austria lost the province of Venetia when under the leadership of Cavour Sardinia made her successful struggle for Italian freedom. This was soon followed by Lombardy, and control of the Italian provinces with the exception of the small portion which she holds today was irrevocably lost. She had scarcely emerged from this struggle, when, in 1864, Bismarck snared her into war with Denmark, and though by this for a short time she became joint sovereign over Schleswig-Holstein the addition to her domain was but nominal, and she lost it two years later, when Prussia humbled her in the war for German supremacy.

The war with Prussia was the greatest blow Austria had suffered, for by a single stroke she lost the leadership of the

German States, and at the end of it her position had been definitely marked as a nation in southern Europe, and no longer the single great power of the central part of the continent. Since that day she has been engaged in but one foreign war and that largely by diplomacy.

At the close of the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, a most important time in the present light of affairs, Austria with England was much concerned in the growing menace of Russia, and when Russia signed a treaty annexing half of the Porte's territory, Austria's protest amounted to a threat. At this time she had a treaty with Russia (the *Dreikaiserbund*) whom Bismarck had inveigled into trusting her, and finding her own interest opposed to the "scrap of paper," she deliberately frustrated Russia's policy. Again, as in 1856, she had proven false to her oath. Confronted by two Powers, and persuaded by Bismarck, the Czar consented to present his claims to the Congress of Berlin for settlement, and the rage of the Russians knew no bounds when Germany, the other Power of their alliance, turned and abetted Austria by getting for her the fruits of the war which Russia had fought. At this time Austria obtained a protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina, the disputes for which were to cause her much of the present trouble.

By this time it was clear to Austria's statesmen, partly through the convincing logic of Bismarck, that the aims of herself and Russia naturally conflicted in the Balkans; she was united first with Germany in the Dual Alliance and later with Italy in the Triple Alliance in 1882 and except in the single instance of her annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, her foreign policy since the formation of the alliance has been dictated by Germany.

But her internal troubles became yearly more difficult of solution. The Hungarians, finding the defeat of Austria in the war with Prussia a favorable moment, demanded a government of their own, and Francis Joseph, realizing that since the loss of control of the German states his best course lay in more closely uniting what part of his Empire remained, granted their demands. The Austro-Hungarian Empire which we know was formed in 1867 by an agreement called the *Ausgleich*. The two parts of the Empire were to maintain their separate governments

save in foreign affairs and control of the army and navy with such taxes as were necessary to maintain these branches. They were united in the person of the sovereign, who was not only Emperor of Austria-Hungary, but was crowned separately Emperor



FROM THE WORLD'S WORK

THE RACES IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

of Austria and King of Hungary. The Czechs, who saw the Hungarian Magyars obtain the independence of which they had fondly dreamed, at once demanded that Bohemia be elevated to a kingdom. The Emperor prepared to grant their demands, but was prevented by a storm of protest, and claims for equal privileges from all the other Slav nationalities and the opposition of the German Austrians and the Magyar Hungarians at length caused him to abandon his plans. This was the first

voice of fear against the Slav races, and was to lead to much trouble, for as one writer remarks, "the *Ausgleich* was satisfactory only to the dominant Germans and Magyars."

The difficulty has become more acute within the last fifteen years, and the Empire which has its one bond in the general confidence of warring nationalities in the person of Francis Joseph, has in the belief of close observers been drifting toward a crisis.

The successes of the Balkan States in gaining freedom from the vanishing Turkish Empire have inflamed in the kindred races of Austria-Hungary the idea that they can likewise be freed from the galling German yoke. To understand the desperate situation of Austria before the present war began, it must be noticed that whereas in 1900 there were in the Dual Monarchy 23,500,000 non-Slavs opposed to 20,500,000 Slavs, by 1910 there were 26,000,000 non-Slavs to offset 24,000,000 Slavs, a clear gain of 1,000,000 for the Slavs, for which the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is responsible. Of the non-Slav races, in each census approximately 4,000,000 are Rumanians and Italians, who have their own idea of nationality and therefore the Germans and Magyars numbered in 1910 but 22,000,000, or an absolute minority. If the Italians were to join the Slavs in revolt, as is probable, the governed races would hold 28,000,000 population against 22,000,000 of the governing.

Even in the face of this the ruling races were no longer satisfied with the *Ausgleich* and 1903-1907 saw the greatest crisis since 1867. At that time the Magyars demanded that their language be placed on a final basis of equality with German, and that in the Hungarian regiments the officers should give their commands in Magyar. But Francis Joseph, who had always shown the spirit of compromise, thought this struck at the heart of military efficiency, and that the danger that soldiers on the field of battle would become confused when the Austrian and Hungarian forces were combined was too great. He claimed the regulation of the army was guaranteed him by the *Ausgleich* in 1867, and refused to brook interference. The four years' deadlock following threatened to split the Empire in two parts, but the question was finally put in abeyance.

In 1908 Austria Hungary made her great coup. She openly violated the Treaty of Berlin (1878) and annexed the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina which were under her protectorate. Russia protested, Serbia prepared for war, and when Germany menacingly stood behind Austria, Russia withdrew her protest. But Serbia never forgot; for not only were Bosnia and Herzegovina part of her cherished dream of uniting the Serbs in a great empire, but they stood in her way of a commercial outlet to the sea. It is claimed that the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina cost Austria-Hungary \$68,000,000.

Then came the Balkan Wars; and Austria on the edge of the seething cauldron threatened to be drawn in. There were race riots throughout the Empire, demands of the different races for establishment of universities teaching their own language, attempts to assassinate government officials, and claims of Servian plots. The Government attempted to soothe the disturbers by granting a university at Innsbruck and immediately there were revolts at the great universities for like privileges to other races. When the army question came up again in 1912, there was fearful rioting; the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes became restless, and in 1913 dissension between the Germans and Czechs in Bohemia was so great that the legislative assembly could do no business, and conditions grew so bad that the Emperor was obliged to dissolve the assembly, and suspend all government. That the Czar, as head of the Greek Catholic Church, was not displeased at the growing weakness of his Roman Catholic neighbors and that, as recognized head of the Slavs, he probably conveyed his encouragement to them can hardly be doubted.

The state of affairs just before the outbreak of the war might have been summed up thus:

The Germans, forming 10,000,000 of a total population of 27,000,000 in Austria held control of Austria, which through the Emperor with his German tendencies carries the deciding influence in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Austrian-Germans are closely allied to the Germans in the Kaiser's realm, and would have been incorporated long ago, but Austria is Roman Catholic and Germany Protestant, and the Austrian vote

would, therefore, give the Catholics a majority in the German Reichstag.

The Magyars, with a population of 10,000,000 out of 22,000,000 are the ruling race of Hungary. They are allied with the Finns of Finland. While they are one with the Germans in opposition to the Slavs, they wish their kingdom to have equal rights in the Empire with the Austrians.

The Czechs—Slavs of Bohemia—are next to the Germans the most numerous people of Austria. They demand equal recognition with the Magyars.

The Serbs and Croats in Croatia-Slavonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina desire a Slavic empire of their own, possibly in union with Servia. Croatia-Slavonia is already an autonomous state in Hungary, but is not satisfied with that concession.

The Poles in Galicia desire independence and would probably form with Russian Poland and German Posen, a new kingdom of Poland.

The Rumans in Transylvania await the first chance to join Rumania. The Rumans are not Slavic, but claim descent from the ancient Romans.

The Italians in the land bordering the Adriatic racially belong to Italy, and would take from Austria her only good seaport, Trieste.

And underneath all lies the unsolved question of religion. The Germans of Austria and the Magyars are Roman Catholics, and since France separated church and state in 1905, the dual empire is the greatest stronghold of the Pope. A very few of the Slavs are Roman Catholic, but the largest number are Greek Catholics, and are under the spiritual control of the Czar of Russia, the head of the Orthodox Greek Church.

Austria's Note to Servia.

Communicated by Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorf, and published in the "White Papers" of Great Britain, dated August 5.*

(Translation.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23d July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instruction of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

"'Servia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers Servia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last Autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter.'"

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the monarchy and has tolerated

* For the text of these "White Papers" we are indebted to the *New York Times*, which has published them in full.

unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the Magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the monarchy.

To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its Official Journal of the 26th June (13th July) the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—i. e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of

propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. *To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;**

6. *To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;*

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voijsa Tankosositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under head (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

* Sections in italics were considered by diplomats unusual and dangerous to European peace. Sections 5 and 6 were called an infringement of Servian sovereignty.

I have the honor to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighboring monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis, there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in

opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude toward the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandizement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neighboring state had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that in taking this step it will find itself in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the im-

perial and royal representatives accredited to the other signatory powers.

You are authorized to leave a copy of this dispatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

ANNEX

The criminal inquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last, has up to the present led to the following conclusions:

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voijsa Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez, by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander Voijsa Tankosic at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades, coming from the arms depot of the Servian Army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to insure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Topischider.

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organized by Ciganovic.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic of Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals.

The Austro-Servian Conflict.

By Constantin Theodor Dumba, Ambassador of Austria-Hungary.

Published in the Outlook for August 29, 1914.

The tragic events which have obtruded themselves in resounding succession upon the attention of the world since the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum at Belgrade on July 23 are the outcome of a purely defensive measure imposed upon the Dual Monarchy by the imperative laws of self-preservation. The Foreign Office at Vienna sought only to maintain within the borders of the Empire the peace which was menaced, and had been continuously menaced for many years, by the active Servian propaganda conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other parts of the Dual Monarchy, under the full view of the Servian Government.

It is useless and disingenuous to explain the latest phase of Austro-Hungarian policy towards Servia upon the theory of an active hostility to Servian interests and a desire to suppress Servian nationality. In at least two conspicuous instances Austria-Hungary has championed the vital interests of Servia, and with marked success, in the councils of the nations.

One of these occasions was the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Count Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor and Plenipotentiary, employed the influence of the Dual Monarchy to obtain international recognition of Servia as an independent kingdom and to include within the boundaries of that country the cities and districts of Nish and Pirot, which had been assigned by the San Stefano Treaty to the newly created Principality of Bulgaria. This was accomplished in the face of the indifference of the Russian statesmen at the conference. The other occasion was in 1885, when Servia, after having declared war upon Bulgaria against Austria's advice, suffered decisive reverses, and the Prince of Bulgaria, with his victorious army, was on the road to Belgrade. At Pirot Prince Alexander of Bulgaria was met by Count Khevenhueller, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, who interposed Austria-Hungary's veto to the triumphant march of the Bulgarians, and informed the Prince

that if he proceeded another kilometer into Servian territory he would meet the forces of the Dual Monarchy in defense of the territorial integrity of the Servian Kingdom. The invasion, made possible by the abortive attempt of Servia to prevent the consummation of the union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, was checked instantly by the word of Austria-Hungary.

These two pages of Balkan history are sufficient to prove, if proof were needed, that the policy of Vienna towards the Serbs of Servia is not actuated by any fixed consideration of hostility to the Kingdom. The fact that there is a flourishing Croatian university at Agram under the patronage of the Government, that throughout the Dual Monarchy the Serbs and Croats have their national schools, in which the language of instruction is Serb or Serbo-Croatian, that in Dalmatia the Croatian is the prevalent language of the administration and the Diet, should indicate sufficiently whether Austria is trying to strangle Serb nationality.

In spite of the equal treatment which the Serbs enjoy with the other races under the ægis of the Dual Monarchy, the Servians of the Kingdom continued their agitation in the border provinces of Austria-Hungary and in Bosnia, trying to hamper the work of civilization intrusted to the Empire by the Treaty of Berlin. This agitation and the provocative attitude of the press and people of the Servian Kingdom have been redoubled in persistence and violence since the victories which the Servians won in the two Balkan wars. It was this agitation that created the atmosphere of bewildered discontent in Bosnia that resulted in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serb youth whose mind had been muddled by the propaganda of the Serb nationalistic organization, the *Narodna Obrana*, and by the virulent newspaper campaign against Austria conducted in Belgrade.

The crime of Serajevo was the culminating event in the Servian propaganda of violence within the boundaries of the Dual Monarchy. That deplorable incident finally opened the eyes of the Austrian authorities to the full criminal possibilities of what the Servians in Belgrade are pleased to call the movement for the maintenance of Servian nationality. The realiza-

tion came clearly to the Austro-Hungarian Government that energetic measures must be taken to put an end forthwith and forever to a murderous political campaign carried on in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Servian capital. It was this conviction, based upon the elementary instinct of self-preservation, that prompted the ultimatum which the Foreign Office of the Dual Monarchy presented at the Servian capital on July 23.

The reply, although apparently conciliatory, was far from satisfactory in several essential respects. The promise to suppress the agitation was made conditional upon the proof of its existence, when the affirmation of its existence was the basis of the ultimatum. Then, again, the promise to restrain the license of the press in its mendacious attacks upon Austria-Hungary took the form of a vague concession of reform in the law governing the press, but did not contain any pledge to put a stop to the virulently provocative references to the Dual Monarchy.

The Servian Government, on the face of its reply, also undertook the suppression of the *Narodna Obrana*, with its country-wide network of affiliated organizations—only on condition, however, of conclusive proof of its subversive activities. Inasmuch as the affirmation of the existence of these subversive activities formed the sum and substance of the ultimatum, such a reply to this phase of its just demands was regarded by Austria as the flimsiest sort of evasion on the part of the Servian Government.

Another point that indicated insincerity of Serbia's apparent compliance with the terms of Austria's ultimatum was the failure to accept the Austrian suggestion of co-operation between the Austrian and the Servian police in a joint inquiry into the origin and consummation of the crime of Serajevo, to serve as the basis for the judicial proceedings in Servia. As to the judicial phase of the inquiry, Austria never made any suggestion of participating. The co-operation of the Austrian police was essential to a successful and final solution of the problem. The shifty attitude of the Servian police on the entire issue raised by the crime of Serajevo can best be understood when it is remembered that the principal instigator of that offense against the laws of civilization could not be brought to justice because

he had been warned out of Belgrade by a Servian prefect of police.

The duplicity characteristic of Servian diplomacy came under my personal observation when I was Minister to Servia in the last year of the reign of King Alexander and the beginning of the rule of the present Karageorgevitch dynasty. At my request, after a peculiarly offensive outbreak of anti-Austrian agitation carried on in Belgrade, the Government suppressed the society responsible for endangering the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Servia by a campaign of criminal mendacity. Two weeks later, however, the same organization, under another name and with a new secretary, but with the same membership and the same provocative aims, was in full operation in the same assault upon the peace and security of a neighboring friendly state. Such instances of evasion are so frequent in the history of Servian promises to Austria-Hungary that in this case the Austro-Hungarian Government was determined to exact complete and infallible guarantees for the performance of the required pledges. It was all the more necessary to act with final firmness because the Servian conscience, after the butchery of King Alexander and Queen Draga, of which all the authors, well known to every man of any account in Belgrade, were promoted in army rank, was not especially sensitive to the murder of royal personages.

Besides, the Austrian Government had to be determined to obtain a clear and final solution of the problem, because of its knowledge that Servia's recalcitrant attitude was the result of encouragement from the great northern Power whose shadow was darkening over the Austrian frontier. Nevertheless, with the certainty that Russia was the actual instigator of Servia's defiant policy, the Austro-Hungarian Government regarded the issue involved as so vital that it did not hesitate to submit it to the final test of war.

Austria's Civilizing Mission.

By an Austrian Diplomat.

Published in the *World's Work* for September, 1914.

At this portentous moment in history, when the activities of Austria-Hungary in the Near East have suddenly been made a world-issue by the outbreak of the most terrible war in the history of civilization, the aims and methods of the dual monarchy are of paramount significance.

Situated upon the outskirts of Central Europe, in the debatable region between the West and the East, Austria stands in a peculiar sense as the connecting link between civilization and vanishing barbarism, between to-day and yesterday. The double eagle of Austria is the symbol that connects racial fragments in a civic bond which spells progress and peace. The aims of Austria, whether in the Balkans or further east, are mainly commercial and cultural. They are political only in so far as the geographical situation of the dual Empire makes it incumbent upon her statesmen to maintain her territorial integrity and to provide for the normal expansion of her industrial output.

The attempt to centralize and Germanize the Austrian Empire as a whole has been twice made—once under the Emperor Joseph II, toward the end of the eighteenth century, and again under Francis Joseph after the suppression of the revolution of 1848. In each case the attempt failed, and it was abandoned as impracticable by the present Emperor-King. Hungary had always retained its old liberties under the hegemony of the Magyars. By the compromise of 1867 the dual form of the monarchy was definitely fixed. So carefully were the rights of the various races in the Empire safeguarded under this adjustment that in Hungary, for instance, the Croats were recognized as a separate entity, under their own Ban, or governor, their separate diet, and their distinct machinery of local and provincial administration.

In Austria proper the constitution of 1867 created a central parliament in Vienna and left a large measure of autonomy to

the old provinces. One of the most important articles of the constitution guarantees to every nationality the free use of its language "in word and writing." By this means it made forever impossible any attempt to interfere with the legitimate aspirations of the various races in the Empire. In fact, the entire spirit of the new constitution was to assure to each race the greatest and freest use of its language in its educational system, from the primary school to the university, in the diets, in the provincial legislatures and in the administration, excluding only the ministries at Vienna, and in the courts with the sole exception of the Supreme Court in the imperial capital.

Even to this last reservation in favor of a central authority an exception is made. In Polish litigation the entire process of litigation and judicature, including the highest court, may be carried on in the Polish language.

Only in the army common to the Empire is there a common language, and that language is the German. This arrangement is not based upon any propaganda, but is the outcome of the entirely practical consideration that an army made up of so many races as is the Austro-Hungarian would be badly handicapped in the performance of its duties if it did not have a common language of command and communication. The selection of the German language for this purpose was the logical outcome of the German origin of the Empire.

The tangible result of this practically unlimited freedom of race-development is presented by the present complexion of the Reichstag in Vienna. So long as the franchise was based upon property qualifications the votes of the landed proprietors kept a disunited German majority in the Reichstag, but the granting of universal suffrage upon the personal initiative of the Emperor a few years ago resulted in the return of a Slavic majority in the imperial legislative chamber—a remarkable result if one is to believe the persistent charges that Austria has sought to destroy or Germanize the Slavic nationalities within its boundaries.

This presence of a Slavic majority in the chamber has brought about a state of affairs wherein no Austrian administration can neglect the wishes of the Slavic groups without being

forced to resort to the short-lived and unpopular expedient of imperial decrees.

Thanks to its liberal treatment of the claims of contending nationalities, the German element in many parts of Austria is already on the defensive, and the ascendancy of the Slav element is more and more felt in the political and intellectual life of the Empire. The Slav has taken the offensive all along the line, and the Germans have lost many important positions in the civil and financial administration and in the courts. Bohemia is the centre of the Slavic movement. In Prague, the capital of Bohemia, the new Czech university is a dangerous rival to the old German university, the renowned Carolina, founded in 1348 by the Emperor Charles of Luxemburg. This Czech university has become the focus of Slav science, literature, and thought—and, unfortunately, also of pan-Slavic agitation, as hundreds of Servian and Croatian students have flocked to its gates to be imbued with the dreams of the future universal Slavic domination.

In the midst of these contending racial forces, the mission of Austria has been, first, to introduce among the great Slavic populations within her borders the ideals of German culture and German civilization. Her greatest achievements in this direction have been in Bohemia. It is recognized by the Slavic world universally that the Slavic movement in Prague is the outcome of German culture inculcated by Austria. It is one of the tragic circumstances of history that the German culture imparted to the Czechs is now operating in favor of the pan-Slavic cause, intellectual and political.

In the east, the mission of Austria has been suggestively indicated by the flow of the Danube. Eastward and southward, with the current of the mighty river, have gone Austrian cultural and industrial activities, hand in hand. And one of the earliest stations of the commercial and moral expansion—the stations of Austria's *Drang nach Osten*—are Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The destinies of Bosnia and Herzegovina came under the purview of Austria in 1876-77, when the revolutionary movement in the provinces, in conjunction with the Servian war against Turkey, was suppressed with unexampled severities by the Ottoman government. At that time the natural refuge for

the stricken Christians of Bosnia-Herzegovina was Austria. Two hundred thousand of them were cast upon the resources of the authorities and had to be taken care of. As there was no promise of the immediate amelioration of the stricken provinces the question of the day at Vienna became the final solution of the problem of introducing order and personal security in the territory infested by brigands and terrorized by official severities, just across the Turkish border.

The relation of Austria to Bosnia and Herzegovina duplicated in a marked degree that of the United States and Texas during the Texan uprising against Mexico, and the solution of the problem in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as in that of Texas, appeared to be an Austrian occupation. This destiny of the distracted provinces was recognized by the Congress of Berlin, which adjusted the affairs of southeastern Europe after the defeat of Turkey by Russia in 1877. The Congress, after a thorough balancing of international interests and international jealousies, handed over the two provinces to Austria for pacification and administration, and conceded to Austria the right to occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar, the narrow strip of territory which lay between Serbia and Montenegro. This occupation was in the nature of a condominium with Turkey.

Installed in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the mandate of Europe, Austria entered upon its task of cleaning the Augean stable of Bosnian affairs with an energetic realization of the difficulties of its undertaking. The first obstacle that confronted the newly installed authorities was an uprising of the Begs, or Mohammedan nobility. Aroused by the land-owning Moslems, secretly instigated by the Sultan, they undertook to oppose by force of arms the peaceful entrance of Austria into its new functions. The outcome of the contumacy of the Begs was a six months' war, which ended in the suppression of the Moslem resistance and the restoration of internal peace. Next, Austria undertook the task of cleaning out the brigands who infested the country and made travel and commerce practically impossible.

Side by side with measures for the pacification of the provinces and the restoration of internal order, the new Austrian administration accomplished wonders in the construction of a

system of roads, the first that Bosnia and Herzegovina had had since the Ottoman conquest.

The land question in the newly occupied provinces was extremely delicate. When Austria marched into Bosnia she found there a survival of the feudal ages in the distribution of the land. The entire area of the provinces, with rare exceptions, was owned by the Begs, and the tenants who cultivated them for the scant reward of one-half the produce were in a condition of peonage. Two alternative solutions of the question presented themselves. One was the forcible expropriation of the lands of the nobles, and the other was the gradual distribution of the holdings through a period of years.

It is one of the foremost grievances of the Servian agitators on the Austrian border provinces that the administration of the dual monarchy did not at once proceed to the seizure of the land and its distribution among the peasantry by arbitrary means, after the method employed by the Servians after the fall of the Ottoman power in Servia. Such, however, was not the Austrian method of dealing with the rights of property, and it had been understood by the signatories to the treaty of Berlin that no agrarian revolutionary measures would be undertaken by Austria.

Baron Kallay, the first Austrian civil administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, adopted the much more equitable and on the whole far more successful plan of encouraging thrift among the peasants, and at the same time enabling them to achieve independence by the gradual acquisition of the lands they cultivated. This conservative reorganization of the agrarian system of the country was accomplished through the aid of the Land Bank of Bosnia, an institution of private finance under the rigid supervision of the Government. Baron Kallay's project, which produced highly satisfactory results, was carried on by his successors, Burian and Bilinski.

The educational problem of the provinces was no less difficult than that presented by the distribution of the land. When Austria entered Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, she found no schools there, with the exception of a few mosque classes and madrasahs for the chanting of Arabic prayers and verses from Al Koran. Far from attempting to make German the language of the people,

or even the language of the more highly educated among them, the Austrian authorities at once undertook the establishment of native schools, in which the instruction should be carried on in Serb or in Croatian, the former written in the Cyrillic or Bulgarian alphabet, and the latter in Latin characters. Not only was no attempt made to introduce German schools, but the Government declined to permit the expenditure of public money for instruction in any language except the two named idioms of the Slavic language.

This liberal policy stands out in sharp contrast to the destructive activities of the Servians in the newly occupied Macedonian lands, where they have closed all the Bulgarian schools amid circumstances of severity, to which some reference is made in the Report of the Carnegie Commission. Certainly there is nothing in the establishment of Serb schools by Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina to justify the contention of the Servians that Austria is seeking to crush out Serb nationality under the rule of the double eagle.

Nevertheless, the Serbian propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following closely the Serbian propaganda in its first stage in Macedonia, was conducted along cultural lines, quite regardless of the palpable fact that the people of Serbia themselves stood in need of all the cultural efforts of which their Government and their financial resources were capable. This fact is easily demonstrable when it is remembered that in 1909 the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after thirty years of Austrian administration, stood higher educationally than any of the independent Slavic nations of the Balkan Peninsula. Despite the manifestly hostile purposes of the so-called cultural Serbian propaganda in the border provinces, the Austrian authorities took no measures to combat it until it had entered the phase of bomb-throwing, in which the Servians had become adepts in the course of their abortive struggle for the conversion of Macedonia to Serbism. And that final and intolerable phase of the Serb nationalist propaganda was close at hand. The crisis began in 1909, when the Austrian Government declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This annexation was based upon three essential consider-

ations, each one of which would have been considered sufficient in itself by any nation. The first of these considerations was the mandate of Europe; the second was the right of conquest, established at the beginning of the occupation by the suppression of the armed resistance of the recalcitrant Begs; the third was the expenditure of about \$250,000,000 by the dual monarchy for the construction of railroads and other means of communication, public works of various sorts, and education and local improvements; and the fourth was the duty of continuing a régime which had brought peace and prosperity to the country itself. All the signatories to the treaty of Berlin readily acquiesced in the accomplished fact as a logical outcome of accomplished events.

Servia, however, conceived that it had been robbed by the act of the Austrian Government, and the press of that country launched a campaign of bitter and indecent vilification of the dual monarchy. The contention of the Serbs that they were entitled to the annexed provinces was based upon two considerations, each easily demonstrable as absurd. The first was that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been a part of the great Servian Empire under Stefan Dushan about five hundred years ago. This argument may best be compared with a Mexican claim to Texas because that state had formerly been a part of Mexico. And the Servian pretension to Bosnia-Herzegovina is very much weaker than the hypothetical Mexican claim to possession of Texas, because the inclusion of the contested provinces in the gigantic empire of Dushan (The Strangler), which was only one tenth as large as the State of Texas, lasted, as did the empire, only about twenty years.

The second basis of the Servian claim to Bosnia-Herzegovina is the allegation that the provinces are inhabited by the people of Serb race, of Servian language and of Serb faith. Not one of these contentions even approaches the facts. Of the less than two millions of people who populate the provinces, only 800,000 at the most are orthodox Serbs. The remainder are Roman Catholic Croatians, whose written language the Orthodox Serb cannot even read unless he has a knowledge of the Latin characters, or Mohammedans, who detest the Servians heartily and despise them profoundly.

The frothing protests which the Servian press continued to make against the act of annexation, it was realized clearly at Vienna, were instigated partly from St. Petersburg, where the statesmen saw, or pretended to see, a fresh sign of Austrian encroachment upon the Southern Slavs, those dear Southern Slavs whose destinies have been for centuries the pawns on the chessboard of Russian diplomacy. But the Russian statesmen did not observe, or, observing, did not care to admit, that Austria, while annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, had definitely abandoned her alleged road to Salonika by the withdrawal of her troops from the Sanjak of Novibazar, which was the key to the military situation in any advance further south and east. A glance at the map will convince even the most hostile critic of Austrian policy in the Balkans that the abandonment of Novibazar by Austria is incompatible with any suspicion of an Austrian design of territorial expansion in the direction of Salonika or of Constantinople.

Thus events wore on toward the culminating tragedy of Sarajevo. In 1913 the Serbs had attained a wild dream through the annexation of a large part of Bulgarian Macedonia by the defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War. The Servian campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina, following out its previous metamorphosis in the Macedonian agitation that preceded the alliance with Bulgaria for the first Balkan War, emerged from the "cultural" stage and entered the bomb-throwing phase. The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort at Sarajevo by a young Serb patriot this summer startled the world and aroused Austria to the imperative need of energetic action to put a check upon a political and racial movement which had degenerated into a conspiracy to commit murder.

The tremendous events which have cast the world in gloom since July 23d are the outcome of Serbia's resistance to Austria's demand for a cessation of this orgy of violence. The Servians have opposed Austria's civilizing mission with unpardonable venom, and Austria has not flinched before the task of undertaking to crush that opposition.

BELGIUM

Belgium, though small in extent, being little larger than the state of Massachusetts, is in many ways the most remarkable country in Europe. If Germany can complain of the crowded condition, which forces her to seek colonial expansion, she has but to look at her small neighbor (with an average density of 622 persons per square mile), whose population supports itself without having recourse like the French to artificial limitation of birth. The secret of this, her statesmen assert, is that Belgium is a country of peace and not eaten up by her war establishment. But perhaps equally responsible is the industry and frugality of the Belgian people who still retain many of the Spartan virtues which Caesar admired when he wrote "Of all the Gauls, the Belgians are the bravest."

Belgium, like Austria-Hungary, is a country where race tides meet, its population being composed in almost equal numbers of the Flemings of Teutonic stock, and the Walloons of Celtic stock. As in Austria-Hungary neither race has been willing to sacrifice its mother tongue, and both Flemish and French are official, but Belgium differs from Austria in having a common religion. What little hold the Reformation showed among the Walloons having died out, Belgium is now almost entirely Roman Catholic and the two elements of her people which lean respectively toward the Germans and French have fused into a single race unlike either of the parent stocks.

That the modern prosperity of Belgium is due to her freedom from great wars, is proven by her earlier history, for prior to the guarantee of neutrality in 1831 her lands were swept by one great struggle after another. She was the great battle-ground of Europe. During the middle ages the battles of the Netherlands against Spain and Austria were fought on her fields, her towns plundered and the shipping of the great port of Antwerp ruined for centuries. Belgium became involved in the French Revolution, and Napoleon conquered and despoiled it. Finally

after the fall of the French Empire, when the great powers re-made the map of Europe in 1815, Belgium became a part of the new kingdom of the Netherlands.

But Holland was disposed to dominate the new state and the attempt of the northern half of the population to impose Calvinism and the Dutch language on the southern Catholics was not taken in good part. As in Austria-Hungary today, two million Protestants governed three and a half million Catholics, and the latter seized a favorable moment to overturn the Dutch government in Brussels. The five Great Powers were called to intervene by Holland, and the independence of Belgium was formally declared by treaty in 1831. The English parliamentary system of government was adopted, and Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was elected king.

Eight years later, in 1839, the present treaty neutralizing Belgium was drawn up. In accordance with the ideas of the Great Powers, it was necessary for the peace of Europe to secure the smaller states against being absorbed. Holland and Belgium are particularly valuable to England as so-called "buffer states," for while she need not fear invasion from small rivals the possession of their coast line by a Great Power would be a distinct menace to her and the delicate balance of European affairs. The same applies to France and Germany. Hence it was agreed that violation of treaty by any Great Power would constitute a *casus belli* for any other Great Power which was a party to the treaty of 1839.

When the war of 1870 broke out between Germany and France, Belgium realized the temptation for the German army to take the line of least resistance to France, and raised an army to protect her frontier. Great Britain at the same time asked for a declaration from Germany respecting Belgian neutrality, and was assured by Bismarck that he would live scrupulously by her pledge. England has therefore in the present instance acted consistently with the principle laid down forty years ago.

Belgium has been occupied since that time more in the development of her interior than in the affairs of Europe. She has, however, acquired the single colonial possession of Congo. Her government there came into prominence in 1905 when the

intolerable conditions of the exploitation by the Congo Company were shown, and many of the abuses traced to the then King Leopold II. Popular opinion in the great nations forced some reforms, and since the present King Albert ascended the throne in 1909, the condition of the natives has been further improved.

It has been generally supposed that Germany desires very much the possession of this rich African province, as a glance at the map will show that it forms with German East Africa and the portion of French Congo which was ceded to the Kaiser in 1911 a solid strip across the heart of Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. Possessing this, Germany could indefinitely block England's aim for a continuous railroad from Capetown in the south to Cairo in the north. Some agreement for its cession by Belgium was supposed to have been reached secretly between the Kaiser and Leopold II.

As Belgium formed but a pawn on the chess board of European politics, it was not until recent statistics called attention to her internal progress that the real measure of her prosperity was appreciated. The commercial capital of Belgium is and has been Antwerp since the fifteenth century when she first outstripped Venice. Owing to hostile measures her trade dropped away for several centuries but in 1913 her tonnage among the world's ports was second only to New York, and in value of commodities imported and exported she was exceeded by New York, Liverpool, London and Hamburg. For Antwerp is the single outlet in Belgium for the iron and machinery manufactures of Liege, the finished products of Ghent and Brussels, and the great grain fields of southern Belgium, which are said to be the best known examples of intensive agriculture. And it is a remarkable fact that the carrying trade from this port gives Belgium a larger tonnage per capita population than any of the other great commercial powers of Europe.

But though the Belgians have prospered under a regime of peace they have been under no illusion about their real relation with the Great Powers. Recognizing the growing European tension in recent years, Belgium has re-organized her army, and made the service partly compulsory on a permanent basis of 42,000 troops serving the colors at all times; she has also, under

the direction of the famous General Brialmont, reconstructed and modernized the fortresses of Liege, Namur and Antwerp until they were thought to be impervious to modern artillery.

And if this were not a warning to any nation that wished to set foot on Belgian soil, a study of her history and the parliamentary debates should have made plain that she would resist an invading force to the utmost. As early as 1870, it was stated by one of her statesmen that in case of invasion the guarantee of neutrality by the Powers was based on the assumption that Belgium would make an effort to defend herself. At the time of the Moroccan crisis between England, France and Germany in 1911, an assemblyman urging an increase in the army said in a speech which has proved prophetic, "We do not doubt the sincerity and loyalty of the great nations who are guarantors of our neutrality. We have seen by numerous declarations that in case of war Belgium would be called on again to offer Europe a battlefield."

The Violation of the Neutrality of Belgium.

The Belgian View.

(An Extract from the Published Protest of the Belgian Delegates to the United States, Registered Against the German Violation of Their Territorial Integrity September, 1914.)

When the Belgians proclaimed their independence the Five Powers, England, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, met in conference in London. There they signed, on June 26th, 1831, the document known as "The Treaty of 18 Articles."

The text of articles 9 and 10 of said treaty is as follows:

"*Art. 9:* Belgium, within the limits traced in conformity with the principles laid down in the present preliminaries, shall form a perpetually neutral state. The Five Powers, without wishing to intervene in the internal affairs of Belgium, guarantee her that perpetual neutrality as well as the integrity and inviolability of her territory in the limits mentioned in the present article."

"*Art. 10:* By just reciprocity Belgium shall be held to observe this same neutrality toward all the other states and to make no

attack on their internal or external tranquillity whilst always preserving the right to defend herself against any foreign aggression."

This agreement was followed up on January 23d, 1839, by a definitive treaty, accepted by Belgium and by the Netherlands, which treaty regulates Belgium's neutrality as follows:

"*Art. 7:* Belgium, within the limits defined in articles 1, 2 and 4, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. She is obligated to preserve this neutrality against all the other states."

All the articles of this treaty were placed under the guarantee of the Powers.

Thus, in 1870, at the time when the Franco-Prussian War broke out, the two belligerent Powers, when invited by Great Britain to manifest their intentions with regard to Belgium's neutrality, both of them replied that they intended to respect it fully.

On Sunday, August 2d, 1914, at 7 o'clock in the evening, without the least warning of such an incredible decision, the German Minister in Brussels handed to the Belgian Government the following ultimatum, requesting a reply within twelve hours:

"Brussels, August 2d, 1914.

"The German Government has received positive information according to which French forces intend to march upon the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to France's intention to march upon Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial German Government cannot help fearing that Belgium, in spite of her willingness to prevent this, may not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, a French movement of such proportions. This fact is sufficient evidence of a French attack directed against Germany.

"It is Germany's imperative duty of self-preservation to forestall this attack of the enemy.

"The German Government should greatly regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility directed against herself the fact that the steps taken by Germany's enemies oblige her, on her side, to violate Belgian territory.

"In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the German Government declares the following:

"1st: Germany does not contemplate any hostile act against Belgium. If Belgium—in the war which is imminent—will consent to adopt an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government on the other hand, promises that, when peace is concluded, it will protect the Kingdom and all its possessions to their fullest extent.

"2nd: Germany promises, on the condition set forth above, to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.

"3rd: If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany declares herself ready, in concurrence with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to buy for ready cash everything necessary to its troops, and to indemnify Belgium for the damage caused in her territory.

"4th: Should Belgium behave in a hostile manner toward German troops, especially by placing difficulties in their line of march, or by resisting with the forts of the Meuse, or by destroying highways, railroads and tunnels, or other works, Germany shall be obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy.

"In that case, Germany will make no promises to the Kingdom, but will leave to the decision of arms the regulation of the ultimate relations of the two States toward each other. The German Government is justified in hoping that this eventuality will not arise, and that the Belgian Government will take appropriate steps to prevent its arising. In that case the friendly relations of the two States will become closer and more lasting."

On receipt of this ultimatum, the Council of Ministers, sitting under the Presidency of the King, and completed by the Ministers of State, decided unanimously to reply to this extraordinary and outrageous ultimatum by the following note which was handed to the German Minister in Brussels on Monday, August 3d, at 7 o'clock A. M.

"August 3d, 1914.

"Under date of August 2d, 1914, the German Government has announced that, according to positive information, the French intended to march upon the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of its willingness to prevent this, would

not be in a position to repulse without assistance a forward march of French troops, that the German Government considered itself obliged to forestall this attack and to violate Belgian territory. Under these conditions Germany proposes to the King's Government to adopt toward her a friendly attitude and promises, at the time when peace is concluded, to protect the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their fullest extent. The notification adds that if Belgium offers difficulties to the forward march of German troops, Germany shall be obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy and to leave to the decision of arms the regulation of the ultimate relations of the two States.

"This notification has profoundly and painfully astonished the King's Government.

"The intentions which she attributes to France are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us under date of August 1st in the name of the Government of the Republic.

"Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, the country's neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium would fulfill its international duties and her army would oppose a most vigorous resistance to the invader.

"The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, perpetuate Belgium's independence and neutrality under the guarantee of the Powers, and especially under the guarantee of the Government of his Majesty the King of Prussia.

"Belgium has always faithfully observed her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no opportunity to maintain her neutrality and to cause it to be respected by others.

"The attack upon her independence with which Germany menaces her is a flagrant violation of the law of Nations.

"No strategic interest can justify the violation of that right.

"The Belgian Government, by accepting the proposition mentioned, would sacrifice its national honor and betray at the same time its duty toward Europe.

"Conscious of the rôle which Belgium has played for more than 80 years in the civilized world, it refuses to believe that its independence can only be preserved at the price of a violation of its neutrality.

"If the Belgian Government be disappointed in its expectations, it is resolved to repulse by every means in its power any attack upon its rights."

The German View.

Arthur von Briesen.

From the New York Times, October 18, 1914.

Was Germany justified in disregarding any previous treaty which related to Belgium if her interests required her so to do?

United States Supreme Court: In its unanimous opinion in the Chinese exclusion cases, reported on pages 581 to 611 of vol. 130 of U. S. Reports, the Supreme Court of the United States had this very question before it. A treaty had been entered into by the United States and China, allowing Chinese subjects the right to visit and reside in the United States and to there enjoy the same privileges that are enjoyed by citizens of the United States. After that treaty an act of Congress was passed in violation of the treaty, providing it to be unlawful thereafter for Chinese laborers to enter the United States. The question was whether we had the right to violate a treaty solemnly entered into with another country. On this subject the court said (page 600):

"The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations was elaborately considered in the head money cases, and it was there adjudged 'that so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.' 112 U. S. 580, 599. This doctrine was affirmed, 124, followed in *Whitney v. Robertson*, 124 U. S. 190, 195. It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country; but that circumstance may arise which would not only justify the Government in disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country."

In the same opinion the Supreme Court calls attention to an act passed in 1798 declaring that the United States was freed and exonerated from the stipulations of previous treaties with France. This subject was fully considered by Justice Curtis, who held, as the Supreme Court says (page 602):

"That whilst it would always be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no nation could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence."

We observe, therefore, that under our own ideas of international law the United States claims the right to disregard its stipulations if the interests of the country should require it. And the same right we should concede to other nations. Particularly to Germany in the present instance, when we find her battling for her very existence against enemies that seek to destroy her, against enemies that surround her on all sides, against enemies who do not hesitate to bring troops into the conflict from the wilds of Africa and Asia, and who do not hesitate to drag Japan into this war, causing her to disregard Chinese neutrality in her effort to capture a small settlement lawfully occupied in China by a handful of German soldiers.

In this connection I quote the British sentiment, as expressed by Gladstone, regarding Belgian neutrality in the year 1870:

"But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House, what plainly amounts to the assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding to every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the question arises."

This shows that England herself reserved the right, whenever her interests required her to do so, to act in violation of the treaty with Belgium. That, at least, is my understanding of Gladstone's language. England did not respect Danish neutrality 100 years ago when she destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen because her interests required it, and England does not now, through its Asiatic ally and directly respect Chinese neutrality, claiming the right primarily to consult her own interests. Should this right, asserted by our own Supreme Court, and actually

assumed by England and Japan, be denied to Germany? Finally, I understand that The Hague Conference of 1907 drafted a convention which reads:

"The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power."

Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy refused to sign it and did not sign it. Russia was not represented.

The English View

From a Speech in the House of Commons by the Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, August 3, 1914.

Published in the London Times of August 4, 1914.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what our position in regard to Belgium is. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose and various things were said. Amongst other things Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the Treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights. What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville, on August 8, used these words. He said:

"We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we did not think this country was bound, either morally or internationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium. Though this

course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country, with any due regard to the country's honor and to the country's interests."

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligation under that Treaty. But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to the assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid, and if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever."

The Treaty is an old Treaty—1839. That was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium which benefits under the Treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are at least as strong to-day as they were in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

Well now, Sir, I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilization was beginning I knew

that this question must be a most important element in our policy, and a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments, respectively, were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. I got from the French Government this reply:

"The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."

From the German Government the reply was:

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor"

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing to a certain extent part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed, at the same time, to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks me for the communication and replies that Belgium will, to the utmost of her power, maintain neutrality, and expects and desires other Powers to observe and uphold it. He begged me to add that the relations between Belgium and the neighbouring Powers were excellent and there was no reason to suspect their intentions, but that the

Belgian Government believed, in the case of violation, they were in a position to defend the neutrality of their country."

It now appears from the news I have received to-day, which has come quite recently—and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—the news is that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment I do not wish to say all that one would say if one was in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. Sir, we were sounded once, in the course of last week, as to whether, if a guarantee was given that after the war Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram has been received from the King of the Belgians by our King George:

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence, and integrity is the least part of the independence of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if, by agreement, she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing; their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity, but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of

one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action is taken to resent it, at the end of the war whatever the integrity may be the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in Hansard, volume 203, page 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. He said:

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes the independence of Holland will follow.

Now, Sir, I ask the House, from the point of view of British interests, to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a Great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right

and to adjust them to our own point of view. If in a crisis like this we ran away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty, I doubt whether whatever material force we might have at the end it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost; and, do not believe, whether a Great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of this war to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet which we believe able to protect our commerce and to protect our shores, and to protect our interests if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no other trade at the end. Continental nations engaged in war, all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. At the end of this war, whether we have stood aside or whether we have been engaged in it, I do not believe for a moment—even if we had stood aside and remained aside—that we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the west of Europe opposite to us, if that had been the result of the war, falling under the domination of a single Power.

King Albert's Speech.

Delivered Before the Belgian Parliament on the morning of
August 4, 1914

(Translation.)

"Gentlemen:

"Never since 1830 has a more serious hour struck for Belgium: the integrity of our territory is threatened!

"The very strength of our right, the sympathy which Belgium, proud of her free institutions and of her moral conquests, has

uninterruptedly enjoyed at the hands of other nations, the necessity of her autonomous existence for the equilibrium of Europe, still make us hope that the threatening events will not take place.

"However, if our expectations be deceived, if we are obliged to resist the invaders of our soil and to defend our menaced homes, this duty, however hard, will find us armed and prepared for the greatest sacrifices.

"Already our gallant youth in preparation of every eventuality, is ready firmly resolved, with the traditional tenacity and coolness of the Belgians, to defend the endangered country.

"In the name of the nation, I fraternally salute the army. Everywhere, Flemings and Walloons, in the cities and in the country, one sole sentiment binds our hearts: Patriotism; one sole vision fills our spirits: our endangered independence; one sole duty imposes itself upon us: a stubborn resistance.

"Under these circumstances two virtues are indispensable: a cool courage, but a strong courage, and a close union of all the Belgian people.

"Both of these virtues have already been demonstrated brilliantly under the eyes of the Nation, filled with enthusiasm.

"The perfect mobilization of our army, the number of voluntary enlistments, the devotion of the civil population, the self-denial of families, have shown, beyond dispute, the consoling bravery which animates the whole Belgian people.

"The time for action has come.

"I have assembled you, Gentlemen, in order to allow the Legislative Chambers to unite with the people in the same spirit of sacrifice.

"You will therefore immediately take measures necessary for war as well as for preservation of public order, under the present circumstances.

"When I look upon this enthusiastic assembly, an assembly in which there is but one party, the side of the Fatherland, where every heart beats in unison, my mind goes back to the Congress of 1830, and I ask you, Gentlemen, are you firmly resolved to maintain the sacred patrimony of your forefathers?

"None in this country but will do his duty.

"The army, strong and disciplined as it is, is equal to its task. My Government and myself have the utmost confidence in its leaders and its soldiers.

"Closely allied with the population, and supported by it, the Government is conscious of its responsibilities and will assume them to the very end with the deliberate conviction that the efforts of each and every one, if united in a spirit of most fervent patriotism, will safeguard the supreme welfare of the country.

"If the foreigner, trampling upon our neutrality, the duties of which we have always scrupulously observed, violates the territory, he will find every Belgian around his Sovereign, who will never betray his Constitutional Oath, and around the Government invested with the supreme confidence of the entire nation.

"I have faith in our destiny: a country which defends itself cannot but gain the respect of everyone: that country cannot perish.

"God will be with us in this just cause.

"Long live independent Belgium!"

FRANCE

France is a nation of idealists, and her government today is the result of the writings of her philosopher, Rousseau. The twenty five years which mark the political upheaval of the French Revolution, and the rise and fall of the First Empire are the most brilliant and eventful in France's history, if not in all modern history, and the French, who never forget, have thrown a halo of romance over that great era of France. France longs for another empire, in theory, though she is the mother of Republics, and the conflicting governmental ideals of her different factions of political philosophers keep her in constant turmoil.

The heart of France is Paris, and the support of France is her peasantry. Not only is Paris recognized as the centre of the intellectual world, from which nations have in past centuries derived their schools of thought, but it is the focus of all activities in France. Other states may move their capitals, as Belgium with Brussels taken has Liege, Louvain and Antwerp, but throughout history, to take Paris has been to subdue France. The thrifty peasants, whose savings have taken up the heavy debts of their own country, and developed the new lands over the entire world, look to Paris for their leadership. The same administrators might rule the country from Marseilles or Bordeaux, but it would not be the same to the French, for the idea of Paris would have been lost.

It is strange to find France, the nation of idealists, by a combination of fate and sentiment allied in the present conflict with Russia, the country which has been synonymous with arbitrary autocracy. But it is fairly clear that France was forced into it for her own defense. When Bismarck in 1870 imposed an indemnity of \$1,000,000,000 on France, quartering his troops in Paris and moving them toward the German frontier ten miles each time an instalment was paid, he did not conciliate French

enmity, and when in addition he annexed the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, the people who could not forget Napoleon did not forgive the injustice to their "lost provinces." It was in their minds a shattering of the traditional French empire. Whether Alsace and Lorraine are justly German territory or French, is of less concern for the present than that then the policy of *revanche* (revenge) had its birth. Its memory has since been handed down from father to son, and immortalized in French history and art.

The recovery of France after the war and the rapid payment of the indemnity, astonished Bismarck, who had reckoned little on the powers of self denial of the French peasantry. Germany, the victor, with the billion dollars gold in her treasury was still in the throes of financial distress, and with a reinvigorated France opposing Prussian arms, the question of French or German supremacy seemed as far as ever from solution. Bismarck therefore began his policy of mercilessly isolating France to counteract the *revanche*. In 1875, when the French began to re-create their army, it became known over Europe that Von Moltke, the commander-in-chief of the Prussian forces during the Franco-Prussian war, had advised that a second war be declared immediately before France could regain her strength. But Bismarck's way was more subtle.

He had succeeded in keeping Austria from fighting against Prussia in 1870, had become allied to her, and in 1882 he added Italy, forming the Triple Alliance; by 1887, he also had the good graces of England and Russia, and it seemed as if force were about to overwhelm France. At the proper moment according to German plans, she was to be obliterated from the map.

For three years her statesmen vainly sought aid against Germany, and when in 1889 Russia refused to renew the *Dreikaiserbund*, the two unallied countries drew naturally together on the defensive against the growing power of the Triple Alliance. To make the bond closer, France loyally poured out her money to develop the vast plains of Russia.

France was at this time the enemy not only of Germany, but also of England, whose statesmen were contemptuously referred to as the "perfidious Albion." For France had not given up her

idea of empire, and the ten years from 1890 to 1900 marked the period of conflict between the two great rivals of Western Europe. Egypt had formerly been considered the French domain, but it had been tacitly agreed at the Congress of Berlin that England and France should exercise a joint sphere of influence. When England occupied Egypt in 1882, she invited France to share responsibility, but her statesmen unwisely refused, and Egypt was lost. The French ambition now centered on Tunis which was made a protectorate about this time to the chagrin of Italy, and by extending her African territory which bordered the Mediterranean back indefinitely into the Sahara, France with her former possession of Algeria now held a large extent of Northern Africa.

But her aims had already included the entire northern half of the continent. In an attempt to take the valley of the upper Nile in 1896 (made famous by Kitchener's march to Khartum), France was almost involved in a war with England, but being in no condition for a struggle on account of internal troubles, she was compelled to yield.

France's other colonial ambition had been to create a great empire in Indo China; but here again she met British opposition, and the Russian alliance from which she hoped for so much failed her. She obtained some concessions here in 1894, but had to abandon all intention of including the southern part of China and limit her boundary to the southern side of the Meekong River.

With these two causes of friction removed, England and France drew naturally closer in 1904, when the spheres of influence in Africa were drawn up, and France given control of the northern part with the exception of Egypt, while England exercised sovereignty in the south. Thus England became one of the parties to the Triple Entente.

At the time of the formation of the entente, France had to choose between what she considered two evils: either she must resign the idea of getting possession of Egypt and cooperate with England against Germany in north Africa, or she must relinquish the hope of recovering the lost provinces, and co-operate with Germany to oust England from Egypt. When she chose

the first of these alternatives, she therefore had the overdue account against Germany left.

Germany, though apparently assenting to the African agreement, was quick to seize her chance for intervention. The Kaiser objected to French sovereignty in Morocco, and with the United States participating a convention was called in Algeciras, Spain, in 1906. A compromise was then drawn up, recognizing the Sultan as supreme ruler and permitting France to police his territories to insure a fair government. But scarcely had the agreement been signed than it was put to the test. Revolts broke out, and the French were called to put them down; a new Sultan ascended the throne, and matters went from bad to worse. France was called to send in more troops. With German ambitions and French ambitions conflicting, it was but a short time before France was accused of gradually assuming control of the entire state. Germany's feelings were soothed in 1909, but new revolts broke out, and Germany's final protest was to send the cruiser Panther to Agadir in 1911, with the threat to occupy it unless French activity ceased. Coming without warning as it did, this was a challenge. France, which was just involved in the exposure of political intrigue, was not prepared to fight, yet she could not yield. Her people again revived the *revanche*, and clamored for a war with the barbarian. The only hope for peace lay in England, which intervened and informed Germany that an attack on France would be an attack on her. The result was another convention. In return for recognition of her right in Morocco, France then ceded to Germany 1,000,000 square miles of her territory in the basin of the Congo, and war was averted.

Statement of M. René Viviani, Premier of France, to the German Ambassador.

Reported in the New York Times for August 2, 1914.

Paris, August 1.—In the course of their second interview today Premier Viviani said to the German Ambassador:

"You are mobilizing. We know it."

Baron von Schön did not reply, and M. Viviani continued:

"This attitude of your Government has dictated ours. We were compelled to take precautions similar to yours. Our peaceful intentions remain unchanged. We wish peace, and the best proof we can give you of this is that at the present moment the French Parliament has not been convoked. Under our constitution we should be compelled to convoke it if our intentions were not peaceful."

Baron von Schön said: "But frontier incidents are unfortunately to be feared."

Premier Viviani replied:

"How can you suppose such things? Our troops are five miles from the frontier. We are, in fact, exposed to the violation of our frontier, and there is not another power in the world which would have consented to do such a thing."

This refers to the withdrawal of the French troops from the immediate frontier.

The Premier proceeded to point out that the German troops were at the very foot of the frontier posts, and said he concluded from this that if incidents occurred they could only be provoked by the German military forces.

The German reply was submitted to a French Cabinet Council, which, within a few minutes afterward, ordered a general mobilization of the French Army.

Proclamation by President Poincaré and the Members of the French Cabinet Ordering Mobilization.

(Translation.)

For some days the States of Europe have been considerably aggravated, and, notwithstanding the efforts of diplomacy, the horizon has darkened. At the present hour a greater part of the nations have mobilized their forces. Even the countries protected by neutrality conventions have deemed it their duty to take this measure as a precaution.

The powers whose constitutional or military legislation differs from ours have, without issuing a decree of mobilization, begun and carried on preparations which, in reality, are equivalent to mobilization, and are but the anticipated execution of it.

France, who always has affirmed her desire for peace, who on many a tragic day has given to Europe counsels of moderation and a living example of decorum, and who has multiplied her efforts to maintain the peace of the world, has now prepared herself for all eventualities, and has taken from henceforth her first indispensable dispositions for the safeguarding of her territory.

But our legislation does not permit the completion of these preparations without a decree of mobilization. Conscious of its high responsibility, and feeling that it would fail in its sacred duty if it did not take this measure, the Government has signed the decree.

Mobilization is not war. Under the present circumstances it would appear, on the contrary, to be the best means of assuring peace with honor.

Strong in its ardent desire of arriving at a peaceful solution of this crisis, the Government under cover of these essential precautions will continue its diplomatic efforts, and still hopes to succeed. It counts upon the coolness of the people not to give itself up to unjustified emotion. It counts upon the patriotism of every Frenchman, and it knows that there is not a single one who is not ready to do his duty at this hour.

There are no longer any parties. There is an eternal France—a France peaceful and resolute. There is a fatherland of peace and justice, all united in calm vigilance and dignity.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

The French View.

An article evidently inspired by the French Foreign Office, published in *Le Matin* (Paris) of August 3, 1914, and reported in the *New York Globe* of August 28, 1914.

Who can say henceforth that Germany did not want the war? She has mingled expertly, hypocrisy and provocation. For days and days she has pretended to intervene at London, at Paris, and St. Petersburg, with all the governments which were for peace;

she has refused to intervene with the one government which was waging war—that of her ally, Austria.

But she has gone further in dissimulation, in duplicity. Thursday, M. de Pourtales, ambassador from Germany at St. Petersburg, went to find M. Sazonof, Russian minister of foreign affairs, and said to him:

"We should be happy to have an understanding with you; tell us what you ask of us."

M. Sazonof answered him by drawing up the following formula:

"If Austria agrees to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she allows the Great Powers to examine the satisfaction that Serbia could grant to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state and her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude."

It was agreed at this moment between the Russian minister of foreign affairs and the German ambassador that in order not to injure the feelings of Austria-Hungary, this proposition should be presented to her after having been presented at London (literally having been made to pass by London).

It is thus that the English proposition, of which we were speaking yesterday, before even being launched, had received the implicit adhesion of Germany and of Russia, which had composed it together.

However, the English Government amended thus the text proposed by M. Sazonof to the German ambassador:

"If Austria-Hungary agrees to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory, and if recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she allows the Great Powers to examine the satisfaction that Serbia could grant to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state and her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude."

The acceptance of this formula by the powers interested would have avoided the European conflict.

Russia accepted it day before yesterday morning.

And day before yesterday, in the course of the day, Germany declared war on Russia.

On her side Austria accepted it also.

"London, Aug. 1, 6:45 p. m.—The Daily Telegraph says that it has learned that yesterday afternoon Austria-Hungary expressed her formal acceptance of the proposition of Sir Edward Grey looking to the calling of a conference."

This dispatch confirms the information which appeared on this subject in yesterday's *Matin*.

Now, as we say above, Russia for her part had accepted the proposition of Sir Edward Grey. It is, therefore, neither Russia nor Austria that has wished the European war, but it is Germany which has deliberately drawn her ally into this frightful adventure.

It is always the old game that Bismarck played in 1870: to caress, to smooth, to promise, and when one has turned away the attention of one's adversary, when one has put his suspicions to sleep, to try to deal him the mortal blow. But the German diplomats of today have not the ability of Bismarck.

They had dreamed, after a secret mobilization of surprising our armies all of a sudden and making a sudden and irresistible entrance into France. This calculation has been deceived, and when, yesterday, they began to pass our frontiers, they found everywhere armies to reply to them.

But what must be borne in mind for history is that Germany ceased to lie only to attack.

What are we saying? She still lies; she does not break off her diplomatic relations with France.

The baggage of M. de Schoen is still in the courtyard of the German embassy, and M. de Schoen is still in his residence in Paris. Yesterday again, toward the end of the evening, he went to pay a visit to M. Viviani, president of the Council. M. Viviani received him, giving thus a supreme mark of the French spirit of conciliation.

"The ambassador did not leave any communication; the interview finished without definitive conclusions," says the official note.

Thus it is possible that the French Government will see M. de Schoen again.

German soldiers are penetrating into our country. They are firing on our soldiers, and in the same hour the German ambassador talks perhaps still of peace.

Why this double dealing? Why these marked aggressions? Recalling the example of M. de Bismarck, Germany wishes that England and Italy could still have illusions as to the veritable assailant. But Germany has degenerated greatly since the Iron Chancellor. She cradles herself in an impossible hope. Italy has clearly signified it to her.

One recalls that in 1904 M. Delcasse declared from the tribune of the chamber that Italy had promised us never to become the accomplice of an act of aggression toward France. This promise Italy has kept. Therefore that instinctive crowd was right which yesterday on the boulevards acclaimed the name of the Latin sister and saluted respectfully the Italian flag which was passing in the hands of a number of young men.

France and the War of Revenge.

Extracts from an Article Written Several Weeks Before War Broke Out, by Albert Leon Guerard.

From The Contemporary Review, September, 1914.

The first reason why the French cannot forget 1871 is that the Germans will not let them. I am not alluding to the innumerable war memorials erected throughout Germany: every nation commemorates in a similar way her triumphs and even her disasters. I am not even alluding to the celebration of the anniversary of Sedan, which is ungenerous and unwise. But, in less legitimate ways, Germany has tried to keep France humble and mindful of death. When a duel has been fought, and bravely fought, even if no reconciliation ensues, it seems to be the rule with individuals as well as with nations that mutual esteem should be restored. Even vanity should prompt you to honour your unfortunate adversary, thereby enhancing the splendour of your own triumph. But the war of 1870 was

preceded, accompanied and followed by an abominable campaign of slander against France. In the coarse but striking words of a French journalist, "instead of holding out her hand to her fallen foe, Germany spat upon her." France was declared to be, racially, intellectually, morally, an inferior nation, a decadent nation, a rotting nation. The worst passions of mankind, envy and hatred, assumed a mask of science and religion. Anthropology, philology and the Bible were pressed into service to complete the work of Bismarck and Moltke. Jingoism, in its popular and brutal form, is not wholly disgusting. Making night leaves no deep stain on the annals of England. But the mixture of jingoism, pedantry and pietistic hypocrisy is unbearable. The attitude of Strauss, Mommsen, Richard Wagner, is singularly damaging to the good name of Germany. When the highest and best go so far wrong there is something unsound in the nation's soul. This attitude of hatred and contempt spread from Germany to German sympathizers throughout the world. Carlyle, in England, uttered his weighty *Vae Victis!* Bancroft, in the name of the country for which France had fought, seemed to endorse the moral judgment passed by her enemies. . . .

And behind that campaign of vulgar or learned slander—which has not ceased—there were more definite facts. Bismarck did not want France to get on her feet again. He was cruelly disappointed when he discovered that he had not bled her to death with his enormous war indemnity. In 1875, without provocation, he would have renewed the war, had not England and Russia intervened. Repeatedly Germany has given France to understand that the treaty of Frankfort had given her a supremacy which she was not willing to forego or even to veil. When the rivalry between England and Germany became intense, a favourite conception with Pan-German writers was that France should be treated as a hostage; that England, impregnable behind her fleet and her coast defences, should be humbled and wounded in the person of her friend; that France should be compelled to abandon the *Entente Cordiale* and to join her forces with those of Germany in a war against "the modern Carthage." The most extraordinary of these unholy conceptions,

the most galling to the sensitive pride of the French, is that France should be coerced into a reconciliation with Germany. "I shall kick you until you profess to be my friend, seems to be the *ultima ratio* of German diplomacy—and the world wonders why France, the object of such flattering attentions, should remain so peevish and restive. . . .

Then there is the Alsace-Lorraine question. Here again superficial foreign observers fail to sympathize with the obstinacy of the French. "The holy ground of France has been desecrated," forsooth! But was German territory any less holy when Henry II., Richelieu, Louis XIV., the Revolution, Napoleon, seized German cities or provinces? Why should the conquests made by France be legitimate, and those made against France be inexpiable crimes? The great majority of the Alsace-Lorrainers spoke a Germanic dialect: by war were they torn away from their fellow Germans; by war were they brought back into the fold.

This defence sounds plausible enough, but it does not take into account a new and all-important factor: the rise of the modern spirit of free citizenship. Under the old dispensation conquest was law, subjects could be lost and won, sold or bartered away; they were never consulted, and but seldom was their voice heard. But the nations of Continental Europe were born anew during the great Revolution. Henceforth the essential right of men to be *themselves*, to be citizens, and not chattels, has been asserting itself irresistibly. The foreign policy of Napoleon III. may have been vacillating and tortuous; but it had one redeeming feature: it recognized the new principle of *nationalities*. Not the fate of battles or the intrigues of diplomatists, but the will of the people must decide on their allegiance. Thus were the populations of Savoy and Nice consulted when these provinces were annexed to France. Thus did Napoleon III. request, without avail, that a plebiscite be taken in Schleswig-Holstein. Now, in 1870, the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine were French at heart. They fought heroically against their German invaders. Their representatives in the National Assembly at Bordeaux protested against their annexation to Germany. For many years, as long as they had any hope of an immediate

change in their destiny, their deputies in the Reichstag were the irreconcilable opponents of German occupation. Many Germans may have cherished for years the delusion that in 1871 they had delivered "long lost brothers." No illusion is permissible at present. In 1913, after forty-two years of German rule, the ominous words were spoken by a German official: "Alsace is a *hostile* country."

Under these influences the conception of a *revanche* arose immediately, spontaneously. It remained for many years the cardinal principle of French national life—the thought left unuttered, but ever present, according to the dictum of Gambetta: "Let us think of IT always, and never speak of it." Even Victor Hugo, the prophet of peace and of the universal republic, had to confess: "Another war, alas! Yes, it is necessary."

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR.

The candidacy of a prince of the Hohenzollern house for the throne of Spain, was formerly given as the cause of the Franco-Prussian war, but Bismarck has admitted that he considered a war with France necessary for the unification of the German States. He changed the wording of a telegram (the famous Ems dispatch) which had been sent in answer to French demands, and Napoleon III declared war.

This happened on July 18, 1870, and exactly six months later Paris fell and the war was over, for the two German objects as outlined by Clausewitz had been accomplished; the field armies of the French had been defeated and Paris had been occupied.

The number of troops participating in the war is estimated at 534,000 for the French and 835,000 for the Germans, but the battle lines were not nearly as long as in the present war. Bismarck, after declaring for Belgian neutrality, was compelled to invade France solely through the frontier mutual to the combatants, extending for about 150 miles. The Germans quickly fought their way through Alsace and Lorraine in the battles of Spicheren and Wörth, leaving large forces to invest the fortresses of Strassburg and Metz. In the territory that the French have retained, the frontier fortresses of Toul and Verdun

were invested and taken, and battles that resulted in victory for the Germans fought at Mars-la-Tour and Saint Privat. Five weeks after the beginning of the war, the French under MacMahon suffered the crushing reverse of Sedan (September 1, 1870), and the capture of their Emperor.

The entire German army, consisting of three parts, then advanced on Paris in an enveloping movement from Rheims on the north and Orleans on the south. Though they were met by two French armies, one of which gained the only important French victory of the war at Coulmiers, the capital was invested about September 20. With its collapse the war ended, though the French still had armies of 250,000 in the field and were preparing to fight the battle of Le Mans.

The estimated losses for the Germans were 28,000 killed and 101,000 wounded, and for the French 156,000 dead (17,000 of whom died in German prisons) and 143,000 wounded. The Germans held 720,000 prisoners.

The German forces were commanded by the famous Von Moltke, uncle of the lately retired chief of the General Staff.

ALSACE-LORRAINE.

The disputed German crownland of Alsace-Lorraine is one of the richest and most thickly populated parts of the German Empire. Bismarck little knew when he annexed the two French provinces in 1871, that in the Vosges mountains of Lorraine lay the finest fields of coal and iron to be found in Germany. He needed Alsace strategically to include both banks of the Rhine within German domain, and Lorraine being at right angles to it and forming an inverted L lengthened his frontier many miles. For if the French could establish fortresses such as Strassburg on the left bank of the Rhine, they could always delay the crossing of the German army until such time as their own had mobilized, and the standing threat of a quick German invasion would be scorned by her.

The claim was also made that Alsace and Lorraine were originally Germanic provinces, and history would tend to prove that. Alsace, which included most of later day Lorraine, orig-

inally part of Roman Gaul, was occupied by Germanic tribes in the fourth century, was later settled by the Franks (a Teuton race), and by the tenth century was entirely German. Held by the houses of Swabia and Habsburg it was ceded to France by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. But it took the French a century and a half to remove German influences, and not until the French revolution was the territory French in sentiment.

The expectation that the liberated German brothers would welcome release from the French was badly shaken. The people would not take part in the government, and when in 1872 Berlin called on the inhabitants to declare either for French or German citizenship, 150,000 chose France. Emigration from the provinces took place in vast numbers, and so hindered industrial life that Lorraine did not recover her ante bellum prosperity until the early 90's. In the past twenty five years both parts of the crownland have seen an era of remarkable growth which has mitigated the hatred of Teuton rule. But that resentment still lingers was shown by the Zabern affair, when the entire populace rose against a Prussian officer's brutalities. That Alsace and Lorraine if given a vote would not return to France is the general opinion of impartial observers. Sir Harry H. Johnston, a prominent English writer on international politics writes in the *Nineteenth Century Magazine*: "If a plebiscite were called for at the present day, absolutely uncontrolled by government officials, it would probably be found that there was an overwhelming majority of votes in Alsace-Lorraine for inclusion within the German Empire. The native inhabitants of French-speaking Lorraine would vote to a man and woman in behalf of reincorporation with France, but as I have pointed out that is only a region of about 450 square miles. But I doubt if public opinion in the Reichsland (crownland) would continue to favor the administrative association of Lorraine with Alsace. The two regions are quite distinct in dialect, and even in the trend of business affairs. German Lorraine would probably prefer a close connection with the Lower Rhine Provinces, the region of which Cologne is the centre. Alsace, on the other hand, would like to be united with the Grand Duchy of Baden on the other side of the Rhine."

GERMANY

Germany is the most astonishing fact in modern Europe. England has been a united nation since the early medieval ages; France, though her government has changed externally many times, was the earliest to solidify into a compact mass; Germany, with the exception of small states in the Balkans, like Bulgaria and Albania is the most recent of European nations. In the forty odd years since William I was crowned emperor in 1871, she has apparently accomplished a growth which other large nations of Europe have obtained only during many centuries. In all lines of human activity, commercial, intellectual, and martial, the missionaries of the new Germany have taken up the gauntlet of achievement and carried it toward a new goal. And logic says that if Germany continued this rate of progress for many years, it might not be predicted what the rest of the world would do.

The accomplishment is the more remarkable when the nature and history of the people who have done this is considered. The Germans are of Teutonic stock, from which the Anglo Saxons are also derived. The Germans are a "philosophical rather than a practical" people, says Price Collier in his "Germany and the Germans." "They want peace; . . . The huge armaments are intended to frighten us, just as were the grotesquely ugly masks of the Chinese warriors. "They are not noted for their warriors but for musicians, poets and philosophers. An old saying ran that 'England ruled the sea, France the land, and Germany the clouds.'"

So little were the Germanic peoples of Europe gifted with the practical arts, such as manly defense, that for centuries their lands, like the present-day Balkan states were overrun by successive wars of the French, Poles, Swedes, Austrians and Russians. Scarcely had they recovered from one invasion than another swept away all the gains they had made. When Napoleon came over the German territories, he found more than

three hundred petty, quarreling states, which could not compose their differences even to fight against him; and that was after Frederick the Great had incorporated many of the smaller members into Prussia.

To that great Teutonic warrior belongs the credit for placing one German state, Prussia, in advance of the others, and gaining for it recognition among the Powers of Europe. But Frederick fulminated against the despised German culture, and himself spoke French. What he accomplished, was done by force (with a touch of justice), and was the forerunner of Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron."

In the years following his reign, his work was all but undone by the weak and vacillating policy of his successors, and the campaigns of Napoleon. Some advance toward a union of states was made when by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 alliances were formed among the German states to counteract France, which was not thoroughly subdued. Prussia as the recognized leader of North Germany received large accessions, particularly along the northern part of the Rhine. But it was not the purpose of Austria which still held the German leadership to permit a rival to grow at her expense. The Prussian kings and their ministers were but children in the hands of Metternich, who for thirty years played the petty jealousies of the German states against each other, and against Prussia. Frederick William III, who ruled until 1840, and Frederick William IV, who followed him, were well intentioned, but philosophical and emotional, and little fitted to cope with the mailed fist of Austria which then ruled Central Europe. The revolutions of Paris in 1848 found echoes in Vienna, where Metternich was deposed for the more benevolent rule of Francis Joseph; and in Berlin in which rioting had to be put down by the military authorities. Though the feeling of German nationality was growing, the king of Prussia still hesitated to make a step contrary to Austria's wishes. In 1851, the German *Zollverein* was formed, and here for the first time Prussia gained a slight advantage—for the southern states of Germany in following the lines of least resistance in trade routes were drawn away from Austria toward Prussia.

This was the apparently hopeless condition of the German

states when in 1862 Bismarck, a member of the landed Prussian gentry class, was called to become premier of Prussia. Bismarck was a man of deep and decided convictions; and realized as no one had before him the needs and failings of the German temperament. He was fired with a deep desire to obtain unity of the German states without the interference of Austria, and he believed this could only be done under the firm leadership of Prussia.

That he was correct in this a glance at Germany of to-day gives no doubt. For the present Empire naturally divides itself into three parts: the eastern, western and southern. Glancing at the past of any number of eastern cities and towns it will be discovered that their history is full of armed castles, wars, and martial exploits of medievalism. The country is low, flat, open to invasion by hostile Russians, and the alternative to defence was extinction. It is in the portion from Brandenburg eastward that Prussian militarism, which made possible the final unification of Germany, had its hold. The western part, with the Rhine flowing through the middle is better protected by steep hills, the scenery is more romantic, and the people have always been more inclined to peaceful pursuits. Here have grown up the remarkable industries which give Germany her world renown in commerce. In the central and southern part, a spotted and heterogenous mass on the map even to-day, is the natural home of the famous "Germanic temperament." Protected by mountains and woods, the philosophic Teuton of the Thuringian states, the Black Forest, the Bavarian Alps and the picturesque upper basins of the Rhine could dream of the liberty he might not achieve for himself. It is to the cities of the southern and central parts, not to Berlin, that the famous Germans, Goethe, Schiller and others, have turned.

It was Bismarck's aim to bring these incongruous and centrifugal parts together into a federation. He knew that it has been unsuccessfully tried for a century, and decided that it could be accomplished in but one way. Prussia must take the lead and rule with an iron hand.

Two obstacles stood in his way: Austria and France. Reform was begun in the army, but timid delegates, who refused to vote

additional funds for new levies of troops, forced Bismarck to suspend constitutional government, and use the prerogative of the king to raise funds. He first conciliated Russia, who was overjoyed that an influence should arise to counteract Austria. In quick succession, with Austria he fought the Danes and acquired Schleswig-Holstein; persuaded Napoleon to remain neutral in the war with Austria and within two years had his former ally humbled, not thoroughly, but enough to serve his purposes, for he purposed to become allied with her later. He then began to prepare against France who soon realized that she should have aided Austria. After a six months' campaign, Alsace-Lorraine and a billion dollars in gold had been taken from the French. Instead of getting control of the entire left bank of the Rhine, as he had expected, Napoleon lost what he already had. His empire became a republic.

With even so much accomplished in ten years, Bismarck still believed that Germany's exposed position between hostile nations in middle Europe was not secure. After he had succeeded in persuading William to accept the position of German emperor at Versailles, he had scarcely a safe working majority for a parliamentary government; and what with the continual bickerings and jealousies of the smaller states of the new empire, to have held a constitutional majority together would have been impossible. He therefore revised the German constitution, which he had written in 1867, to fit the peculiar needs of the people. By it the King of Prussia as emperor exercised his power through the chancellor (Bismarck), and further to throw control of the government to Prussia and the Emperor, he introduced the three-class voting system, which based the number of votes a person could cast according to the taxes paid, and so gave the Prussian delegates a veto on any bill placed in the Reichstag.

But even with that Bismarck had to be very arbitrary to put the bills he considered as necessary through the upper chamber. He could depend on no special party, and had to bargain with different factors to maintain support. Many times, he had to act without authority; but his most successful measure to enforce his will was a threat to resign.

He decided that Germany's safety in Europe lay in a strong

standing army, concentration of her efforts on her home soil without thought of foreign conquest, and a number of alliances to insure joint action. He was very decided in his denunciation of any policy which included aggression against foreign nations, or required colonial conquest. The alliances, first with Russia and Austria, and later with Austria and Italy, he believed to be natural expressions of parallel interest among the powers which were allied. Though he believed many of them temporary, he considered above all that France must be so ruthlessly trodden down that she could never rise again. But after France had shown remarkable powers of recovery during the 70's, he is found later trying with Jules Ferry to bring the two bitter rivals together.

Bismarck continued to dominate the government until the accession of the present Emperor in 1888; he remained chancellor for two years under the new rule, but with growing irritation as William II showed a desire to rule directly instead of through him. Moreover, the new sovereign thought that the time had come for a more aggressive attitude. In the twenty years that Germany had been a European empire, she had expanded, and unified and the new Emperor believed that her strength entitled her to become a world empire. To this Bismarck was opposed. He had grudgingly consented to German possession and colonization of German Southwest Africa in 1882, and the Kamerun and German East Africa in 1884, but believed that if Germany should acquire territory outside of her European possession, she would make the Triple Alliance an offensive weapon and weaken her defensive position. As it was he claimed her strength lay in that "she was the only European Power without a single aim which a war was necessary to accomplish," and so could cultivate the friendship of all nations.

However, the new Emperor thought differently. German manufacture was beginning to feel the first pulse of new life, and the Emperor was ambitious to create markets. In the same year that Bismarck retired a treaty defining the African possessions of Germany and England was concluded. By it, Germany recognized England's interest in Zanzibar, and in return received the island of Heligoland at the mouth of the Elbe. She im-

mediately fortified it, thus protecting the city of Hamburg, and the only German coast line entrance to the interior.

The Kaiser began soon to show that he, and not the chancellor, was the real leader of the Empire. When Caprivi, who succeeded Bismarck suggested that he be consulted, the suggestion was ignored. Altogether the new government did not find that things ran as smoothly as under the experienced hand of Bismarck, as the Social Democrats, whom he had held in subjection, had by several indiscreet utterances of William largely increased their representation in the Reichstag.

In 1890 a bill for increase in the army was passed, and in 1893 the compulsory service was made more general by striking out many of the clauses for exemption that had previously existed.

About this time, the Kaiser coined the first of his well known phrases that have become famous. It was the *Welt Politik* or world empire. He followed it by a campaign of aggression, not only in Africa where Germany had become established, but also in Eastern Europe and Asia. When Japan had decisively beaten China in 1894, Germany joined with France and Russia in preventing her from annexing territory on the continent of Asia; a few years later, after several missionaries had been killed, she landed troops in the bay of Kiaochow, and as compensation received a lease of ninety-nine years on a territory of 117 square miles. Here she built up the town of Ts'ingtao, with fine buildings and public works, and protected by almost impregnable fortifications. In 1900 she participated in the Boxer war, and in the same year by treaty with the United States and Great Britain secured the Pacific island of Samoa. She had also during the previous year bought Caroline, Pelew and Marianne islands from Spain.

The Kaiser's actions and utterances within and without the empire were bringing him into the public eye as the most aggressive sovereign in Europe. He had on the occasion of the visit of Prince Henry to China made his widely quoted speech on the "mailed fist"; he called personally on the Sultan of Turkey to assure him of his good will, and a few years afterward German officers began to drill the Turkish army.

A new navy had since 1895 been one of the Emperor's favorite schemes, but it was not until after the war of the United States with Spain in 1898 had demonstrated what a powerful weapon of offence great fleets were that he obtained large appropriations. He said the fleet must be large enough successfully to defend itself against the greatest Power. As only the United States and England had larger fleets at the time, and a possible clash on this side of the Atlantic was very remote, there could have been but one meaning.

Now England has from the day she defeated the Spanish Armada been the mistress of the seas. She has more miles of coast line per square mile of area than other European nations with the possible exception of Denmark and Greece. Consequently, with a number of good harbors, a large percentage of her population living in coast towns, and the blood of the seafaring Norsemen running in her veins, she naturally took to the sea. Moreover, being an island, and unable with her population to produce the food she eats, she has had to develop a carrying trade. Her navy is a natural growth. But Germany has a fairly straight coast line with very few harbors save those she has created artificially, on her rivers; being on the continent, she has the vast plains of Austria-Hungary and Russia to draw on for supplies; with her aptness for manufacture, and with a large army to protect her industries, England felt that the creation of a German fleet could only be aimed at her, although the Emperor declared his battleships were for defense. For Germany, at least, a navy is not an evolution, but a creation, built in the same precise, methodical manner as her commerce, and her manufacture.

The German navy has been built in the last fifteen years, and is the product of the single labors of Grand Admiral Von Tirpitz, who still directs its maneuvers. Starting with a small and unimportant arm of service, he has rapidly brought it close to the standard of the British fleets, with the aid of enormous war budgets in 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912. The Germans have particularly devoted themselves to torpedo craft and submarines, from which they hoped for great results. The same aggressive policy was followed in the army, which increased from about 550,000

peace strength in 1899 to 750,000 peace strength in 1913. In order to support these greatly increased armaments, heavy taxes have been laid. The Socialists, have generally resisted the great expenditures.

But the Emperor has had his way, and owing to the success of his policies has gained great regard among the people. On the other hand, his desire to interfere with official work, and to speak without consulting his ministers has caused them much trouble.

At the opening of the twentieth century, the quick accessions of territory in Asia and the Pacific seemed to have increased his ambition. Shut out of the Americas by the Monroe Doctrine (though there were large German colonies in Brazil) the Emperor based his hopes on Africa, and the still open trade route by land to India via Asia Minor. When England and France concluded their treaty for the division of Africa in 1904, the Kaiser at first acquiesced, saying that he considered France's interest in Morocco paramount, but the following year, he called personally on the Sultan of Morocco, and assured him that Germany was his protector and would see that his territorial integrity was upheld. He then claimed that France and England in concluding the African treaty had violated a convention of 1880, which guaranteed that no change of territorial division in Africa would be made without a general conference of European Powers. He forced France and England to hold a conference at Algeciras. The sovereignty of Morocco was partly preserved, and France given the right to police the Sultan's territory in case of revolt. Soon after the conference, France was compelled to act. The Powers were mutually suspicious, and in 1909, Germany warned France that she was violating the treaty of Algeciras. As matters seemed to grow worse, Germany made the famous naval demonstration against Agadir, and brought Europe to the verge of war. The trouble was composed, and Germany received a million square miles of French Congo.

To acquire control of Asia Minor, the Germans had always encouraged the ambitions of Austria in the Balkans. With England and Russia, Germany hoped some day to be the favored

power that should control Constantinople, the key to the eastern Mediterranean. Until the recent Balkan wars, when Turkey lost most of her western territory to Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and the new kingdom of Albania, the Ottoman Empire touched Austria's boundaries at several points. Therefore, through her alliance with Austria, and the good will of the Sultan, which she had cultivated, Germany had an eastern route through Austria-Hungary, Turkey in Europe, and Turkey in Asia to Asia Minor. This is the last undeveloped territory which has not fallen under control of some Power. German capital had been invested in it and a German railway partly built, but suddenly the new divisions of territory after the Balkan war, cut Austria off from Turkey, and the land route was destroyed. The history of 1906, when Germany had been shut out of Persia by English and Russian partition, had repeated itself.

But though defeated in many of her colonial ambitions since the opening of the twentieth century, German conquests in a less doubtful direction had gone forward at an accelerated rate. Her population had increased from 56 million in 1900 to 65 million in 1910, and yet by a system of intensive production, she supported the increase, and altogether stopped emigration. She has in a remarkable way applied the sciences of her universities to practical life.

In agriculture, she has succeeded in doing much with a poor soil, but in manufacture her rise has been astonishing. The great mechanical industries, the products of which are exported to every part of the globe center along the Rhine Valley. The most remarkable manufacturing community is the Rhine-Ruhr district where within a few miles of each other are the large cities of Essen (with the Krupp gun works), Elberfeld-Barmen, Düsseldorf, Duisburg, Dortmund, Remscheid and Mülheim. While iron is the principal industry, scarcely anything can be named which is not made within this twenty-five mile radius. Berlin, as the metropolis, produces varied articles, but the other great manufacturing districts are in Bavaria, which is famous for its toys, and Saxony for its iron furnaces. The finest coal fields are in Lorraine, along the river Ruhr, and in Silesia.

In order to get markets for the great volume of manufactured

goods, Germany has had to seek the foreign trade; and to do this, just as she set out to acquire a navy, so she has created her merchant marine fleet: Germany's great misfortune is that she has no great port directly on the sea, and in passing down her greatest river, the Rhine, she must go through Holland (where the name changes to the Waal), to reach the North Sea. Much of her shipping is done through the foreign ports of Antwerp and Amsterdam. Hamburg, with maritime business ranking only next to New York, Liverpool and London, on the Elbe, and Bremen on the Weser, with their outlying stations of Wilhelmshaven, Bremerhaven and Cuxhaven, are the only ports, west of the peninsula of Schleswig-Holstein, and so accessible to large transatlantic traffic.

But where nature has denied them, the Germans have supplied the want by their ingenuity. The Rhine has been dredged one hundred and fifty miles from its mouth for navigation by vessels of fair seagoing capacity, and the whole of Germany is cut up by a network of canals, the most famous of which is the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal from Kiel on the Baltic to Brunsbüttel at the mouth of the Elbe on the North Sea. This is used not only for commerce, but also for naval purposes, and by it the German fleets can make quick sorties either on the North Sea or the Baltic.

The same remarkable energy which has made the Kaiser so much feared in the world of diplomacy, turned to the encouragement of these internal works, has been a great stimulant to the people. His influence in the promotion of such peaceful arts has been very beneficent, and under him the rivalry of the German merchant has become a factor which has caused the English much anxiety. The German Empire is today what he has made it; Bismarck turned over a federation of small states, which had spent twenty years in finding out its possibilities as a nation. Its remarkable expansion is a work of the genius of William II.

Germany's Progress in Production and Wealth: 1888-1913.

Dr. Karl Helfferich, Director of the Deutsche Bank, Berlin.

Published in the *Times-Annalist* for October 20, 1913, and
March 16, 1914.

Berlin, Oct. 9, 1913.—The economic progress of Germany during the past twenty-five years is a subject that continually astonishes even the observer who has lived in Germany and witnessed its development from year to year. He has seen progress on all sides, has seen it expressed in statistical form over and over for individual branches of production; but when the aggregate results of the economic movement are now brought together into one composite picture it might well amaze and move to a certain enthusiasm even the most jaded writer on economic matters. Such a composite picture of the results achieved by economic Germany during the first quarter of a century of the Emperor's reign has just been made by Dr. Karl Helfferich, a Director of the Deutsche Bank. The German edition of his study is now about to appear, and English and French translations will very soon follow it. Some of the larger results of his inquiry will interest the readers of this publication.

The agricultural progress of Germany during this period is a subject that has been far too little attended to by foreign observers. Yet Helfferich's statistics, based upon the official reports, show that the yield per acre of wheat, rye, oats, barley, potatoes, and hay has increased 77.7 per cent. in twenty-five years; and the aggregate yield of these crops increased 87.7 per cent., notwithstanding an increase of only 5.8 per cent. in their acreage. In all these crops Germany is getting a larger yield per acre than any other of the large agricultural countries. At the same time Germany has increased its production of beet sugar about two-and-one-half fold. These remarkable results in agriculture appear all the more striking when one remembers that the number of persons engaged in agriculture has remained practically stationary during the period in question, whereas the percentage of the population subsisting from agriculture dropped from 42 per cent. in 1882 to 28.5 per cent. in 1907.

In industrial production, of course, results have been for the

most part still more remarkable. The coal production of the country—including lignite— rose from 76,200,000 tons in 1887 to 259,400,000 tons in 1912. The gain of 240 per cent. is without a parallel in any other country except the United States. At the same time the German production of iron ores has increased threefold, while the excess of iron ore exports of more than 700,000 tons for 1887 was converted by 1912 into an excess of imports by nearly 10,000,000 tons. During the same period pig iron production rose from 4,024,000 to 17,853,000 tons. From 1886 to 1910 Germany increased its steel production 1,335 per cent., the United States 910 per cent., and England 154 per cent.

Production statistics are not at hand for the other industries, but the increases in the number of employes and in steam power in a few of them give an idea of their rapid development. In the machinery industry the number of persons employed increased 229 per cent. from 1882 till 1907, and more than 100 per cent. was recorded in mining and smelting, earths and stone, chemicals, paper, printing, and building. Still more remarkable was the gain in steam power, for which the statistics cover only the twelve years 1895-1907. In that brief period only four industries—textiles, woodworking, foods and beverages, and printing—failed to increase their power more than 100 per cent., while the building trade gained 308 and machinery 557 per cent., and other industries between 100 and 200 per cent. This wholly leaves out of account the great increase in electrical energy.

From 1890 to 1910 Germany increased its railway mileage 42.6 per cent., against 44.6 for the United States, and much smaller figures for England and France. From 1885 to 1911 the freight movement on the railways increased in ton-miles nearly 273 per cent., the passenger traffic 377 per cent. Germany's commercial marine made a gain in steam tonnage from 470,000 net registrations in 1888 to 2,655,000 tons in 1913. From 1887 to 1912 Germany's import trade rose from \$740,000,000 to \$2,610,000,000, while exports rose from \$747,000,000 to \$2,156,000,000. In the same years Germany's total foreign trade gained 214.7 per cent., as compared with 173.3 for the United States, 113.1 for Great Britain, and 98.1 for France.

The effect of all this increased activity in agriculture, manu-

facturing, and trade is reflected in the rapid growth in the aggregate income of the German people. This total income Helfferich estimates now at not less than \$9,525,000,000, or probably somewhat more. For the year 1896 his estimate is only \$5,120,000,000. Hence there has been an average yearly gain of \$275,000,000 during the past sixteen years. As compared with the above estimate of the annual income of the German people, Leroy-Beaulieu estimated the income of the French people five years ago at \$5,000,000,000; and Chiozza Money several years ago made an estimate of \$8,310,000,000 for the English people. Thus the income of the German people amounts to a considerably greater total than that of those two rich countries.

Taking up the subject of aggregate national wealth Helfferich applies two methods of calculation, one based on the assessments for the property tax in Prussia and several of the other states, and the other on the volume of property insured against fire in Germany. The totals recorded in both cases, of course, had to be corrected by making additions for property escaping taxation or not covered by insurance; and these additions appear to have been made in a very conservative spirit. According to the former method he arrives at an aggregate national wealth of \$68,000,000,000; while the total reached by the latter method was nearly \$80,000,000,000. He assumes a mean of about \$75,000,000,000 for the national wealth.

The growth of the national wealth—i. e., the savings of the people, together with the created and the natural increment in the value of property—is placed at an average of between \$1,430,000,000 and \$1,670,000,000 during the past fifteen years; and in the most recent years the growth has even risen to \$2,380,000,000 a year. Fifteen years ago the yearly accretion was hardly half so great.

Berlin, March 5, 1914.—The great addition to the population during the past twenty-five years has found employment more and more within Germany itself. Emigration, which in the eighties of the last century still reached enormous proportions, has dropped almost to insignificance. This development cannot be measured in its full extent till we compare the number of emigrants with the

excess of births. In the decade 1881-90 there were 1,342,000 German emigrants, as against a total birth excess of 5,500,000; in the following decade there were still 528,000 emigrants to 7,300,000 net births; but in the decade 1901-10, when the birth excess rose to 8,670,000 the number of emigrants sank to 220,000. In the year 1912 the number of German emigrants was only 18,500. If, while considering emigration from Germany, we also take into account immigration into Germany, a still brighter color is given to the picture. Whereas Germany always had formerly a more or less considerable excess of emigration over immigration, there has been an excess of immigration since the middle of the nineties. After having been an emigrant land, Germany is becoming an immigrant land.

The enormous progress of modern economic technique is due to the splendid development of the natural sciences and the systematic application of scientific knowledge to economic labor. Physics, chemistry, and electricity (which overlaps the first two sciences), have outvied each other in their influence upon economic technique. German scientists and scholars have accomplished revolutionary results in these sciences, and, by discovering the law of the conservation of energy, have lifted all the natural sciences to the highest plane.

Whoever has had an opportunity to observe the various races at their economic labor cannot escape the impression that military service, to which the vast majority of German workers with hand and brain are subject, has a great influence upon co-operative work in large economic groups by accustoming men to order, punctuality, and discipline.

The advantages of the association of labor, assisted by the development of capital organization, have had the effect in numerous and important spheres of economic life, particularly in industry, trade, and transportation, of facilitating the creation of large productive units; and, in addition to this, of promoting the consolidation into centralized business undertakings of various branches having interdependencies among themselves in the process of production.

Even a considerably greater increase in the capital supply would not have sufficed to furnish the financial foundations for

the association of labor so enormously expanded, unless it had been possible at the same time to develop the means and forms for assembling and consolidating capital owned by numerous persons for a business purpose in a manner similar to the organization of human labor itself. This was accomplished by means of the development of stock companies and the system of credit.

In order, however, to complete the picture of the development of economic organization, another stroke must be added. Development did not stop with gigantic undertakings; it extended beyond these to greater organizations, embracing many similar or related undertakings; namely, to the syndicates, cartels, community-of-interest arrangements, &c. In contrast to the American trusts, which almost entirely absorb the individual undertakings, these combinations let the individual undertakings attached to them remain independent, and restrict themselves to enforcing certain controlling principles in regard to production, prices, and competition. They aim at removing, so far as possible, conflicts and losses which must necessarily result from an unplanned and disordered working of one against the other; and they seek to unite all interests and intelligently secure for them the maximum of economic success. They are, in this respect, the climax of the development that our economic life has passed through, in its organization, during the past few decades.

A Quotation from Bismarck upon German Policy.

From his "Reflections and Reminiscences."

If Germany has the advantage that her policy is free from direct interests in the East, on the other side is the disadvantage of the central and exposed position of the German Empire, with its extended frontier which has to be defended on every side, and the ease with which anti-German coalitions are made. At the same time Germany is perhaps the single Great Power in Europe which is not tempted by any objects which can only be attained by a successful war. It is our interest to maintain peace, while without exception our continental neighbors have wishes either secret or officially avowed which cannot be fulfilled except by war. We must direct our policy in accordance with these

facts—that is, we must do our best to prevent war or to limit it. We must reserve our hand, and not allow ourselves before the proper time to be pushed out of a waiting into an active attitude by any impatience, by the desire to oblige others at the expense of the country, by vanity or other provocation of this kind, otherwise *plectuneur Achivi*.

Our non-interference cannot reasonably be directed to sparing our forces so as, after the others have weakened themselves, to fall upon any of our neighbors or a possible opponent. On the contrary, we ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling which has been called out through our growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honorable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan and also less harmful for the freedom of others than that of Russia, France or England. That respect for the rights of other states in which France especially has always been so wanting at the time of her supremacy, and which in England lasts only so long as English interests are not touched, is made easy for the German Empire and its policy, on the one side owing to the practicality of the German character, on the other by the fact (which has nothing to do with our deserts) that we do not require an increase in our immediate territory, and also that we could not attain it without strengthening the centrifugal elements in our territory. It has always been my ideal aim, after we had established our unity within the possible limits, to win the confidence, not only of the smaller European states, but also of the Great Powers, and to convince them that German policy will be just and peaceful, now that it has repaired the *injuriis temporum*, the disintegration of the nation.

In order to produce this confidence it is above everything necessary that we should be honorable, open and easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events. I have followed this recipe not without some personal reluctance in cases like that of Schnaebles (April, 1887), Boulanger, Kauffman (September, 1887), as toward Spain in the question of the Caroline Islands, towards the United States in that of Samoa, and I imagine that in the future opportunities will not be wanting of showing that

we are appeased and peaceful. During the time that I was in office I advised three wars, the Danish, the Bohemian, and the French, but every time I first made myself clear whether the war, if it were successful, would bring a prize of victory worth the sacrifices which every war requires, and which are now so much greater than in the last century. Had I to say to myself that if after one of these wars, we should find some difficulty in discovering conditions of peace which were desirable, I should scarcely have convinced myself of the necessity for these sacrifices as long as we were not actually attacked. I have never looked at international quarrels which can only be settled by a national war, from the point of view of the Goettingen student code of honor which governs a private duel, but I have always considered simply their reaction on the claim of the German people in equality with other great states and Powers of Europe, to lead to an autonomous political life, so far as it is possible on the basis of our peculiar national capacity.

Proclamation by Emperor William.

The Official Gazette, August 7.

(Translation.)

Since the foundation of the German Empire it has been for forty-three years the object of the efforts of myself and my ancestors to preserve the peace of the world and to advance by peaceful means our vigorous development.

Our adversaries, however, are jealous of the successes of our work, and there has been latent hostility to the east and to the west and beyond the sea.

This has been borne by us till now, as we were aware of our responsibility and our power.

Now, however, these adversaries wish to humiliate us, asking that we should look on with folded arms and watch our enemies preparing themselves for the coming attack.

They will not suffer that we maintain our resolute fidelity to our ally, who is fighting for her position as a great power, and with whose humiliation our power and honor would equally be lost.

So the sword must decide.

In the midst of perfect peace the enemy surprises us. Therefore, to arms!

Any dallying and temporizing would be to betray the Fatherland.

To be or not to be is the question for the empire which our fathers founded. To be or not to be is the question for German power and German existence.

We shall resist to the last breath of man and horse, and we shall fight out the struggle, even against a world of enemies.

Never has Germany been subdued when she was united.

Forward with God, who will be with us as He was with our ancestors.

A German Official's View of the Situation.

By Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, Former Colonial Secretary of the German Empire.

Reported in the New York Sun.

When I arrived in New York a fortnight ago, I was greatly surprised on reading in the papers big headlines such as "The Kaiser's War," "The Kaiser's Army," "The Kaiser Beaten," etc. I thought at first that this was only a sort of abbreviation and that the "Kaiser's" name stood as a symbol for the whole of Germany in this war forced upon our nation. I soon had to see, however, that something quite different was meant and that a large portion of the American people were of the opinion that the Emperor was more or less responsible for the breaking out of the war, and that the German people, whom they all knew to be good and peaceable, had been dragged into it in consequence of autocratic institutions peculiar to Germany, and as a sequel to militarism rampant in Germany.

I consider it therefore of interest to explain here the constitutional basis on which our institutions rest. The German Empire is a union composed of all the states which formerly belonged to the German Federation, with the exception of Austria-Hungary. The 11th Article of the German Constitution says:

"The Union shall be presided over by the King of Prussia, whose title is to be 'Deutscher Kaiser.'" There is a great similarity with the Constitution of the United States, which is also a union of a number of independent states, who have given part of their sovereignty in favor of the union. While the Kaiser represents the empire in its foreign relations, he may not declare war in the name of the empire without the consent of the Bundesrat, representing these single states forming the empire, except when German territory is attacked. In this Bundesrat of fifty-four equal votes the Emperor in his capacity of King of Prussia has only seventeen votes. It follows that the Emperor could not, and as a matter of fact, has not, declared war on his own account, but that he had to have, and, in fact, had, the consent of his allies represented by the Federal Council. This consent was unanimous. This is a much greater check than the control placed by the Constitution of the United States on the President, who of all great rulers of the earth concentrates in himself the greatest power. The German Kaiser can no more than the President of the United States make war at pleasure.

Neither is the Emperor what is called here "The War Lord." He has not the disposal, that is, the absolute command, over the forces of the entire German army. Article 66 of our Constitution says that the German princes, more especially the kings of Bavaria, Württemberg and Saxony, are the chiefs of the troops belonging to their territory (six army corps of twenty-four); they nominate the officers for these troops, they have the right to inspect these troops, etc. Consequently the absolute disposition of the German army passes on to the Kaiser only in the moment when the consent of his allies, viz., the states who with Prussia form the empire, has been obtained for the declaration of a war. But there is a further and much heavier check on the Emperor's doings. All measures providing ways and means for conducting war must be passed by the Reichstag. The Reichstag is a body elected on the most liberal ballot law that exists anywhere, more liberal even than the ballot law of the United States for the election of a president. The German law, ever since 1867, has been a one man one vote, universal secret, and direct ballot law. The German people are represented as directly and democratically in

the government as the American people are in theirs. The right to vote does not depend either on a census or on any educational test. Any German being twenty-five years and over may vote. The Reichstag consists of 397 members. The conservatives, the so-called "War Party," from which most of the officers are being recruited, is in a hopeless minority, about 55. There are 110 Social Democrats and about 100 Liberals, so that in fact there is a Liberal majority in the German Reichstag. Notwithstanding this composition, this Reichstag has voted unanimously the necessary laws and credits for conducting the present war, and although the Social Democrats reject war on principle in their programme, they have indorsed unanimously the policy of the empire as set out to it by the Emperor's Chancellor.

I say this to prove that this war is not "a Kaiser's war," because he cannot make a war, but it is the "German people's war." A modern war, according to Prince Bismarck's great speech in 1887, with its enormous armies comprising whole peoples, cannot be undertaken with safety nor carried through with success except by the full consent and enthusiastic assistance of the whole nation. Americans returning from Germany will tell you that this consent and enthusiasm are there in the highest degree and that there has never been such a unity of the German people between princes and people, between parties and creeds as there is in these trying times, where not less than seven nations have joined hands to down our people.

But, I hear the reply that the consequences of militarism all-prevailing and all-dominating in Germany have brought about militarism in the other European nations until matters reached such a tension that one day the string had to snap and that it has snapped now. My reply to this is that Germany has not created nor unduly fostered militarism in Europe, that militarism in Germany forms but a very small part of our general activities, and that the maintenance of an army and navy were forced upon us by circumstances, by the history of our country and by our neighbors. We have not the strongest navy and never aspired to have it. Neither have we numerically the strongest army, as can be seen from American papers, which speak of 8,000,000 to 10,000,000 Russian soldiers, while Germany is being credited with

one-half that number. Nor did we start standing armies or navies at all.

Ever since the Hapsburg dynasty withdrew more or less from the old German Empire to develop its own dominions, Austria and Hungary, the "Holy Roman Empire," a term that has been the ridicule of the world for centuries, which is in fact but the territory of modern Germany, has been the cockpit and battleground for all the big wars that European nations, fighting for supremacy, have invariably chosen. Every student of history knows that in the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), for a full human lifetime, the French, the Danes, the Swedes, the Poles, the Austrians, and Croates; even Spaniards, have fought their battles on German soil. A once flourishing and prosperous country was so utterly devastated that at the end of that war it had only one-sixth of its former inhabitants. Everybody further knows that as a sequel to this deplorable condition Louis XIV. was able to tear Alsace-Lorraine from Germany, to which it had belonged for more than 800 years, and that in connection with the Swedes and Poles he carried on war against Little Prussia on German soil.

Goethe, who studied in 1770 in Strassburg, the capital of Alsace, says in his "Wahrheit und Dichtung" that it must not be wondered at that the Alsatians had become so little French, in view of the short space they had belonged to France.

During the next century we have the same picture. Everybody knows of the celebrated "Kaunitz combination," when Russia and Austria, in alliance with France and the Holy German Empire, fought Frederick the Great for seven long years between 1756-63, all on German soil. And only forty years later Napoleon carried on his wars for the supremacy of France in Europe again on that same battlefield, where Germans and Austrians, Russians and Swedes gave each other a rendezvous in their fights against France for another seven long years from the battles of Jena to those of Leipsic and Hanau. It was, and is, the situation of Germany in the middle of Europe, especially as long as she was so powerless and torn up into a number of small states, that makes it so convenient to settle the troubles of the whole of Europe on its territory.

England has had a large standing navy ever since the times of Henry VIII. in the sixteenth century, and it has used that navy to maintain its absolute sway of the sea by always fighting the next best man, be it the Frenchman, the Spaniard, the Dutchman, or the Russian. Russia and Austria have had their armies for centuries back, and so had Spain and especially France. There was no German army because there was no unified Germany. We had a Prussian army only reconstructed in 1863, and the minor forces of twenty-five small states. After having destroyed Napoleon's power better days would have been expected for my country, but quite the reverse was the case. Three great diplomatists combined to keep Germany in her weakened condition—Prinz Metternich, the Austrian prime minister; Prince Talleyrand, the versatile French envoy, and Lord Palmerston. The Napoleonic war ended with the Vienna Congress in 1815. Germany was kept in her powerless and defenseless position under the name of the "German Federation." Holland and later on Belgium, which latter had formed, up to 1830, the southern part of Holland, were constituted neutral buffer states, in order that England would have no reason to fear any power on the other side of the channel, and France managed to have herself surrounded on all parts with absolutely innocuous neighbors. Austria's jealousy of Prussia in connection with the English and French aspiration did not permit the German race to become a nation and a unity.

When Belgium seceded from Holland the Powers selected a king who was both the son-in-law of the King of France and the uncle of the Queen of England, and therefore strongly affiliated with these two countries. The German Federation, in which Prussia had just one vote out of seventeen, was purposely made an unworkable machine, requiring the unanimity of votes for all important measures. This was the situation that Bismarck found when in 1852 he was appointed Prussian envoy to the Federation at Frankfort. He very soon perceived the absolute helplessness and the consequent misery of Germany, so he decided that if the German people were to become a nation and a power commensurate to its population and resources, Austria's domination had first to cease. This was brought about by the war of

1866. The Norddeutscher Bund followed and the common war with France welded Germany into an empire. History, however, had taught Bismarck that this empire could only live and prosper, wedged in as it was in the middle of Europe between the great powers, if it had an army strong enough to defend its frontiers against any attack and invasion; that it had to do as its neighbors had done before, viz.: to create and maintain a large standing force for its preservation and its peace and for the possibility of developing its international advantages and prosperity.

So the German military, as well as its naval force, have been created on purely defensive lines, its alliances have been concluded for defensive purposes only, and Germany holds the record for keeping peace within and outside of Europe for the last forty-four years. It has never coveted its neighbors' territory nor its colonies, it has never gone to war either in or out of Europe, and that is much more than can be said of any of its neighbors and antagonists.

Let us pass them in review. Since 1870: England has conquered Egypt, shelled Alexandria, taken by force two Boer republics; it has added to its sphere, by force, southern Persia, and by intimidation a part of Siam. France has conquered Tunis, she is fighting for Morocco, she has made war on Madagascar, has tried to take the Sudan and conquered Indo-China in bloody war. Russia has fought the Turks in 1878 and the Japanese in 1904, she has torn from China the northern part of Manchuria and all of Mongolia, she has made war on Turkestan, she has bagged northern Persia, she has formed and fomented the Balkan combination and has all along proved herself the most aggressive European power.

All that time Germany has added to its territory only certain colonial possessions, all ceded to her by peaceful agreement and by common consent of the great powers. Willard Grass, a Lene Lenape chieftain, in his petition of 1852 to the legislature of New Jersey for compensation to his tribe for the extinguishment of their fishing rights, declared:

"Not a drop of our blood you have spilled in battle, not an acre of our land you have taken but by our consent."

That is the case of my country in its territorial acquisitions

since 1870 with respect to the European powers. Germany has proved herself the most peaceful European power, even Spain and Italy not excepted, and the militarism plays a very much smaller part in the German national life than with any other nation.

Americans in their love for fair play have frankly acknowledged the great strides that my country has made in the arts of peace, in science and technics, in trade and industry. We had better things to do than to think of how to attack other countries. We have built up a large merchant marine, the second largest in the world; we built up a foreign trade second only to the trade of England, which continues to be the clearing house of the world. We have developed universities, which are visited by students from all parts of the world. Our legislation is made in the interest of the laboring man. Germany has been the first to introduce compulsory national insurance to ward off the consequences of accident and sickness, of old age, widowhood, etc. Our technical advances are undisputed. The electrical, and more so our chemical industries, have conquered the world's markets. German dyes and German medicines, Salvarsan, the Behring serum and others are wanted everywhere. Germany was the first country to accomplish compulsory primary education, and the works of its painters and artists are known the world over. One of the greatest accomplishments finally has been that by developing agriculture as a fine art we made our country self-sustaining and nearly independent from outside food supply. In all this work the Kaiser has been most active and interested. He has always been recognized as a lover of peaceful development. Has it not been significant that he should have been placed on the list of candidates for the Nobel prize of peace?

All this activity, however, presupposes a state of peace in the world; it would be insane to start so many enterprises if the idea of an aggressive or provoked war had been in the mind of the Emperor or of the people. It cannot be denied that all this has been the work of the last forty years. Before that time Germany was known and ridiculed in a way as a country of "poets and thinkers." Are they not the same people who have been doing so much since for civilization? Why didn't they develop

these characteristics before? For the reasons I have just set forth. Without unity, liberty and security from outside interference these characteristics would not have been developed.

A people that must always be afraid of being overrun from all parts, of being made a hostage of the Powers contesting for European supremacy, can do nothing in the works of peace, nothing in the acquisition of property and means, which are the basis of all great commercial and industrial advance. The same claim can be made with regard to the German colonies which have been developed on humanitarian lines and become a valuable addition to our home productions. That such a marvelous development, such a continuous increase in wealth, such an unrelenting competition with the older people for the markets of the world, should create the envy of our neighbors cannot be wondered at, and that they, therefore, should seize an opportunity to give what they call "a lesson to Germany" is not very remarkable.

Now for the reasons of the present war.

The world has become more democratic within the last half century, the power and influence of the dynasties have been replaced to a great extent by the all-prevailing spirit of nationalism and of racial assertion the world over. It is the people who now control the trend of European and of American politics also. The stronger the nationalism or racial feeling becomes the less are the rulers in control. This has happened especially to Russia, which, though autocratic as she is in her Constitution, has forced the Czar to unroll the banner of Pan-Slavism. Pan-Slavism means the rallying of all people of Slav race under the dominion or protectorate of the White Czar. How far the Pan-Slavism has forced upon Russia the protectorate of the Balkans may be seen from the following quotation from the English White Paper document No. 139:

"Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey:

"M. Sazonof informed the French ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian government that war with Russia must

inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death."

You see it was a matter of life and death to Russia that Servia should not be attacked. Everybody knows that a great many Slav peoples are components of the Austrian Empire. Out of a total population (in 1910) of 51,000,000 in Austria-Hungary no less than 20,500,000 are Slavs. The contention of Pan-Slavism, that the Servians and all Slavs must be dependent on Russia and that all Slavs would be protected by Russia, did mean nothing less than the breaking up of Austria. That is what Austria most bitterly resents in her ultimatum.

Whether this war came now, as a consequence of the murder of the Austrian crown prince, or at some later time, is without importance. Come it must, in any event if not today then tomorrow, as long as Mr. Sazonof's theory was upheld, and no international mediation, no court of arbitration of whatever nature would have prevented the clash as long as the Russian theory was maintained and the Russian prestige demanded such theory.

But that such is the Pan-Slavism theory and has been since at least 1878 every reader of the Russian press can testify to. I quote from the New York Times of September 10, 1914:

*"Recasting Europe's Map. Russian Views as to the Final
Division of Territories.*

"Petrograd, Sept. 8.—The 'Pretch' argues that the war must be terminated in such a way that it shall leave no vengeful association on either side. The change in the map of Europe must be final and no nationality must be opposed in the satisfaction of its legitimate ambitions. This ideal is, however, irreconcilable with the evidence of an empire like Austria-Hungary. It is also irreconcilable with the hegemony of Prussia in Germany. Further, it is irreconcilable with the division of Poland and the treaty of Bucharest.

"The unification of Russia, Italy, Germany, Rumania, and

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Servia must be completed. France must recover what has been taken from her and Bulgaria also.

"A hundred years' fight for the principle of nationality must finish with a decision free from all compromise, and, therefore, final.

"These ideas seem to have many advocates in this country."

The national existence of Austria can never be arbitrated upon. It is not too much to say that even the Czar, had he wanted to, could not have prevented this development. The breaking up, however, of Austria-Hungary cannot be tolerated by Germany. Austria is the only aid that Germany has for the purpose of defense which can be relied upon. The breaking up of the Dual Monarchy and the absolute isolation of Germany would have made her an easy prey to her neighbors whenever they chose to attack her.

Sir Edward Grey has said of France that she had to take a hand in the struggle as a consequence of a fixed alliance and as a matter of national honor. That is quite so. Whether this French policy is wise or not need not be discussed, but France has certainly fared very badly for binding herself for good and all to a power which is ruled by racial instinct and whose aims and aspirations she cannot in the least control.

By loaning to Russia 10,000,000,000 francs she has enabled her to go to war, and she is not only the creator of Russia's war machine, but also the battlefield for Russian aspiration and the hostage of Germany for Russia's good behavior in the future. The English theory has always been for centuries back to keep all Europe in an equilibrium of forces, to have her divided in two camps with opponents matched as evenly as possible, so that she should always have a free hand and on whichever scale this hand was pressed that the scale would go down. That England was very much averse to going to war, and that the endeavors of Sir Edward Grey were very serious and very active to avoid the clash, just as incessant as those of the German Emperor and his Chancellor, must be readily believed and understood. But when it had once been decided that Russia could not be held back, in spite of these

endeavors, and as France had been dragged in, England had to take a hand because of this theory of equilibrium.

In 1870 there were 38,000,000 Germans fighting against 40,000,000 of French. At the return of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany the ratio was reversed. Germany had 40,000,000, France 38,000,000. But, while Germany, making great progress in its population and without addition of territory, has now more than 66,000,000 of inhabitants, France has remained absolutely stationary with 40,000,000 inhabitants; it was clear from the start that in a European struggle France must be crushed by the sheer weight in numbers and that the European equilibrium, which was the stock theory of England, would thereby go forever if England did not take a hand in the matter.

It is very often said that England entered into war in consequence of the violation of Belgium's neutrality. Sir Edward Grey, whom I have known for a long while and always considered a superior diplomatist, but a gentleman, has never stated that the breach of the Belgian neutrality was the reason, and even less the only reason, for England's going to war. His theory as expressed in his great speech in the House of Commons on August 3 is contained in his quotation from Mr. Gladstone's address to the House of Commons on August 8, 1870. This quotation runs:

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty, . . . but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine . . . that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy, . . . as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid, and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case. . . . There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power whatever."

This means in so many words that the neutrality treaty did not obligate England to uphold it, and that it was Mr. Gladstone's as well as Sir Edward Grey's opinion that it should be upheld only if and because the particular interest of England commanded it. That it means also this, that the guarantee was not binding upon Germany either if its particular position did not permit of her holding it. Germany has offered Belgium integrity and indemnity, which she refused. Her particular position necessitated marching through Belgium, and this, according to Mr. Gladstone, she had a right to do. Ramsay Macdonald, the great English labor leader, attacking Sir Edward Grey in The Labor Leader of Manchester, comments very bitterly on this theory. He says (see New York Evening Post of September 8) :

"Germany's guarantee to Belgium would have been accepted by Mr. Gladstone. If France had decided to attack Germany through Belgium Sir Edward Grey would not have objected, but would have justified himself by Mr. Gladstone's opinions."

Every unbiased reader of the above quotation will agree to this. The salient point is that, to use Mr. Gladstone's words, England was afraid of "an unmeasured aggrandizement of Germany," and that is why she resolved to defend the Belgian neutrality. This was her interest and such is Mr. Gladstone's theory, which Sir Edward Grey declares rules the British attitude. England has been the foremost power in the world for many hundred years, and Sir Edward Grey did not mean to bargain away lightly this inheritance.

This is also the reason why they demanded of Germany that she should not attack any of the French coasts after France, with English consent, had previously withdrawn her fleet from the Mediterranean. Sir Edward Grey says in the same speech :

"The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has been for some years concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries."

He goes on to say :

"My own feeling is this, that if the foreign fleet, engaged in a

war which France had not sought [Which is not very true.—Dr. Dernberg] and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the unprotected coasts of France, we could not stand aside," etc.

So England thought it necessary to prescribe to Germany from which side to attack France, neither from the sea, because the coasts were undefended, nor from Belgium, because Belgian neutrality was an essential element in England's policy of the equilibrium:

If two locomotives are crashing into each other the buffers are the first parts to go, and if a clash came between England and Germany, necessitated because England had to take up the defense of France, it must not be wondered at that the first thing to go was the buffer state intended purposely to keep the two powers separate, and England, with a weak neighbor on the North Sea. This is to my mind the history of the development of the present struggle. It is the Pan-Slavic agitation and the necessity of the Czar to uphold Russia's prestige which forced his hand to take issue with Austria. It was a necessity for Germany, and I may add here her bounden duty, under the written obligation of the treaty of 1878, to come to the help of Austria and protect her from destruction and dismemberment.

Whoever says that Germany should have forsaken Austria if she did not take Germany's counsel to crouch before Russia's pretences asks her to commit an act of breach of the most solemn obligations and subscribe to the "scrap of paper" theory that is so much attacked. As a matter of fact the scrap of paper theory is not a German but an English invention, as proved above. But not only the treaty with the Dual Monarchy, but the hostile attitude of her neighbors, forced Germany to stand by Austria. That France would come in was a foregone conclusion (they have the same treaty with Russia as we had with Austria) and how and why England's interests dictated her to assist France I have just tried to expose. This trouble has been pending over Europe for a number of years. It is ridiculous to proclaim Russia, the land of pogroms and Siberian horrors, as a progressive European power, as a shield of liberalism, and as the land of

growing liberty. It is rather unfortunate, and I do think it is being regretted very much by England, that their common interest with France has forced it to become allies to Russia.

I believe that the end of all this struggle can only be accomplished when the truly progressive nations of the West, led by Germany and England, join hands to render to Europe her peace on an honest and equitable basis. How this will come about depends upon the spirit of the various peoples. Germany did not want this war; it was forced upon her. Austria felt it as a national necessity; it surely did not want it. France did not want the war; there was too much at stake. England did not wish the war, because she could have been absolutely contented with the state of Europe before the outbreak of the war. It was the Pan-Slavic tendency that got the better of saner views of the Russian Czar that started the ball rolling. In this light is it needless to ask whether the difference between Austria and Serbia could have been arbitrated or not. They are questions of national existence and honor which do not lend themselves to arbitration. The Pan-Slavic theory which wants to bring every Slav under the rule of the Czar is threatening to break up Austria and even wipe it off the European slate. Serbia was used as a wedge and driven into his neighbor's living body. The documents attached to the Austrian ultimatum prove this conclusively.

It is equally useless to try to prove that Germany committed a great wrong by breaking Belgium's neutrality. Mr. Gladstone settled that question once for all in the negative and Sir Edward Grey is with him.

All this is a very sad state of affairs and has been leading to very serious consequences. But it is of no use to stickle at incidents in order to shirk the great issue. The great issue has been and is now whether the Slav is to rule from the Japanese Sea to Berlin and further west, or whether Germany, even fighting with her civilized western neighbors, is to stand up to maintain European civilization and save it from the Rule of the Knout.

The Case of German Militarism.

A Digest of General Friederich von Bernhardt's book, "Germany and the Next War."

Published in the Outlook for September 9, 1914.

Germany has been a peace-loving nation. A rude shock is needed to awaken its warlike instincts, and compel it to show its military strength. The aspirations for peace threaten to poison the soul of the German people. War is not merely a necessary element in the life of nations, but an indispensable factor of culture. And for three reasons. War is a biological necessity. It is a phase of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. It is true that it temporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economical development, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes the primitive brutality of man. But it is nevertheless a necessity for national life. Healthy nations increase in numbers. They require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population and must obtain it by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity. This right of conquest is universally acknowledged. In such cases might becomes the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war, which gives a biologically just decision, since that decision rests on the very nature of things. Industrial conditions may compel the same result. The native population cannot consume all the products of the nation's industries. They depend, therefore, on exportation. This necessity creates an embittered struggle in the markets of the world, and war is required to enable the nation to create colonies which will take the products of its industries.

War is also a moral necessity. It is political idealism which calls for war, while materialism—in theory, at least—repudiates it. It is only the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence that creates the conditions under which mankind develops into the most splendid perfection. When the State recoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion, each individual becomes cramped, selfishness and intrigue run

riot, and luxury obliterates idealism. Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social petrification and stagnation.

War is also a Christian necessity. It demands the exercise of constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism and absolute self-forgetful devotion to one's country. "Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. Love God above all things, and thy neighbor as thyself." But "this law can claim no significance for the relations of one country to another, since its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead men astray. . . . Thus, according to Christianity, we cannot disapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morally and historically." "Any action in favor of collective humanity outside the limits of the State and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide domain of utopias."

Arbitration treaties are detrimental to an aspiring people which is bent on extending its power in order to play its part honorably in the civilized world. "The efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race. . . . A one-sided, restricted, formal law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. The weak nation is to have the same right to life as the powerful nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most disastrous consequences for humanity generally."

War is a peculiar necessity for Germany at the present time. It is necessary to recover for the nation that unity which is lamentably deficient today; to retain for Germany that strength of the German nation which has been pouring into foreign countries and lost to the fatherland; to secure for Germany colonial territory where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of living; to protect Germany from Slavonic races which are ever dashing against her coast. If Germany succeed in guarding its present posses-

sions and preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the world, it must not hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world.

This necessity is accented by the rivalry of France, which has created for herself the second largest colonial empire in the world, while the conqueror of Gravelotte and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her. "All which other nations attained in centuries of natural development—political union, colonial possessions, naval power, international trade—was denied to our nation until quite recently. What we now wish to attain must be *fought for*, and won against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers."

War is not only a necessity for Germany, it is a duty which she owes to the world. "There is no nation whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as the German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the intellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of free and natural development." "No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate all elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it received." "We often see in other nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position." Germans of every profession are actively employed throughout the world in the service of foreign masters. But this is not enough. The fulfillment of Germany's duty to the world will depend on two points: first, how many millions of men in the world speak German; secondly, how many of them are politically members of the German Empire.

Thus the issue is presented to Germany: "world power or downfall." In meeting this issue Germany must take the aggressive as did Frederick the Great, and in more recent history, Japan in her struggle with Russia. Germany must not wait until war is forced upon her. To wait until war is forced upon Germany under conditions unfavorable to her, is to court political downfall. "We must remain conscious in all such eventualities

that we cannot, under any circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as possible, but to bring it on under the most favorable conditions possible." In war the advantages are with the attacking party. Germany must therefore, during the period of preparation, raise the tactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, and then in the war itself "act on the offensive and strike the first blow."

In such a war Germany must expect the hostility of the civilized world. The German Empire "is hated everywhere because of its political and economic prosperity." The Triple Alliance will probably break up by the withdrawal from it of Italy. "Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with Germany or to take part in one." But her policy of marking time can be only transitory. Germany will always find her on the side of those who try to cross Germany's political paths. England, whose aim it is to repress Germany and strengthen France, will be Germany's chief enemy upon the sea. Specific protestations of England's politicians, publicists and Utopians may be disregarded. A specific agreement with England is a will-o'-the-wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. To England the neutrality of Holland or Belgium would be a matter of no moment. "That England would pay much attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbors when such a stake was at issue is hardly credible." No very valuable results can be expected from a war against England's trade. Nevertheless the war against the English must be belligerently prosecuted and should start unexpectedly. "The prizes which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing our vessels to great risks." It is, however, upon France that Germany's attack must first be made. "France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path."

In such a conflict the other members of the Triple Alliance will owe no duty to support Germany, for "neither Austria nor Italy is in any way bound to support by armed force a German

policy directed towards an increase of power." The "neutrality of Belgium will not defend Germany from an invasion by the English, for neutrality is only a paper bulwark." But if invasion of that neutrality is attempted, it will be the duty of the other Powers to intervene, for by the treaties of London of November 15, 1831, and of April 19, 1839, on the part of the five great Powers, it is made "the *duty* of the contracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all agree that it is menaced"; and "each individual Power has the *right* to interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced."

What the Scholars Think.

An Appeal from Rudolf Eucken and Ernst Haeckel.

Published in the Independent for September 28, 1914.

The whole learned world of Germany is at the present time roused to feelings of deep anger and strong moral resentment at the conduct of England. We, who have both of us been for many years connected with England thru the bonds of science and by personal relationships, consider ourselves entitled to give public expression to this feeling of profound indignation.

In close companionship with English scholars of congenial aims, we have zealously endeavored to bring the two great nations closer to each other in spirit and to promote a better mutual understanding; a fruitful interchange of English and German culture appeared to us not only desirable, but indispensable for the intellectual progress of humanity, which is at the present time confronted with such stupendous tasks. We gratefully acknowledge the favorable reception which our endeavors have met with in England; great and noble qualities, native to the English race, manifested themselves to us and we were led to hope that these traits would get the better of and outgrow the dangers and disadvantages bound up in the English character.

And now those qualities have succumbed to the ancient English malady, to a *brutal national egotism* which, careless of morality or its opposite, pursues its own advantage.

Examples of such a ruthless egotism are unfortunately all too common in English history; it may suffice to recall in passing the destruction of the Danish fleet (1807) and the theft of the Dutch colonies during the Napoleonic wars. But what is happening today surpasses every instance from the past; this last example will be permanently characterized in the annals of the world as the *indelible shame of England*. Great Britain is fighting for a Slavic, semi-Asiatic power *against Teutonism*; she is fighting not only in the ranks of barbarism, but also on the side of *wrong and injustice*, for let it not be forgotten that Russia began the war, because she refused to permit adequate expiation for a miserable assassination; but the blame for extending the limits of the present conflict to the proportions of a world-war, thru which the sum of human culture is threatened, rests upon England.

And the reason for all this? Because England was *envious* of Germany's greatness, because she was bound to hinder further expansion of the German sphere at any cost? There cannot be the least doubt that England was determined from the start to break in upon Germany's great conflict for *national existence*, to cast as many stones as possible in Germany's path and to block her every effort toward adequate expansion. England lay in wait, until the favorable opportunity for inflicting a lasting injury upon Germany should come, and promptly seized upon the unavoidable German invasion of Belgian territory as a pretext for draping her own brutal national egotism in a mantle of decency.

Or is there in the whole world a person so simple as to believe that England would have declared war upon France, had the latter power invaded Belgium? In that event, England would have shed hypocritical tears over the necessary violation of international law, while concealing a laughing face behind the mask. The most repulsive thing in the whole business is this hypocritical Pharisaism; it merits only contempt.

History shows that such sentiments as these, far from guiding nations upward, lead them along the downward path. But we of this present time have fixed our faith firm as a rock upon our righteous cause, and upon the superior power and the inflexible

will for victory that abide in the German nation. Nevertheless, the deplorable fact remains, that the boundless egotism already mentioned has for that span of the future discernible to us destroyed the collaboration of the two nations which was so full of promise for the intellectual uplift of humanity. But the other party has willed it so. Upon England alone rests the monstrous guilt and the responsibility in the eye of world-history.

GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain's stake in the present war is her colonial empire. During many centuries she has been acquiring possessions in all parts of the world, until the component parts of the Greater Britain are now larger than the enormous Russian Empire which covers the entire northern parts of Europe and Asia, and extends its influence south into the fast disappearing Turkish and Persian territories. The total possessions of the British Empire include nearly 14,000,000 square miles and 450 million inhabitants—almost a quarter of the total population of the globe. The annual trade is over eight billion dollars. It is said "the sun never sets on England's dominions."

It is obvious that the task of keeping the enormous number of scattered parts together must be difficult; and that unless the loyalty of the colonies is gained, the mother country would be confronted by uprisings whenever a hostile power attacked her. Acting in accord with the theories of the Cobden-Bright school, the colonies received the largest freedom of government about 1850; Gladstone was the natural successor to these principles, but the influence of Queen Victoria against him was too strong. Imperialism begun by Disraeli has found acceptance; especially because of the remarkable increase of territory which it caused since 1875.

The strongest inducement for English colonization has been the isolated position of the British Isles and the system of land inheritance known as primogeniture. This latter is a rule by which the eldest son of the family receives practically the whole of his father's estate. It keeps the family fortune from being dissipated, maintains the family name, and makes the island of England a domain of the first born. But the younger sons become discontented and emigrate. They have settled in scantily inhabited lands and built them up. Being gifted with the art of government, they have gained control of affairs in their adopted lands, first commercially, then officially, and then the

country has become a British colony. Profiting by her experience when she lost America, England has given these new lands practically self-government, retaining for herself control of their foreign relations, commercial and official.

The turning point in her colonial policy was the premiership of Disraeli. When he became premier for the second time, in 1874, the chief colonies were Canada and Australia, both of which had Constitutions of their own. He persuaded Queen Victoria to be crowned Empress of India in 1876, and also solidified English control in the East by the purchase of the majority stock in the Suez Canal in 1875. With the Island of Cyprus, obtained after the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Malta and Gibraltar, England secured control of the Mediterranean. His successors completed the water route in 1882, when, by taking a protectorate over Egypt, they gained the western shore of the Red Sea. England already held the port of Aden on the eastern shore (Aden is situated in the same strategic relation to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal as Gibraltar is to the Mediterranean). Later the entire southeastern coast of Arabia was defined as her sphere of influence.

By the Treaty of Berlin, England was to have a joint sphere of influence with France in Egypt. When revolts broke out in 1881, France refused to aid in suppressing them, England bombarded the port of Alexandria and established a protectorate. Nominally, she is today adviser to the Egyptian Government, but practically controls it, having refused after 1882 to act jointly with France. She has had to fight twice in the upper basin of the Nile; against the natives in 1885, and against the French in 1896.

The colonization of South Africa was largely accomplished in the 80's, when England extended her Cape colony, and occupied Nigeria. Her possessions were confirmed by treaty with Germany in 1890. Acting on the vigorous representations of Cecil Rhodes, she fought the Boer War in 1899, and added the Transvaal to her possessions. During this war public opinion in both Germany and France was very hostile to England. At the close of that period, in 1902, she had a solid strip of territory in the eastern half of Africa from Capetown to the Mediterran-



FROM THE WORLD'S WORK

DIVISION OF AFRICA AMONG THE EUROPEAN POWERS.

Shading at an angle of 45 degrees to the right indicates British territory.

Shading at an angle of 45 degrees to the left indicates Italian territory.

Solid black shading indicates German territory.

Square shading indicates French territory.

ean, except where German East Africa interposed and blocked the accomplishment of Cecil Rhodes's dream of a Cape-to-Cairo Railway.

Since 1905 the ambitions of all European governments have been centered on the division of southwestern Asia as the only part of the world which had not come under the control of some great power. In 1906, Germany was shut out of Persia because of its division into two spheres of influence by England and Russia.

Besides the above areas, Greater Britain consists of many islands in the Pacific archipelagoes, off both coasts of Africa; the West Indies, and on the American mainland British Honduras and British Guiana.

The colonies are now divided into three classes: (1) The self-governing, including Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia and the Union of South Africa; the power in these is really exercised by a responsible cabinet, and not by the governor appointed by the Crown. (2) Crown colonies, in which the lower chamber is elected and the upper appointed by the Crown; these include the Bahamas, Jamaica, Mauritius and Malta. (3) Colonies in which a Crown governor rules alone—Gibraltar and Saint Helena. In India, the King as Emperor appoints a governor, called the viceroy, who is assisted by a partly elective council. British Central Africa, British East Africa, Nigeria and Uganda are protectorates, and in Egypt the British consul-general has practically the powers of a governor. The most remarkable feature of the English government in Egypt and India is that populations of several hundred millions of believers in Oriental religions, many of them allied to the Turk, are held in control by a few thousand Englishmen specially trained for the colonial service.

Following up the reasoning of Disraeli, the idea of a "federated empire" grew rapidly during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and it is now a serious question with England what form it shall take. At the same time that the home government is trying to draw the outlying territories into closer connection with London, the Irish have been fighting for a local government of their own. They have been opposed bitterly by the Imperial-

ists, but the successors of Gladstone have succeeded in putting through the home-rule bill which he introduced twenty-five years ago. In 1875, the Imperial Federation League was formed to promote closer relations with the colonies; conferences of the ministers of the colonies have been held since 1887; and a permanent Imperial staff of secretaries is kept in London. In 1901 the "League of the Empire" was created, but the colonies have become more independent as they grew. Germany believed that with the Irish in revolt and the general tendency of the British Empire to decentralize, Great Britain's colonies would remain neutral or even fight against her. It was predicted the Moslems in Egypt, India and the Dutch in South Africa would rise as well as the Irish.

It must be obvious to any one, that with such widely scattered possessions it is an absolute necessity to maintain a large protecting fleet. The world-wide tendency has been to destroy all artificial barriers such as protective tariffs, and in order to maintain her control of the colonies, England must be prepared to carry their merchandise and give their commerce protection. Most of the colonies have been gained through the influence of trading companies and commercial settlements and with only the trade relation remaining intact, if it is lost, the control of the mother country becomes a mere fiction. The colonies wish for peace, and will cling to that country which can best ensure them peace and good trade.

With German merchants taking the markets of Canada and Africa, the control has become increasingly difficult; Germany feels crowded and would empty her surplus population into any country that could be brought under the German flag, but like the English, the Kaiser is loath to have his people emigrate and change their nationality.

If England, with her insular position, were to lose her fleet, and her commerce were stopped, she would be absolutely without resource. Continental nations may raise at least a large part of their own foodstuffs, but England would starve in a few months. To obviate this danger, Sir A. Conan Doyle has suggested that a tunnel be dug under the English Channel to France. In recent years it had been the custom to make appropriations

for the navy according to the "two-power" standard, which is that the British navy should exceed the combined strength of the next two naval powers by 10 per cent. This is the principle which the creation of the Kaiser's navy has broken. An increase in the pace of shipbuilding by England has been met by a greater appropriation in Germany, until the budgets in both countries have become enormous. The hard feeling between England and Germany dates from 1900, when this naval race began.

If the central government had been obliged to keep up alone, the task would have been tremendous, but some of the colonies have aided in recent years by the donation of dreadnoughts. The army has been kept small, as England depends on the navy to hold invaders out of the British Isles, and in the colonies the principle of home defense has long been recognized. Large bodies of native troops have been efficiently trained by British officers in India and Egypt; Canada and Australia have their own territorial guards.

The Official Version.

Extracts from Sir Edward Grey's Speech, Delivered in the House of Commons, August 3, 1914.

From Hansard's Debates.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose, we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that, because we had entered into that engagement, there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There has been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the "Triple Entente," for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an Alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis, also a Balkan crisis, originating in the annexa-

tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeiras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a General Election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France, then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember, almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time—and I think very reasonably—"If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance,

you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a General Election was in prospect. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on November 22, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government:

"My dear Ambassador,—From time to time in recent years

the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

Lord Charles Beresford: What is the date of that?

Sir E. Grey: November 22, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free and, *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France, out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. [An Hon. Member: "And with Germany!"] I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away. I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship

entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the Northern and Western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing! I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her Northern and Western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Chan-

nel, to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war: and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—[Hon. Members: "Hear, hear!"]—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen—and which perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests—make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once!—whether or not in the

event of attack upon her unprotected Northern and Western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French, coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the Northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.*

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without those conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will

* For the part of this speech referring to Belgian neutrality, see pages 53 to 57.

have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian Treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

The English Military View.

The Supreme Duty of the Citizen at the Present Crisis.

Fieldmarshal Earl Roberts, V. C., K. G.

Published in Hibbert Journal for October, 1914.

I maintain unreservedly that the conflict has been forced upon us by the action of the Pan-German advisers of the German Emperor. The whole resources of the German nation, naval, military, financial, political, journalistic and educational, have been prepared with Teutonic thoroughness for this struggle.

The German navy, which scarcely existed in 1900, has been increased with feverish haste, and at times with borrowed money, until it has become so formidable in the North Sea that we have been compelled to concentrate practically all our battleships in home waters, and to entrust our naval interests in the Mediterranean almost entirely to the care of the French navy.

The German army was increased in 1912, and again in 1913, to such an extent that the peace strength expanded from about 650,000 in 1911 to 822,000 in 1913; and it is a fact worthy of note that this addition of 170,000 men to the numbers with the colours—an addition just equal to our expeditionary force—was made almost immediately after the Morocco crisis of 1911, when the British Government had shown its determination to stand by the side of France against any attempt of German aggression.

Financial preparations included such steps as the increase of the money in the war-chest at Spandau from six to eighteen

million pounds sterling, for the immediate expenses of mobilisation, and the raising of over fifty million pounds by a special levy on the purses of the well-to-do in 1913. The latter sum was demanded as the initial expenditure required for the increase of the peace strength under the law of 1913, but the whole transaction looked much more like a levy for funds needed for a war in immediate prospect than the ordinary provision by a peaceably inclined nation against a war that might be forced upon it at some future date. At any rate, the fact remains that this sum of fifty millions, though ready for collection, was not actually gathered in by the tax collectors at the moment when the present war commenced, and was therefore immediately available for war purposes.

The White Paper (Cd. 7595) which appeared early in September, describing an "official German organisation for influencing the Press of other countries," gives some idea of the efforts made by Germany in the way of journalistic preparations for her great campaign against the peace of Europe. As regards educational efforts leading up to the same object readers of the *Hibbert Journal* are probably better informed than myself. It is merely necessary to refer to the name of such writers and speakers as the historian von Sybel, Herr von Heydebrandt, leader of the Agrarian Party, and Herr Bassermann, leader of the National Liberals, of Professor Theodor Schiemann, of Nietzsche, of General von Bernhardt, and of Treitschke.

The political preparations have been as active, but hardly as successful, as the others. One thread runs through these political operations—the desire to upset the balance of power, to break up the present grouping of the Great Powers, to sever Great Britain from France and from Russia. . . .

But while it is easy to trace the steps taken by the aggressive leaders of Germany to prepare for this war and to force it on at the first favourable opportunity, it is important to remember that war itself is regarded by German leaders of thought from a view-point absolutely different from that held by British and American people generally. In the United States, as in the United Kingdom, war is looked upon as a last resort, to be used only when every other means of settling a dispute has failed.

But the Germans have been taught otherwise. They have been led to look upon peace itself as merely a pause in the life of a nation, a pause which should be applied mainly to preparation for the next war. The clearest exponent of this point of view is General von Bernhardi, whose book, translated into English and published three years ago, is only now being generally read by English people. No less than one-third of his book, *Germany and the Next War*, is devoted to the philosophy and ethics of war. It is written in a moderate and temperate style; its tone is judicial; it is marked by evident candour and sincerity. But the burden of it is a praise of war: war, not as an accident, but as a law of nature; not as a necessary evil, but as the source of all moral good.

Bernhardi maintains that Germany has an imperative need of new markets for her industry and of new territory for her rapidly expanding population. Germany, again, is put forward as the apostle of universal culture, as the champion of civilisation. He realises that the assertion of her claims involves the establishment of German supremacy, and naturally such supremacy cannot be attained so long as the balance of power in Europe remains undisturbed.

The General sees clearly that other nations will not accept German supremacy without a struggle, and this again leads him back to the necessity for enforcing German claims by a ruthless war, "a war to the knife." He admits that France is peaceably inclined, but endeavours to prove that England is determined to attack Germany and to destroy her trade; he even goes so far as to suggest that the supremacy of the British at sea is a threat to the independence of nations generally.

The fact that the next war cannot be confined to two countries only, does not deter General von Bernhardi; he foresees that it will not be a humane war, that it will be a long war, and that it will mean political annihilation to one or other side. But the prospect of all these horrors does not deter him: it only makes him all the more resolved to see that his country deliberately prepares to wage this war and carry it to a successful issue.

It is necessary to understand this German view of war, of the

use of force as justified in order to establish German supremacy, before we can realise that the present war was deliberately forced upon Europe. Nor must it be imagined that General von Bernhardt's views are his alone: they are obviously founded upon the views of Clausewitz, Treitschke, Nietzsche, and many others. I will merely quote the opinions of the last named, as summarised by an English admirer, Mr. Chatterton Hill: "Nietzsche tells us that the great man is not he who is in sympathy with his fellows, but he who is capable of inflicting the cruellest suffering without heeding the cries of his victim. . . . You say a good cause sanctifies every war, but I say a good war sanctifies every cause. The great man of the future . . . must necessarily be a criminal, a man who is the scourge of humanity; who in order to realise the expansion of his personality . . . needs great hecatombs in order to attain his object."

This heady doctrine has been preached for years to the German people, who were already suffering from the pride engendered by sudden prosperity. When we realise these facts, we are able to understand the careful preparation for the present war, and the diabolical severity with which it is being carried on.

The diplomatic negotiations which immediately preceded the war are clearly set out in the Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 7467, "Correspondence respecting the European Crisis," and Cd. 7445, Sir Edward Goschen's account of the rupture of diplomatic negotiations. . . .

But the actual cause of our declaration of war against Germany was the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium, although Prussia, together with France, Russia, and ourselves, had actually signed in 1839 the Treaty of London, which guaranteed the integrity and the neutrality of that little kingdom. Nothing illustrates the attitude of German thought towards war better than the extraordinary speech of the German Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag on 4th August. In it he said: "We were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached."

He obviously considered that the attainment of military ends justified a flagrant breach of international law. This was no slip; it was clearly the ingrained attitude of the Imperial Chancellor's mind as to what was permissible in war, for when Sir Edward Goschen went to see him before leaving Berlin he was subjected to a scolding which lasted for twenty minutes. In his harangue Herr Bethmann-Hollweg spoke of "neutrality" as a word which was "often disregarded in wartime," and asked whether, for "a scrap of paper," Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired to be friends with her. It is not necessary to go in detail through the letters and telegrams, one hundred and sixty in number, which make up the "Correspondence respecting the European Crisis." An excellent summary of these documents appears in the September issue of the *Arbitrator*, the official journal of the Arbitration League. A careful reading of these documents, we are told, justified these conclusions:—

1. The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia was framed so as to make its acceptance as difficult as possible—indeed, practically impossible for an independent State.
2. That Sir Edward Grey was prompt and full of resources in his efforts to find a peaceful solution. His early suggestion of a Conference of the Powers provided an honourable way out for both Austria and Russia.
3. Germany held the key of the situation all the time, and the refusal of the Kaiser's Government to use the collective machinery of the Powers is the cause of the war. Sir Edward Grey succeeded with Italy, France and Russia, but failed at Berlin.
4. It is clear that the violation of the neutrality of Belgium was in the original plan of the German Government; and, though they were willing to give assurance as to the ultimate integrity of Belgium, they meant at all costs to march through it.

When the Committee of a Society such as the International Arbitration League are forced to give public utterance to such conclusions as the above, the case against Germany seems proved.

As to our own reasons for going to war, they were given officially by the Foreign Office in the following terms:

"Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government of the request made by His Majesty's Government for assurance that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected . . . His Majesty's Government has declared to the German Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany as from 11 p.m. on August 4th."

The Prime Minister on August 6th explained in the clearest terms our reasons for going to war. "If I am asked," he said, "what we are fighting for, I can reply in two sentences. In the first place, to fulfil an honourable obligation. . . . Secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power." No nation which has been constrained to draw the sword could wish for a better cause than is here set down. How proud a thing it is for a nation to stand up as defender of its own faith and as a champion of the oppressed, especially when there is the clearest proof that those responsible for its foreign policy made every conceivable effort to secure a peaceful solution of the difficulties which had arisen!

These, then, are the spiritual ideas which underlie this terrible conflict, and they should lead every British citizen to devote all his means, energy, and even life itself, to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

These aspects of the war, strong in themselves, are reinforced by material considerations. The struggle, commenced in support of high ideals of honourable obligation, of a noble resolve to succour and protect a brave but feeble State, has resolved itself into a struggle for self-preservation. For let there be no mistake on this head: if Germany wins in this war, it means the downfall of the British Empire. For the present struggle, renewed in different shape at the commencement of the twentieth century, is but a revival of struggles waged by England towards the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the

seventeenth century under Queen Elizabeth. This struggle began again in the early years of the eighteenth century, when British armies fought for twelve years on the Continent under Marlborough. It was revived at the end of the eighteenth century, and continued until June, 1815, when it was brought to an end by the decisive battle of Waterloo.

This struggle has always the same underlying motive—viz. the determination on the part of England that no single State shall be allowed to upset the balance of power and to dominate the western half of Europe. As soon as any State attempts this, and then gains possession of, or tries to establish itself in, the Low Countries, then England is compelled to take up arms.

In Queen Elizabeth's reign Spain was the powerful and aggressive nation of Western Europe, and she was established in the Netherland; and when the Great Armada sailed the chief design of the whole operation was that this powerful fleet should gain command of the English Channel, pick up the Duke of Parma's trained veterans in the Low Countries, and escort them to the English coast. The real menace to England lay in the fact that Spanish power was established in the Low Countries. The main purpose of Marlborough's famous campaigns was to check the ambitious designs of the French under Louis XIV., and the great battles of Ramilies, Malplaquet, and Oudenarde were fought in the Low Countries.

The war against the French Republic was undertaken because the French had seized the mouths of the Scheldt: the fighting began in Flanders in 1793, and ended at Waterloo, a few miles south of Brussels, in 1815.

At the beginning of the twentieth century we find ourselves engaged in a colossal struggle against Germany, for she is now the strong and aggressive Power which seeks to dominate the western half of Europe, and has, we hope only for a time, established herself in Belgium.

If Germany succeeds in maintaining her hold on Belgium Holland and Denmark will pass under her sway. Then her seaboard will extend in one unbroken line from Memel, along the southern shore of the Baltic, round Denmark, and then by Holland and Belgium to the shores of the English Channel itself.

In Holland and Belgium she will find great naval bases close to our own shores. The hardy sailors and fishermen of Denmark and Holland—seamen little, if at all, inferior to our own—will be taken to man the warships of the German Navy, and the naval competition between Germany and ourselves will become many times more severe than it is at present.

It is conceivable that on such terms the preponderance of naval power might pass from ourselves to Germany, and then our enemy would be able to pass soldiers over the English Channel with the same ease as we have sent troops to France, almost from the day that war began.

In short, the success of Germany, which necessarily involves the crushing of France, would compel us either to undertake naval and military burdens which would soon become intolerable, or else, refusing such burdens, we should sink to the level of a third-rate Power, trembling at the Kaiser's nod.

And for the United States of America what would the triumph of Germany mean? What would be the naval burden thrown on the United States if the Kaiser became in stern reality what he once styled himself in an irrepressible outburst of vanity—the Admiral of the Atlantic?

But the destruction of the proud position of England, the loss of her naval supremacy, would lead to the disruption of the British Empire.

For the British Isles are the heart of the Empire, parts of which are scattered all over the face of the globe. These scattered portions of the Empire, though sundered by the Seven Seas, are kept together by the British Navy, which guards those seas. Naval supremacy is therefore absolutely necessary for us if we are to maintain the Empire; but naval supremacy we cannot have if France is overcome, and if the naval resources of Denmark, Holland, and Belgium pass into the hands of Germany. As Lord Milner has said: "If Western Europe, with all its ports, its harbours, its arsenals, and its resources, were to fall under the domination of a single will, no efforts of ours would be sufficient to retain the command of the sea. It is a balance of power on the Continent which alone makes it possible for us to retain it. Thus the maintenance of that balance

of power is vital to our superiority at sea, which again is vital to the security of the British Empire. But, in order to help to maintain that balance, we require an Army, and no puny Army."

These words were written by Lord Milner in an article entitled "A Civilian View of National Service," and they were part of a powerful plea for universal military training for home defence, which he, like myself and many others, advocated. And we pleaded for it because we saw no other means of getting a sufficient number of our young manhood trained for war in times of peace.

We pleaded in vain, and the war has come upon us, and with it the call for a million more soldiers. This, therefore, is no time for urging the need of universal training; what we have now to do is to respond to Lord Kitchener's appeals for men to be trained *now*. The brave and generous hearts of our young men, who now see the danger which I failed to make them understand, have responded nobly: half a million men have come forward in a few weeks; it is now the supreme duty of every citizen to see that the second half-million of men is furnished with equal promptitude.

There may be some faint hearts which sink when they contemplate the enormous task which we Britons have undertaken in assuming control of one-fifth of the earth's surface and the care of one in five of all the inhabitants of the world. The Germans, indeed, have made it one of the grounds of their attack on us that we have failed to make the right use of our power. "You are," they say, "like Atlas grown weary of his load. We will snatch the trident from Britannia's grasp and show you how a young and virile nation can rule the waves and the best portions of the habitable globe." The accusation that we Britons are not fitted to continue our Imperial work is absolutely without foundation. Nowhere in the world are there more pushing, more thriving, more virile communities than the self-governing Dominions of Overseas Britain; nowhere in the world is there greater freedom of speech and thought, more democratic government, greater religious toleration, than in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Wherever Britons overseas have been given a free hand and

power to rule themselves, the best traditions of good government have been, and are being, upheld.

In India, which is to some extent under the control of the British Parliament, such good work has been done for the development of the country, there is such security for life and property, such respect and toleration for the religious and social customs of the people, that impartial observers of all nations have united in a chorus of unstinted praise of British rule in India. Russian, French, and German writers who have been in India have in turn paid tribute to the sympathy, tolerance, prudence, and benevolence of our rule, and loudest of all in praise has been that gifted observer from the United States of America, Mr. Price Collier.

Nor is there any sign that British administrators are tiring of their task, or likely to fail in bearing "the white man's burden." In each new dependency which comes under our care, young men, fresh from the public schools of Britain, come eagerly forward to carry on the high traditions of Imperial Britain. We have only to look at the work done recently in Nigeria, in the Sudan, in Rhodesia, and in British East Africa, to see that as a race the British are, if anything, more capable than ever of carrying on the work of Empire.

This work is performed by those Britons who leave the country, who go into voluntary exile, in order that the "Pax Britannica" and the benefits which accompany it shall be extended throughout the world. Is it not, then, the duty of those Britons who stay at home to fight with all their might in order that the British Isles, the heart of the Empire, may be kept sound and uninjured? Shall we not show to the world that we are worthy to carry on our work, and prove that we are no degenerate descendants of those who, a century ago, "saved England by their exertions and Europe by their example"?

Great Britain and the Next War.

An Answer to Von Bernhardt's "Germany and the Next War."

Sir A. Conan Doyle.

Extracts from an article published in the *Fortnightly Review* of February, 1913.

Having laid down these general propositions of the value of war, and of the non-existence of international moral obligations, General von Bernhardt then proceeds to consider very fully the general position of Germany and the practical application of those doctrines. Within the limits of this article I can only give a general survey of the situation as seen by him. War is necessary for Germany. It should be waged as soon as is feasible, as certain factors in the situation tell in favour of her enemies. The chief of these factors are the reconstruction of the Russian fleet, which will be accomplished within a few years, and the preparation of a French native colonial force, which would be available for European hostilities. This also, though already undertaken, will take some years to perfect. Therefore, the immediate future is Germany's best opportunity.

In this war Germany places small confidence in Italy as an ally, since her interests are largely divergent, but she assumes complete solidarity with Austria. Austria and Germany have to reckon with France and Russia. Russia is slow in her movements, and Germany, with her rapid mobilisation, should be able to throw herself upon France without fear of her rear. Should she win a brilliant victory at the outset, Russia might refuse to compromise herself at all, especially if the quarrel could be so arranged that it would seem as if France had been the aggressor. Before the slow Slavonic mind had quite understood the situation and set her unwieldy strength in motion, her ally might be struck down, and she face to face with the two Germanic Powers, which would be more than a match for her.

Of the German army, which is to be the instrument of this world-drama, General von Bernhardt expresses the highest opinion: "The spirit which animates the troops, the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail among them, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they are

soon to be summoned to arms their exploits will astonish the world, provided only that they are led with skill and determination." How their "ardour of attack" has been tested it is difficult to see, but the world will probably agree that the German army is a most formidable force. When he goes on, however, to express the opinion that they would certainly overcome the French, the two armies being approximately of the same strength, it is not so easy to follow his argument. It is possible that even so high an authority as General von Bernhardt has not entirely appreciated how Germany has been the teacher of the world in military matters and how thoroughly her pupils have responded to that teaching. That attention to detail, perfection of arrangement for mobilisation and careful preparation which have won German victories in the past may now be turned against her, and she may find that others can equal her in her own virtues.

Poor France, once conquered, is to be very harshly treated. Here is the passage which describes her fate:

"In one way or another we must *square our account with France* if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path."

It is not said how Germany could permanently extinguish France, and it is difficult to think it out. An indemnity, however large, would eventually be paid and France recover herself. Germany has found the half German border provinces which she annexed so indigestible that she could hardly incorporate Champagne or any other purely French district. Italy might absorb some of the Savoy and the French Riviera. If the country were artificially separated the various parts would fly together again at the first opportunity. Altogether, the permanent sterilisation of France would be no easy matter to effect. It would probably be attempted by imposing the condition that in future no army, save for police duties, would be allowed her. The history of Prussia itself, however, shows that even so stringent a pro-

hibition as this can be evaded by a conquered but indomitable people.

Let us now turn to General von Bernhardi's views upon ourselves, and, first of all, it is of interest to many of us to know what are those historical episodes which have caused him and many of his fellow-countrymen to take bitter exception to our national record. From our point of view we have repeatedly helped Germany in the past, and have asked for and received no other reward than the consciousness of having co-operated in some common cause. So it was in Marlborough's days. So in the days of Frederic. So also in those of Napoleon. To all these ties, which had seemed to us to be of importance, there is not a single allusion in this volume. On the other hand, there are very bitter references to some other historical events which must seem to us strangely inadequate as a cause for international hatred.

We may, indeed, congratulate ourselves as a nation, if no stronger indictment can be made against us than is contained in the book of the German general. The first episode upon which he animadverts is the ancient German grievance of the abandonment of Frederic the Great by England in the year 1761. One would have thought that there was some statute of limitations in such matters, but apparently there is none in the German mind. Let us grant that the premature cessation of a campaign is an injustice to one's associates, and let us admit also that a British Government under its party system can never be an absolutely stable ally. Having said so much, one may point out that there were several mitigating circumstances in this affair. We had fought for five years, granting considerable subsidies to Frederic during that time, and despatching British armies into the heart of Germany. The strain was very great, in a quarrel which did not vitally affect ourselves. The British nation had taken the view, not wholly unreasonably, that the war was being waged in the interests of Hanover, and upon a German rather than a British quarrel. When we stood out France did the same, so that the balance of power between the combatants was not greatly affected. Also, it may be pointed out as a curious historical fact that this treatment which he so much

resented was exactly that which Frederic had himself accorded to his allies some years before at the close of the Silesian campaign. On that occasion he made an isolated peace with Maria Theresa, and left his associates, France and Bavaria, to meet the full force of the Austrian attack.

Finally, the whole episode has to be judged by the words of a modern writer: "Conditions may arise which are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. The country's own interests—considered, of course, in the highest ethical sense—must then turn the scale." These sentences are not from the work of a British apologist, but from this very book of von Bernhardt's which scolds England for her supposed adherence to such principles. He also quotes, with approval, Treitschke's words: "Frederic the Great was all his life long charged with treachery because no treaty or alliance could ever induce him to renounce the right of free self-determination."

Setting aside this ancient grievance of the Seven Years' War, it is of interest to endeavour to find out whether there are any other solid grounds in the past for Germany's reprobation. Two more historical incidents are held up as examples of our perfidy. The first is the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, when the British took forcible possession in time of peace of the Danish fleet. It must be admitted that the step was an extreme one, and only to be justified upon the plea of absolute necessity for vital national reasons. The British Government of the day believed that Napoleon was about to possess himself of the Danish fleet and would use it against themselves. Fouché has admitted in his *Memoirs* that the right was indeed given by a secret clause in the Treaty of Tilsit. It was a desperate time, when the strongest measures were continually being used against us, and it may be urged that similar measures were necessary in self-defence. Having once embarked upon the enterprise, and our demand being refused, there was no alternative but a bombardment of the city with its attendant loss of civilian life. It is not an exploit of which we need be proud and at the best can only be described as a most painful and unfortunate necessity, but I should be surprised if the Danes on looking back to it, judge it more harshly than some more recent experiences which

they have had at the hands of General von Bernhardt's own fellow-countrymen. That he is himself prepared to launch upon a similar enterprise in a much larger and more questionable shape is shown by his declaration that if Holland will not take sides against England in the next war it should be overrun by the German troops.

General von Bernhardt's next historical charge is the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, which he describes as having been effected upon hypocritical pretences in a season of peace. To those who have a recollection of that event and can recall the anti-European movement of Arabi and the massacre which preceded the bombardment the charge will appear grotesque. But it is with a patchwork quilt of this sort that this German publicist endeavours to cover the unreasoning, but none the less formidable jealousy and prejudice which inflame him against this country. The foolish fiction that the British Government declared war against the Boers in order to gain possession of their gold mines is again brought forward, though one would have imagined that even the gutter-Press who exploited it twelve years ago had abandoned it by now. If General von Bernhardt can explain how the British Government is richer for these mines, or whether a single foreign shareholder has been dispossessed of his stock in them, he will be the first who has ever given a solid fact in favour of this ridiculous charge. In a previous paragraph of his book he declares that it was President Kruger who made the war and that he was praiseworthy for so doing. Both statements cannot be true. If it was President Kruger who made the war, then it was not forced on by Great Britain in order to possess herself of the goldfields.

So much for the specific allegations against Great Britain. One can hardly regard them as being so serious as to wipe out the various claims, racial, religious, and historical, which unite the two countries. However, we are only concerned with General von Bernhardt's conclusions, since he declares that his country is prepared to act upon them. There remain two general grounds upon which he considers that Germany should make war upon the British Empire. The first is to act as the champion of the human race in winning what he calls the free-

dom of the seas. The second is to further German expansion as a world-Power, which is cramped by our opposition.

The first of these reasons is difficult to appreciate. British maritime power has been used to insure, not to destroy, the freedom of the seas. What smallest Power has ever been hindered in her legitimate business? It is only the pirate, the slaver and the gun-runner who can justly utter such a reproach. If the mere fact of having predominant latent strength upon the water is an encroachment upon the freedom of the sea then some nation must always be guilty of it. After our mild supremacy we may well say to Germany, as Charles said to James: "No one will assassinate me in order to put you upon the throne." Her mandate is unendorsed by those whom she claims to represent.

But the second indictment is more formidable. We lie athwart Germany's world ambitions, even as, geographically, we lie across her outlets. But when closely looked at, what is it of which we deprive her, and is its attainment really a matter of such vital importance? Do we hamper her trade? On the contrary, we exhibit a generosity which meets with no acknowledgment, and which many of us have long held to be altogether excessive. Her manufactured goods are welcomed in without a tax, while ours are held out from Germany by a twenty per cent tariff. In India, Egypt and every colony which does not directly control its own financial policy, German goods come in upon the same footing as our own. No successful war can improve her position in this respect. There is, however, the question of colonial expansion. General von Bernhardt foresees that Germany is increasing her population at such a pace that emigration will be needed soon in order to relieve it. It is a perfectly natural national ambition that this emigration should be to some place where the settlers need not lose their flag or nationality. But if Great Britain were out of the way, where would they find such a place? Not in Canada, Australia, South Africa or New Zealand. These states could not be conquered if the Motherland had ceased to exist. General von Bernhardt talks of the high lands of Africa, but already Germany possesses high lands in Africa, and their colonisation has not been a success.

Can anyone name one single place upon the earth's surface suitable for white habitation from which Germany is excluded by the existence of Great Britain? It is true that the huge continent of South America is only sparsely inhabited, its whole population being about equal to that of Prussia. But that is an affair in which the United States, and not we, are primarily interested, and one which it is not our interest either to oppose or to support.

But, however inadequate all these reasons for war may seem to a Briton, one has still to remember that we have to reckon with the conclusions exactly as if they were drawn from the most logical premises. These conclusions appear in such sentences as follows:—

"What we now wish to attain must be fought for and won against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers."

"Since the struggle is necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may."

"A pacific agreement with England is a will-o'-the-wisp, which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep the possibility of war with England before our eyes and arrange our political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselves with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists and Utopians, which cannot alter the real basis of affairs."

"The situation in the world generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world, or renounce such position once for all. We must not in any case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide that the hour of attack has come."

"Even English attempts at *rapprochement* must not blind us to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success."

This last sentence must come home to some of us who have worked in the past for a better feeling between the two countries. And this is the man who dares to accuse *us* of national perfidy.

These extracts are but few from a long series which show

beyond all manner of doubt that Germany, so far as General von Bernhardt is an exponent of her intentions, will undoubtedly attack us suddenly should she see an opportunity. The first intimation of such attack would, as he indicates, be a torpedo descent upon our Fleet, and a wireless message to German liners which would bring up their concealed guns, and turn each of them into a fast cruiser ready to prey upon our commerce. That is the situation as he depicts it. It may be that he mistakes it. But for what it is worth, that is his opinion and advice.

He sketches out the general lines of a war between England and Germany. If France is involved, she is to be annihilated, as already described. But suppose the two rivals are left face to face. Holland and Denmark are to be bound over to the German side under pain of conquest. The German Fleet is to be held back under the protection of the land forts. Meanwhile, torpedoes, submarines and airships are to be used for the gradual whittling down of the blockading squadrons. When they have been sufficiently weakened, the Fleet is to sally out and the day has arrived. As to the chances of success, he is of the opinion that in material and *personnel* the two fleets may be taken as being equal—when once the numbers have been equalised. In quality of guns, he considers that the Germans have the advantage. Of gunnery he does not speak, but he believes that in torpedo work his countrymen are ahead of any others. In airships, which for *reconnaissance*, if not for actual fighting power, will be of supreme importance, he considers also that his country will have a considerable advantage.

Such, in condensed form, is the general thesis and forecast of this famous German officer. If it be true, there are evil days coming for both his country and for ours. One may find some consolation in the discovery that wherever he attempts to fathom our feelings he makes the most lamentable blunders. He lays it down as an axiom, for example, that if we were hard-pressed the Colonies would take the opportunity of abandoning us. We know, on the other hand, that it is just such a situation which would bring about the Federation of the Empire. He is under the delusion also that there is deep commercial and political jealousy of the United States in this country, and that this

might very well culminate in war. We are aware that there is no such feeling, and that next to holding the trident ourselves we should wish to see it in the hands of our American cousins. One thing he says, however, which is supremely true, which all of us would endorse, and which every German should ponder: it is that the idea of a war between Germany and ourselves never entered into the thoughts of anyone in this country until the year 1902. Why this particular year? Had the feeling risen from commercial jealousy upon the part of Great Britain it must have shown itself far earlier than that—as early as the “Made in Germany” enactment. It appeared in 1902 because that was the close of the Boer War, and because the bitter hostility shown by the Germans in that war opened our eyes to the fact that they would do us a mischief if they could. When the German Navy Act of 1900 gave promise that they would soon have the means of doing so, the first thoughts of danger arose, and German policy drove us more and more into the ranks of their opponents. Here, then, General von Bernhardt is right; but in nearly every other reference to our feelings and views he is wrong; so that it is to be hoped that in those matters in which we are unable to check him, such as the course of German thought and of German action in the future, he is equally mistaken. But I repeat that he is a man of standing and reputation, and that we should be mad if we did not take most serious notice of the opinions which he has laid down.

The English Writers' View.

A Vision of the Armageddon. H. G. Wells.

Published in the New York Times of August 5, 1914.

London, Aug. 4.—At last the intolerable tension is over. Europe is at war. The monstrous vanity that was begotten by the easy victories of 1870-71 has challenged the world. Germany prepares to reap the harvest that Bismarck sowed. That trampling, drilling foolery in the heart of Europe that has arrested civilization and darkened the hopes of mankind for forty years—German imperialism and German militarism—has struck its inevitable blow.

The victory of Germany will mean the permanent enthronement of the war god over all human affairs. The defeat of Germany may open the way to disarmament and peace throughout the earth. To those who love peace there can be no other hope in the present conflict than her defeat, the utter discrediting of the German legend—ending it for good and all—of blood and iron, the superstition of Krupp, flag-wagging, Teutonic Kiplingism, and all that criminal sham efficiency that centres in Berlin.

Never was a war so righteous as is the war against Germany now: never any State in the world so clamored for punishment; but be it remembered that Europe's quarrel is with Germany as a State, not with the German people, with the system, not with the race.

The older tradition of Germany is a pacific, civilizing tradition. The temperament of the mass of the German people is kindly, sane, amiable. Disaster to the German Army, if it is unaccompanied by such a memorable wrong as dismemberment or intolerable indignity, will mean the restoration of the greatest people of Europe to the fellowship of the western nations.

The rôle of England in the huge struggle is as plain as daylight. We have to fight if only on account of the Luxemburg outrage. We have to fight. If we do not fight England will cease to be a country to be proud of and we shall have a dirt bath to escape from.

But it is inconceivable that we should not fight, and, having fought, then in the hour of victory it will be for us to save the liberated Germans from vindictive treatment, to secure for this great people their right to a place in the sun as one united German-speaking State.

First, we have to save ourselves and Europe, and then we have to stand between the Germans on the one hand, and Cosack revenge on the other.

JAPAN

The Japanese have been called the "Britons of the East," largely because their situation with respect to Asia is similar to that which the British Isles occupy to Europe. It will be noticed that the Japanese Islands form a crescent shaped archipelago off the coast of Asia, and that they are protected from the wars of the mainland just as England is separated from those of Europe. So the defence of the Japanese with their many miles of coast line lies in maintaining a large navy rather than an army.

In still another respect, Japan is situated similarly to England. The peninsula of Korea and the coast of Manchuria, particularly the Liao Tung peninsula, correspond to the position of Holland and Belgium in Europe. Japan has attempted to set them up as buffer states to prevent the seizure of the coast line opposite her own by any hostile power. She gained her end by the terms of the treaty of Portsmouth at the close of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. She has risen to the rôle of a major power only within the last twenty years, and the conflict of her ambitions with those of Russia has necessitated the formation of a balance of power for Asia as well as Europe. She first appeared as a great state when in 1894 she completely defeated China. She had just concluded a treaty of peace by which she was to annex part of Manchuria, when Russia, France and Germany stepped in and prevented her from taking any territory on the mainland of Asia. It was easy to understand the attitude of Russia and France, both of whom had interests in China, but Germany was an interloper whom Japan never forgave. Subsequently Germany acquired the Bay of Kiaochow.

The balance of power until 1898 centered about the disintegration of China, but in that year Secretary Hay of the United States secured the adoption of his neutralization policy, which pledged the Great Powers of Europe, Japan and the United States to preserve the integrity of China, and open her ports on equal terms to all nations. Two years later Great Britain signed

the first of her eastern treaties with Japan. It was a purely defensive alliance, and merely bound one of the signatories, if the other were attacked, to remain neutral and use its good offices. It tended to divide the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of China into two camps, just as the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente have done in European affairs. But in this case the alignment was Germany and Russia against England and Japan.

Russia has marched just as resistlessly across Asia as she has advanced toward Constantinople in Europe; she was merely checked but not beaten during the Japanese War. Japan got control of Korea, which was opposite her own coast, and Russian leasehold of southern Manchuria was transferred to her. But Russia still needs a port free from ice as an outlet for her great inland empire of Siberia. Since she lost Port Arthur to the Japanese she has lacked a good seacoast city.

Besides her interest in China, Great Britain has also valuable interests in India, and the approach of Russia and Germany from the north and west has troubled her. Therefore, she has been led to seek an ally for the protection of her interests, and at the close of the war in 1905, a new and closer treaty, known as the Anglo-Japanese alliance, was drawn up between England and Japan. It makes the joint operations much wider than the treaty of 1902, being both offensive and defensive, and extending its scope to cover an attack on either Power in any part of Asia. Article I of the treaty reads:

"It is agreed that whenever in the opinion of Great Britain or Japan any of the rights or interests referred to in the preamble of this agreement are in jeopardy, the two governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests."

Japan's Ultimatum to Germany.

(Translation)

"We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbances of the peace in the Far East, and to safeguard the general interests as contemplated by the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain.

"In order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give the advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

"First—To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

"Second—To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

"The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of it not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an answer from the Imperial German Government, signifying its unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as she may deem necessary to meet the situation.

Tokyo, August 16, 1914.

**The Imperial Rescript Issued by the Emperor of Japan
Declaring War on Germany.**

(Translation.)

"We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:

"We hereby declare war against Germany, and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that empire with their strength, and we also command our competent authorities to make every effort, in pursuance of their respective duties, to attain the national aim by all means within the limits of the law of nations.

"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which we view with grave concern, we on our part have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-Chau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed vessels cruising the seas of Eastern Asia are threatening our commerce and that of our ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

"Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty, after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance and we on our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commanded our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of our reign and while we are still in mourning for our lamented mother.

"It is our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of our faithful subjects peace may soon be restored and the glory of the empire be enhanced."

Tokyo, August 23, 1914.

The Premier of Japan to the American People.**A Message from Count Okuma.**

Published in The Independent of August 31, 1914.

I gladly seize the opportunity to send, thru the medium of The Independent, a message to the people of the United States, who have always been helpful and loyal friends of Japan.

It is my desire to convince your people of the sincerity of my Government and of my people in all their utterances and assurances connected with the present regrettable situation in Europe and the Far East.

Every sense of loyalty and honor oblige Japan to co-operate with Great Britain to clear from these waters the enemies who in the past, the present and the future menace her interests, her trade, her shipping and her people's lives.

This Far Eastern situation is not of our seeking.

It was ever my desire to maintain peace as will be amply proved; as President of the Peace Society of Japan I have consistently so endeavored.

I have read with admiration the lofty message of President Wilson to his people on the subject of neutrality.

We, of Japan, are appreciative of the spirit and motives that prompted the head of your great nation and we feel confident that his message will meet with a national response.

As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or any other peoples of anything which they now possess.

My Government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always keeps promises.

Tokyo, August 24, 1914.

RUSSIA

Russia is a great inland empire of eight and a half million square miles (including her Asiatic provinces) which has been searching more than a half century for adequate outlets to the sea. On the map her coast line appears long, but most of it either lacks harbors or the deep waters are so far north as to be closed by ice in the winter. Such is the case with the ports on the Arctic Ocean and the White Sea, also in the northern part of Siberia, and even at Riga and Petrograd on the Baltic navigation is closed on an average of 150 days each year. The Caspian Sea, another of Russia's great waterways, has no exterior outlet, and the only port that is open to navigation in the winter is Odessa on the Black Sea. But this is practically closed except by the favor of the Turk who controls Constantinople, guarding the Straits of Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Straits of Bosphorus, which form the outlet to the Mediterranean. In the present war he has thus kept the Russian Black Sea fleet out of action. Constantinople is the key to this southern situation, and Russia has been moving irresistibly toward it, though she was defeated in the Crimean War, and robbed of the fruits of conquest at the close of the Russo-Turkish war in 1878 by the intervention of England and Austria.

After that she turned to the development of her Asiatic resources, and marched five thousand miles across the continent of Asia for a foothold on the Pacific. She had secured part of Manchuria by lease from the Chinese in the middle of the nineteenth century, and during the 90's the Trans-Siberian Railway was built to connect the wheat fields of European Russia with the coast of the Yellow Sea at Port Arthur. But here again she conflicted with the interests of Japan (and indirectly England.) The Russo-Japanese war in 1904 crushed her dream of sea power on the Pacific when she lost Port Arthur to the Japanese.

So her situation is that she has really nowhere to turn:

England and Japan are against her on the Pacific; Germany, England and Austria on the Dardanelles, and Germany holds the two ports of Danzig and Königsberg on the Baltic that she desires.

Though apparently beaten in the last three wars in which she has engaged, the vast resources of the European-Asiatic Empire have never been entirely thrown into the scale of conflict. The Crimean War was limited to a small area near the Black Sea, as was the Russo-Turkish War; in the Japanese war the European troops available to fight Japan were never brought to the battlefield, and the Czar was compelled to make peace on account of the internal disruption of his empire.

Russia is not, as generally conceived, a homogeneous Slav state. The race mixture within her borders is almost as remarkable as that to be found in Austria-Hungary. Of the 129,000,000 population of the Empire in 1897, but 92,000,000 were Slavs; 12,000,000 were Asiatic Tartars; 5,500,000 were Finns (akin to the Magyars of Hungary); 5,000,000 were Jews; 3,000,000 were of Latin and Germanic stock; and 3,000,000 Lithuanians. The race struggle differs from that of Austria-Hungary because the country is so thinly populated and there is little education or means of communication. Until recently there has been no representative government to express dissatisfaction. But in the crucial test of the Japanese war the people seized their chance to get concessions.

The most irreconcilable parts of the empire are Poland and Finland. Poland, once an independent kingdom, consisting of present day Russian Poland, part of German Posen and Austrian Galicia, was divided by successive partitions among the states which surrounded it, until there was left but a small strip of land around Warsaw. With the fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna, the freedom of the Duchy of Warsaw was guaranteed under the protection of Russia, but after a revolt in 1830, it was formally annexed and ruled from Petrograd. There have been many tumultuous days in Warsaw since; the loyalty of Poland in time of war has always been in question, for the Poles demanded nothing short of a constitutional government of their own.

Finland, too, had an assembly of its own until seizing a favorable moment in 1899, Nicholas declared it part of the central government. Finland protested to the Great Powers that the act was a violation of its rights, but received no aid. At the time of the Japanese war, a general strike by all the laborers forced the government to grant demands for a constitutional assembly. After the crisis had passed, the assembly became a mere figurehead.

The incorporation of Finland and Poland was part of the general movement of "Russification"; and an attempt to suppress racial differences and form one language, one church, and one government. In its wider aspect, it is called Pan-Slavism and includes the Slav races of the states in the Balkans. It first appeared violently on the accession of Alexander III to the throne in 1881. The Russian Czar, like the former Popes of the Roman Catholic world, unites in himself the rule of the Greek (Slav) Catholic Church and the temporal power over the vast areas of the Russian Empire. Alexander had been trained by a noted professor named Pobedonostev, who became under him the Procurator of the Holy Synod (second to the Czar himself). Pobedonostev, as the power behind the throne, influenced Alexander to overthrow the alliance with Germany to which his father had held. It was the common complaint of the Russian nobility at this time that the important positions at the Russian court were held by Germans from the Baltic region of Russia, and that almost without exception the great Russian universities were Germanic in culture. Alexander, though bound by the *Dreikaiserbund*, was beginning to grow cool to Bismarck's pleas, and finally yielded to Pobedonostev. A mad wave of Russification swept over the land; the Germans were removed from court and university, the Jews were persecuted, and the attempt to proselyte Greek Catholics begun. (According to an estimate made in 1905, but 87,000,000 of 140,000,000 of the population were members of the Orthodox faith.) The Russification at that time struck particularly hard in Poland which is strongly Roman Catholic, and Finland which is Protestant. In the train of this oppression arose many revolts, all of which were put down under the firm hand of the authorities. The power of the

German element was crushed, and the Jews were much oppressed. Germany and Russia, who had been friendly and in alliance almost continually since the close of the Napoleonic wars, broke with each other, and Russia formed the double entente with France.

Though Pobedonostev lost much of his influence when the present Czar ascended the throne, Nicholas II has, with few exceptions, continued the policy of his predecessor. His intolerance of foreign creeds has been less harsh, but the attempt to take all of the population in his secular domain under his spiritual control has continued unabated.

As the Father of the Slavs he has gone further and encouraged the race movements in the Balkan states; the son of Ferdinand of Bulgaria has been converted to the faith. The policy of Nicholas toward Turkey has also been changed. Alexander, who reigned before the present German-Austrian movement toward Constantinople and western Asia had become marked, was inclined to leave the Sultan to his fate, but since the Japanese war, Nicholas has assumed the attitude of "protector" over the Turks as well as over the other Balkan States.

Since Germany and Russia drew away from each other in the 80's, the German and Austrian alliance has been closer. The tension of Austro-Russian relations, and through them the Russo-German relations has been increased in recent years; the first time by Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 and again at the close of the Balkan war, when Austria blocked the ambitions of the Slav states.

The Rise of Russia.

James Davenport Whelpley.

Published in the Independent of September 21, 1914.

Russia is the most prolific field in the world for the seeker after literary thrills: One of England's best known and most widely read publicists recently said that his audience had been so thoroly well trained to expectation of the melodramatic in anything about Russia that any one writing of practical affairs in connection with that country was either accused of being a

paid agent of the Russian Government, or else lost his audience thru its disappointment or boredom. There is a great deal of truth in this, and yet there is a Russia, and a Russian people, all too little known to other nations, considering the enormous part in the history of the world this country is now playing.

Russia has now a population of about one hundred and seventy million. At the present rate of increase there will be about two hundred million within ten years. These one hundred and seventy million people live in a land nearly nine million square miles in extent, or almost three times as large as the United States. Of the population, about fifteen million are Mohammedans, Buddhists, or other non-Christians, about five million are of Jewish faith, and over one hundred and ten million are of the various sects of the Christian religion. The great land in which these people live has nearly two million square miles of forest, an area greater than half of Canada. The greatest system of waterways on the earth's surface furnishes at present the main trade channels of the empire. Six of these wonderful rivers alone have a total length of sixteen thousand miles. There are forty-five thousand miles of railway, or more than in any other country except the United States, Germany coming next with seven thousand miles less.

These are facts demonstrated by figures which might be dull but for the vastness of the panorama they stand for. They are in a way necessary to the mental picture of a country of such tremendous proportions and such vast potentialities. The land, the forests and the rivers have been there always. From the dawn of history they have been utilized to a certain extent by human beings, but it is only within the past thirty years that they have become the foundation of a vast system of orderly industrial development by a people whose intellectual growth is proceeding on parallel lines. In fifty years the increase of population in Russian cities has averaged over 300 per cent, and in that same period the population of Moscow, the industrial heart of Russia, has increased from 359,000 to 1,620,000, or nearly 500 per cent, and the character of its industries has changed from the small shop for hand-workers to modern factories employing in single instances as many as ten thousand people. Russia is now

the second largest cotton consuming country in Europe, and the third largest in the world.

Figures issued by the Government at Washington credit Russia with less than \$30,000,000 worth of imports from the United States, whereas owing to the fact that the larger part of the trade is indirect, the total is at least five times that amount. Over \$50,000,000 worth of American cotton now goes to Russia each year, and it will not be long before \$100,000,000 worth will be needed. Harvesting machinery of American design and manufacture is sold in Russia to the amount of over \$25,000,000 annually. American life insurance companies are carrying over \$100,000,000 insurance in Russia, as shown by the \$25,000,000 kept on deposit in Russian banks to guarantee these policies. American steel and iron products, shoes, machinery of all kinds, and in fact, something in every line that goes toward modernizing the life of a country, make up the total of the Russian imports. These are nearly all goods that can be obtained elsewhere, but "made in America" has been, until the recent misunderstanding between the two nations over the passport question, a supreme recommendation to the Russian buyer.

No such progress and stirring of new life could come to any country, no matter how rich in natural resources, unless it arose from an awakening of the people. The Duma has finally become an actual working force in the national government, one which ministers take into serious account in all governmental projects. The fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Zemstvos, the Russian form of popular local government, was celebrated last year. The greatest work of the Zemstvos has been in the improvement of roads, the assistance of agriculture, the establishment of agricultural credits and farm loans, and the introduction of machinery.

In no phase of social development have greater changes taken place than in the domain of the education of the people. There are now over six million children at school, or nearly half as many as attend the public schools of the United States. The universities have been thrown open to women and nearly six thousand are enrolled at the St. Petersburg University alone, in the classes of history, mathematics and law. The expenditure

of the general Government for educational purposes this year will amount to nearly \$100,000,000. There are now four thousand Russian agricultural societies, fifteen thousand pupils in the agricultural schools, and last year three hundred thousand farmers attended lectures given for the benefit of those who till the land. Over five thousand agricultural specialists are employed by the Government to assist the farmer. There are many defects in these educational facilities, and in proportion to the population they are limited, but that they exist at all is in sharp contrast to past conditions.

For five years the Government has carried on a great work in the settlement of Siberia, and a minimum of two hundred and fifty thousand people is being moved each year from congested districts in western Russia to the free lands farther east. Communal ownership is being done away with, and fifty-four million acres of farms have now come under individual workings. The Government has spent over ten million dollars the last five years in this work of agricultural land organization. Over \$65,000,000 has been spent during the same period in assisting Russian immigration into southern Siberia, and the single great trans-continental railroad to the Far East is blocked during the summer months with the hundreds of immigrant trains, each swarming with men, women and children on their way to the open. Siberia to the Russian of Europe now stands for what America did to the alien land-seekers of the eighties and nineties.

In the effort to increase the yield of cotton within the empire, ambitious plans have been made to irrigate over eight million acres of land in Turkestan, at a cost of \$80,000,000, and a notable beginning has been made on this work. In 1900 Russia produced thirty-one per cent of the oil of the world, but owing to the recent slackening of the Baku output, this percentage has decreased. This decrease, however, has stimulated development of coal mining, for which there is a practically unlimited field. The building of new railroads and the improvement of river navigation are two items in the national expenditure which, by themselves, equal the entire disbursement of many smaller countries.

Far more significant than the actual figures of the spread

of educational facilities in Russia is the undoubted rapid awakening of the mentality of the mass of the people. The comparatively new and more or less sudden demand for reading matter has led to keen competition in the publishing world, and there can certainly be no complaint of the amount at least of the reading matter which the subscriber can get for his money. For instance, *The Niva*, the Russian *Family Herald*, which costs \$3.75 a year, gives away to each subscriber twenty-five volumes of the works of Korolenko, the complete works of Rostand, the complete works of Maikoff, and many occasional feature supplements of the journal itself. *The Little Lark*, published at \$2.50 a year, gives fifty illustrated volumes, and in addition many "works of art" in the shape of chromos. *The Messenger of Knowledge*, published at \$4.50 a year, among other things presents its readers with Buckle's *History of Civilization*, Haeckel's *Theory of the Universe*, Draper's *Evolution of Europe*, books by Tolstoi and Rousseau, a *History of Science*, Lubbock's *How to Live*, and others too numerous to catalog. The cheapness of printing and the profit from advertisements are the only possible explanation of this remarkable "money's worth" which is offered to subscribers.

It requires a nice mental balance to estimate values in the present state of the Russian people, and to give proper proportion to the strange anomalies witnessed in the conduct of Russian affairs. One important thing should be especially borne in mind, and that is the close mental alliance between the Slav and the Oriental. The Slav is on the borderland of Western civilization not only in material, but in spiritual things as well. It is not so long ago that the serfs were made free; it is but a few years since the education of the people was first attempted to any degree, and it is within the last twenty-five years or less that Western ideas have had even restricted access to the minds of the mass of the Russian people. For generations a bureaucracy and a priesthood held autocratic sway, and none questioned the supremacy of their right. Both bureaucracy and priesthood are yielding perforce to the progressive movement, but there are still thousands of communities in the vast hinterland of Russia practically untouched by the forces of modern life.

No matter how wise or progressive a Government might prevail in St. Petersburg, the great machine of the office-holders possesses a certain immutability which renders all effort vain to bring about vital and immediate change in methods and point of view. The task of government in Russia is herculean in proportion as compared with that in other countries. The old struggling with the new, great questions of ways and means, enormous diversity of race, religion and prejudice, all to be considered and dealt with as may best serve the peaceful purposes of state. Those who have watched with intelligence and personal knowledge the evolution of life in Russia during the ten years past are aware of marvelous changes for the better which have come to pass, and, great in themselves as they may be, these same changes are even more significant in the promise they hold for what is to happen in the ten years now to come.

There is one thing, however, upon which there can be no difference of opinion, and that is as to the part Russia is to play in economic history in the near future. As a food-producing area the country will, as it develops, keep prices down to a reasonable level the world over. The wood of her forests will take the place of the lessening output elsewhere. As a market for products of the labor of all the Western nations, Russia stands supreme as the greatest potential buyer. The Russian peasant is a simple, honest and industrious man. Tremendous in his physique, virile in his stock, and peaceful in his life and intentions. The country itself is largely agricultural and will always remain so. Over ninety per cent of the population at the present time owes its living to the land.

Such a country as this has its destiny written clear in these days, when the struggle for bread in urban communities of the West dominates national political policies thru the vital shortages. A score of recent events can be and will be instanced to prove that Russia is still in hopeless bondage to medieval things. The only way, however, to give these their true value in the life of the nation is to judge the forces at work as a whole, and in this true perspective the vision loses many of its most somber tints.

Manifesto of the Czar.

(Translation.)

"By the grace of God, we, Nicholas II., Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, King of Poland, and Grand Duke of Finland, etc., to all our faithful subjects make known that Russia, related by faith and blood to the Slav peoples and faithful to her historical traditions, has never regarded their fates with indifference.

"But the fraternal sentiments of the Russian people for the Slavs have been awakened with perfect unanimity and extraordinary force in these last few days, when Austria-Hungary knowingly addressed to Serbia claims unacceptable for an independent state.

"Having paid no attention to the pacific and conciliatory reply of the Servian Government, and having rejected the benevolent intervention of Russia, Austria-Hungary made haste to proceed to an armed attack, and began to bombard Belgrade, an open place.

"Forced by the situation thus created to take necessary measures of precaution, we ordered the army and the navy put on a war footing, at the same time using every endeavor to obtain a peaceful solution. Pourparlers were begun amid friendly relations with Germany and her ally, Austria, for the blood and the property of our subjects were dear to us.

"Contrary to our hopes in our good neighborly relations of long date, and disregarding our assurances that the mobilization measures taken were in pursuance of no object hostile to her, Germany demanded their immediate cessation. Being rebuffed in this demand, Germany suddenly declared war on Russia.

"Today it is not only the protection of a country related to us and unjustly attacked that must be accorded, but we must safeguard the honor, the dignity, and the integrity of Russia and her position among the great powers.

"We believe unshakably that all our faithful subjects will rise with unanimity and devotion for the defense of Russian soil; that internal discord will be forgotten in this threatening hour; that the unity of the Emperor with his people will become

still more close, and that Russia, rising like one man, will repulse the insolent attack of the enemy.

"With a profound faith in the justice of our work, and with a humble hope in omnipotent Providence in prayer, we call God's blessing on holy Russia and her valiant troops.

NICHOLAS."

St. Petersburg, August 3, 1914.

The Czar and His People.

Published in the London Times of August 10, 1914.

St. Petersburg, August 9—"You think dissension and dislike disunite us, whereas all the nationalities inhabiting the boundless territories of Russia have joined together in one vast family since danger threatens our common fatherland." These words were addressed by President Rodzianko to Russia's enemies in his opening speech yesterday at the Duma. They serve as an excellent epitome of the historic day of Russia's unity and might.

The reception of the Houses at the Winter Palace and the speeches of the Czar and the two Presidents have left an indelible impression, and the magnificent Nicholas Hall with its magnificent balcony overlooking the sunlit Neva afforded an appropriate setting for the ceremony.

That old enmities, party hatreds, personal jealousies have been forgotten became evident from such an extraordinary sight as the Cadet leader, M. Miliukoff walking arm in arm with the reactionary Jew-baiter, M. Purishkevitch. M. Barck was engaged in earnest discourse with Count Kokovsoff. The Constitutionalist, M. Rodzianko, sat at the window sill beside the reactionary M. Zamyslovsky.

Punctually at 11 the Emperor came out and stood in the midst of a circle formed by ministers, deputies and councilors. Amid deep silence rang out words that went straight to the hearts of his hearers. He welcomed them in these ominous and troubled days when Germany and Austria declared war on Russia. The great outburst of love of country and loyalty

to the Throne that had swept tempest-like over the land was the warrant that the great Mother, Russia, would carry the war to the desired end. He was animated by the same sentiments of love and sacrifice and was also willing to lay down his life, and in the consciousness of unity with his people, he derived strength in the present and confidence in the future. They were not only defending the honor and dignity of their own soil, but also their brothers by blood and faith. He rejoiced to see the union of Slavs developing as strongly as that of Russia. He knew that every one there would do his duty and help him to issue from the hour of trial.

Then raising his voice, the Czar uttered the homely Russian saying: "Great is the God of the Russian land."

The legislators, as if electrified, responded with a thunderous hurrah, and immediately after sang "God Save the Czar." When silence had been restored, the acting Vice-President M. Golubeff, replied on behalf of the House.

President Rodzianko, who followed, made a speech which deeply moved the Sovereign, and I saw his Majesty press his right hand to his heart as if overcome by the depth of his feeling.

The Czar, after a slight pause, said in a voice as strong and firm as ever: "Gentlemen, I thank you from my heart for the sincere feelings of patriotism that you have shown in word and deed. I never doubted them. With all my soul I wish you success." Then raising his voice and devoutly crossing himself, he added "God be with us."

"God be with us," resounded from all sides, and legislators, young and old, crossed themselves as the Sovereign had done. Then mighty cheering again resounded through the stately hall, and the Emperor, after shaking hands with the Presidents and bowing low to his faithful Lords and Commons, left the room. Moved by a common impulse, the whole of the gathering sang the beautiful anthem "Lord Save Thy People." Many of those present were moved to tears.

In this very hall on the previous Sunday, over a thousand young soldiers about to go to the front, prayed together with the Czar. Old courtiers, mindful even at such an hour of etiquette, had insisted that this would be irregular, but the young

Empress overrode all their objections, and, in a fine blaze of indignation, exclaimed, "It is they who are going to fight. It is with them the Czar must mingle his prayers."

Manifesto to Poland.

Issued by the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army.

(Translation.)

The hour has sounded when the sacred dreams of your fathers may be realized. A hundred and fifty years ago, the living body of Poland was torn to pieces, but her soul survived and she has lived in hope that for the Polish people would come an hour of regeneration and reconciliation with Russia.

The Russian army brings you the solemn news of this reconciliation which effaces frontiers severing the Polish people, whom it unites conjointly under the scepter of the Czar of Russia. Under this scepter, Poland will be born again, free in her religion, her language, and autonomous.

Russia expects from you only the loyalty to which history has bound you. With open heart and a brotherly hand extended, great Russia comes to meet you. She believes that the sword which struck her enemies at Grunewald is not yet rusted.

Russia from the shores of the Pacific Ocean to the North Sea marches in arms. The dawn of a new life begins for you. In this glorious dawn is seen the sign of the Cross—the symbol of suffering and the resurrection of a people.

August 16, 1914.

The Russian Revolutionary View.

Expectant Russia. Prince Kropotkin.

Published in the London Times of October 9, 1914.

Most of us feel that Russia is now living through a moment which will be a turning point in her political development. Not only will the Russian government see itself bound to make some small concessions to the demands of liberty which come from all layers of society, such as it has already begun to make, but,

after the remarkably united action of all classes of society, parties and nationalities for the defense of Russia, more important concessions and deeper changes are bound to follow whatever the issue of the war may be.

True, the habits and conceptions of the rulers of Russia are so deeply rooted that up till now a general amnesty has not yet been granted, and the thousands of exiles, scattered in the North of Russia and Siberia, have not yet received the right of returning to their homes, notwithstanding the demands already made by some of the Liberal organs of the Russian press.

True also, that apart from the law passed by the Duma and the Council of the State in their sittings before the war, which law grants to the non-Russian inhabitants of the Empire the right of opening their own primary, intermediary and higher schools, with teaching in their own languages, after having made a simple declaration to the authorities to this effect, there are yet no signs of relaxation of the prosecutions that have hitherto been directed against the non-Russian populations of the Empire. But just as all over Europe, with the exception of Germany there grows a feeling of the necessity of remodeling the map of Europe in conformity with the demands of independence of the smaller nationalities, so also within Russia grows the idea that the autonomy of the different nationalities of the empire will have to be recognized, after the wonderful readiness displayed by them to support Russia in her fight against Germany and Austria.

A still more striking feature of the present day is that a similar feeling is spread all over Europe. Everywhere in the Continent, the thought is expressed that "this war must be the last one"; that "it must be the end of the general period of armaments we have lived through"; and that the institutions under which Europe has hitherto lived have seriously to be revised. And when we see the horrors accompanying the present war, and the abominations to which the Bismarckian contempt of international treaties and obligations and militarist education have brought Germany, we cannot but feel certain that German militarism cannot be victorious. When it has been defeated by the common efforts of nations Europe is sure to enter a period of

evolution which will be the negation of these principles which have plunged our civilization into the murderous struggles of the present day.

The Jewish View.

Equality for the Jews in Russia. Israel Zangwill.

Published in the London Times of August 19, 1914.

The rumor reported in your issue of today that the Czar is about to give civil and political rights to his Jews will, if confirmed, do much to relieve the feelings of those who, like myself, believe that the Entente was too high a price (for England) to pay even for safety against the German peril. Not that the Russians are not fine people; it is only with the Russian Government that civilization has a quarrel, and the quarrel is as much on behalf of her Russian as her Jewish subjects. The offer of autonomy of Poland—even if it is only a good stroke of business—shows that the Government is entering on a greater era of intelligence, and learning at last from her British ally that minorities and dependencies are attached more closely by love than by fear. The emancipation of Russian Jews would be felt as an immense relief in many countries, not only among the Jews, who have felt bitterly that the old land of freedom was helping involuntarily to perpetuate the Pale, but among Christians also, for all civilization suffers under this medieval survival with its sequelae in massacre and emigration. In Russia there is a colossal field—half of Europe and half of Asia—for the energies of six million Jews now cooped up in a province of which they are forbidden even in the villages.

Their enfranchisement would, indeed, be a logical consequence of the redemption of Poland, for how could Russia permit the Jews in her Polish dominion to be freer than in Russia proper? But there is no logic in Russia, and it is, alas! far from improbable that the Poles, now engaged in a barbarous boycott of their Jews, would be stupid enough to imitate Russia and deny them equality. In that case, the Jews now in Austrian and German Poland would lose their hard-won rights, just as the Jews

of Khiva and Bokhara lost theirs when these regions were assigned to Russia. And Russian Jews would only assuredly count as human beings as Russia, instead of conquering German and Austrian Poland herself loses to Germany her Balkan-German-speaking provinces. In these—and they include the bulk of the Jewish Pale—the Jews would be seised with a stroke of the rights they have so long vainly demanded of Russia. Is it not tragic that in this instance civilization should have more to gain from German militarism than from our Eastern ally? I hope that in the final issue of this cosmic cataclysm, England will not be found the catspaw of Powers opposed to her noblest traditions, but that by her insistence on justice and freedom all round she will retrospectively justify her Entente, show a glorious profit on her outlay of armaments, resume her moral hegemony of the world, and her old place in the affections of mankind.

SERVIA

The Servians have been described as a nation of peasants living largely in the past. They are related to many of the surrounding Slav races which were united under Stephen Dushan in 1346 in the Servian Empire. The dream of the Serb today is to have Dushan's historic realm restored. Prince Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich at the conclusion of his book, "The Servian People: Their Past Glory and Their Destiny," writes:

"The sentiment for union and the determination to bring all Servian regions into a great state organism that shall be national in its expression, in its genius, and in its aims, embodying the will and the ideals of the race, are common today in all Serbs.

"It is the belief of the Servians that neither the Habsburgs (Austria-Hungary) or other European powers will be able in the long run to prevent Servian unification.

"Too bold is the man who presumes to forecast the course of future events, but Destiny ever endows her children with opportunity, and the Serbs believe that matching an alert will with opportunity the inhabitants of the various regions of the Serb block of territory will, in course of time, as by action of natural forces, come together into one great state, and the work of Nemanya, the work of Dushan, the work of Lazar, the work of Kara-george and Milosh Obrenovich, of the modern Kingdom and of the Principality, and the dream of all Serbs still under foreign rule, will culminate in the concept dear to them these many centuries—a great and united Servia."

This is the dream of a Serb Empire, not a Servian Empire. The ambitions of the people do not include the conquest of territory for the sake of dominion, but for the union of that branch of the Slavs known as Serbs. The small state known to us as Servia is merely the focus of the dreams of the surrounding Serbs who have not yet attained their freedom from foreign rule. How widely the Serbs were divided territorially

may be seen from the following estimate made by Prince Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich in 1909:

A—Independent Servian Lands.

Kingdom of Servia.....	2,923,000
Principality of Montenegro.....	280,000

B—Servian Lands under Foreign Domination.

Bosnia-Herzegovina (under Austria-Hungary)	1,713,000
Dalmatia (under Austria).....	667,000
Istria (under Austria).....	133,000
Croatia-Slavonia (under Hungary).....	2,334,000
Banat and Batchka (under Hungary).....	872,000
Old Servia (under Turkey).....	1,376,000

10,298,000


Since 1909, by the Treaty of 1913, Old Servia (Macedonia) has been ceded to Bulgaria, and Servia has realized part of her dream, but at that not over four of the ten million Serbs are ruled by King Peter, and of the remaining six million more than three-quarters are part of the Dual Empire. Thus Servian interests are in direct conflict with Austria-Hungary.

The growth of the dream into practical form has been of very recent date. After the death of Stephen Dushan, in 1355, after a rule of only nine years, the Servian Empire rapidly disintegrated, and the entire Balkan peninsula had been overrun by the Turks at the end of the century. It remained in bondage for almost four hundred years until the Turkish Empire began to break up at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Servia obtained autonomy under the noted Milosh Obrenovich in 1830, and after changes of dynasty between the rival houses of Obrenovich and Karageorgevich her status was settled by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Russia at that time refused to aid her, and Prince Milan (later King Milan) was led to make terms with Austria, who procured for him recognition as an independent state.

Russia having lost her hold on the sovereign, now encouraged the Radical party (the new King was supported by the Progressives) and made the government extremely difficult. When, in 1885, Bulgaria annexed Eastern Rumelia, Servia de-

clared war on her, but her armies cut a ridiculous figure, and she would have been badly humiliated had not Austria stepped in and forbidden further invasion of Servian territory on pain of her intervention.

In 1889 Milan abdicated, and under his son, Alexander, the state drifted into a condition of anarchy. The Radicals had



FROM THE WORLD'S WORK

SERBIA BEFORE AND AFTER THE BALKAN WARS OF 1912-13.

gained the ascendancy, and the power of the Karageorgevichs again began to wax; Alexander was still a minor, and Milan was recalled. Russia and Montenegro practically broke off relations with the country because Milan was in the confidence of Austria.

Suddenly, in 1900, Alexander banished his father and contracted a morganatic marriage with Mme. Draga Mashin, a lady-

in-waiting to his mother. His policy was violently Russian, but his marriage and subsequent actions had discredited him at home. In 1903, he and his queen were murdered by a band of political conspirators. The details of the crime form the most revolting episode in modern history.

The regicides proclaimed Peter Karageorgevich king, but only Austria-Hungary, Russia and Montenegro recognized him, England withholding her diplomatic approval until 1906. Under Peter the "Great Servian Idea" has flourished. At peace within herself, Servia has grown to be an important agricultural nation of the Balkans, but she has suffered two great disappointments, both at the hands of Austria-Hungary. In 1908 the annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina, in violation of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, made the realization of the former Servian Empire more distant, and Servia would have made it a *casus belli* unless dissuaded by Russia. In 1913, again Austria snatched the prize of victory from Servia's grasp, when she demanded the creation of the state of Albania to prevent Servia from reaching the Adriatic at Durazzo. Servia's solace has been the redemption of part of Old Servia, almost doubling her territory, and the defeat of her ancient enemy, Bulgaria, in the Balkan wars.

The remarkable success of her troops against the Turks and Bulgarians encouraged her (it is said with the secret support of Russia) in the belief, as Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich says, that "neither the Habsburgs, nor other European powers, will be able in the long run to prevent Servian unification."

Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.

(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

Published in Great Britain's White Papers.

(Translation.)

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the state—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive royal governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the royal government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the imperial and royal government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the imperial and royal government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The royal government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The royal government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring countries.

For these reasons the royal government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the royal government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial

any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The royal government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromise the good neighborly relations to which the royal Servian government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavor."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the royal army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at

present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. *The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.*

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. *As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept*

such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankositch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and who up to the 15th of June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present time, at the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the latter inquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply the Servian Government, considering that it is not

to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

Serb and Austrian.

Michael I. Pupin.

Published in The Independent of July 13, 1914.

The tragedy of Serajevo, in Bosnia, forces on the attention of the civilized world a startling political and social condition in southeastern Europe, which so far has escaped the notice of many thoughtful men and women who love justice, peace, progress and happiness. Who can be indifferent to the drama which is now before the world? The heir to the ruler of a proud empire falls a victim of an assassin's hand. The assassin is a youth of eighteen, a student and a poet. He is a subject of the fallen monarch, a Serb by race, and a native of Grahovo in rocky Herzegovina. Hatred of Austria for the wrongs inflicted upon his race he pleads as justification of his crime, and the display of the Serb flag by the inhabitants of Serajevo as a greeting to the arrival of the assassinated monarch shows that his bitterness is widespread among the inhabitants of sunny Serajevo.

The tragic scene is the last one in the drama which commenced in 1908, when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in arrogant defiance of the treaty of Berlin of 1878. This treaty authorized Austria to occupy those two provinces of the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of restoring peace and order in them. The population, which belongs to the Serbo-Croatian branch of the Slavonic family, protested violently against the edict of the Berlin conference; fierce and long-continued fighting followed, and finally fair Bosnia and proud Herzegovina fell exhausted victims, bleeding from many wounds inflicted by the

merciless talons of the double-headed black eagle of the Austrian Empire.

Let us glance at the events preceding this occupation. The Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina rebelled in 1875 against Ottoman tyranny; this rebellion led to the declaration of war by the Serbs in Servia and Montenegro against Turkey, and this war in turn dragged in Russia. When the war was over and the vanquished Turk begged for peace everybody got some share in the spoils of victory; nay, even the Bulgarians, who did no fighting at all, but who got a lot of sympathy from the world thru Gladstone, because they allowed themselves to be massacred by the Turks, had an autonomous principality established for them. Only the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina received no share in the spoils; they were, moreover, delivered by the Berlin conference to the tender mercies of the Austrian Empire, an empire which they detested even more heartily than they detested the unspeakable Turk.

And yet from the beginning of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian rebellion in 1875 to the end of the Russo-Turkish war in 1878, the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina did just as good, if not even better, fighting than anybody else; they always fought well in many a rebellion which they kindled up against Ottoman tyranny. These Serb Highlanders have always been considered the flower of the Serb race, not only as regards the arts of war, but also as regards the arts of peace. Those wonderful Serb ballads which at their first publication, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, sent a magic thrill thru the literary world of Europe, trace their origin to the somber highlands of proud Herzegovina, and the rhapsodic melodies of the matchless south's Slavonic Sefdalinka songs were born in the golden valleys of fair and fertile Bosnia.

The gallant struggle of the Serbs of Servia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1875 to 1878 was crowned with many victories and ended in a complete undoing of the hated Turk, but its main object was not attained. They fought for the liberation and reunion of the Balkan Serbs and the restoration of the crown of Stephen Dushan, the mighty Czar of the Serbs in the fourteenth century. The battle was won, but the crown

was not restored; Bosnia and Herzegovina, its two most precious pearls, were snatched away by Prince Bismarck of Germany and Count Andrassy of Austria-Hungary. By the Austrian annexation, in 1908, these pearls were inserted in the crown of the House of Hapsburg. Those fond hopes for national reunion which the Balkan Serbs had cherished for five hundred years and which, in 1878, seemed so near their realization, when Osman Pasha capitulated at Plevna, suddenly vanished by the decree of 1878, issued in Berlin by Bismarck and Andrassy. In place of national reunion the Balkan Serbs saw the double-headed Austrian black eagle hovering over the somber mountains of Herzegovina, the plateaus of the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, and the rich valleys of fair Bosnia. The Austrian flag was planted there and Austrian armies covered every vantage point; they were there to stay and to separate forever the Serbs in Servia from the Serbs in Montenegro by an impenetrable barrier which Austria was raising in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This barrier could never be raised until the national spirit of the Serbs in these two provinces was completely destroyed, and hence the cruel policy which Austria pursued there during the last thirty-six years.

I quote now from a book published by an English diplomat who traveled all over the Balkans on a secret mission entrusted to him by the British Government:

"With religion persecuted, education at a standstill, and the press either gagged or suborned, Austria is slowly carrying out her policy of crushing the Serbs. . . . Should it be permitted in this twentieth century to one European people to crush another European people under the false pretext of civilization?" (*The Near East*, pp. 112, 113.)

I quote now from Seton Watson, the highest English authority on Slavonic matters:

"I hope to prove that in matters of education, administration of justice, of association and assembly, of the franchise and the press, the non-Magyar nationalities are the victims of a policy of repression which is without any parallel in civilized Europe." (*Racial Problems in Hungary*, p. 204.)

In this last quotation reference is made to Serbs not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, and the southern provinces of Hungary, that is, to about five million Serbo-Croats, which includes the Croatians who differ from the Serbs in religion only, the Serbs being Greek Orthodox and the Croatians being Roman Catholic.

In face of these conditions is it surprising then that these people show a burning desire to tear themselves away from hated Austria and join their brothers in the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro? It would be a wonder if this desire did not exist. This desire is the so-called Pan-Serb propaganda which Austria parades on every occasion and expects the world to understand that it is a political conspiracy fraught with grave dangers for the Austrian Empire. The Pan-Serb propaganda does exist, I admit it frankly, and I ought to know whereof I speak, because I am a Serb and a former subject of the Austrian Empire. But this Pan-Serb propaganda is not a political conspiracy, born and bred at Belgrade or at any other place in the kingdom of Serbia. It is a natural heritage of every true Serb, who is ever ready to obey the voice of the Serb minstrel, the gouslar, which commands him and has always commanded him for five hundred years to 'struggle for the "honored cross and golden liberty." This voice was always the supreme commander in all Serb struggles against the Turkish oppressor, and it is today the supreme commander in the Serb struggles against Austrian tyranny. The causes of the Pan-Serb propaganda are in Vienna and not in Belgrade. The tragedy in Serajevo on the 28th of June was being prepared in Vienna during the last thirty-six years; it was enacted on the very day—Vidov Dan—when every true Serb celebrates the anniversary of the battle of the field of Kossovo, in 1389, when the Serb Empire fell. Its memory always served as a reminder to the Serbs that they must avenge the wrongs perpetrated upon their race, and that by united effort only can they regain the glories of their ancient empire which vanished at Kossovo.

TURKEY

Constantinople, built on its seven hills, looking across the Straits of Bosphorus to Asia is the second Rome. Easily defended both by land and sea, at the point where the trade routes of the continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe converge, it was seized upon by the Emperor Constantine in the fourth century as the most important strategic point in Europe. It is said that when Napoleon was told he could gain the good will of Russia by allowing her to seize Constantinople, he said, "Constantinople is the center of the universe." Nicholas, William and George would even now repeat Napoleon's verdict.

Constantinople is the only European remnant of the great Ottoman Empire that at one time covered all of Southeastern Europe to the very gates of Vienna. Yet, possessing it alone, the Turk has an apple of discord which can be dangled tantalizingly before the eyes of each anxious Power. In the hands of the inefficient Turk, Constantinople is a city of decaying glory, a relic of the dead race of Romans and the dying race of Turks, but under the guidance of an active Power like Germany, Great Britain or Russia, the nucleus of a network of rail lines penetrating the Balkans, southern Russia, Asia Minor, Persia, India, and northern Africa sending its merchant marine to the ports of the Black Sea, through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, Constantinople with its present population of more than a million would become a New York of the Near East.

The possibilities of this great new Rome are obvious to every great European Power; and the sway of the Turk in Europe has been kept alive one hundred years after his downfall had been predicted by the ability of the Sultans to play the fears of the Great Powers against each other. At the end of the Napoleonic wars the Concert of Powers was in grave doubt what to do, and only the realization that they could agree on no division led them to guarantee to uphold the Sultan. The influence of Russia, which had proven the downfall of Napoleon, was then

predominant over Constantinople. It seemed like the end of a long series of steps and a matter of short time until the Czar should include Turkey in Europe, and hence Constantinople, as a part of his dominion.

The Turks came from Central Asia and first established themselves in Europe at just the time Rudolph of Habsburg was founding the future greatness of his house on the banks of the Danube. They moved around the shores of the Black Sea, taking possession of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (now Rumania), the Balkan peninsula, and captured Constantinople in 1453. Thence the movement spread from Asia Minor and finally included the entire northern coast of Africa to Morocco. The tide culminated in the sixteenth century when the Turk had subdued everything up to the Danube at Budapest. Hungary freed herself from his yoke, but the legions of the Turk held the eastern part of the Mediterranean aided by their highly trained civil service of Greeks, known as Phanariotes. During the Napoleonic era, the power of the Turk was perceptibly shaken, and his kingdom was the subject of negotiation; it might easily have been overrun by Napoleon, the Habsburgs, or the Romanoffs. The Sultan earned the title of "The Sick Man of Europe," because the hungry Powers were waiting for him to die, that they might quarrel over the inheritance. At that time his territories, including present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey in Asia, Arabia, Egypt, Tripoli and Tunis, ranked next to the Romanoffs', the richest legacy in the world.

But the wars of the younger nations were just beginning. A regenerated Greece had already begun to show the stirrings of a new freedom, the Albanians and Montenegrins were in revolt, and an uprising in Egypt was put down with difficulty. Fighting continued almost without interruption for fifteen years. Russia made demands that the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (Rumania) should be placed under appointed governors which could not be removed save by her consent. In the years from 1822 to 1829, the first of the Balkan fragments was broken from the Turkish empire—Greece, by the consent of the Concert of Europe became a separate state. Likewise, Serbia had taken

the occasion of the Greek uprising under Milan Obrenovitch to declare herself autonomous, and the Porte was obliged to grant her self government. Russia and France had been drawn into the struggle, and the Egyptian rebellion had spread into Syria. After a treaty of peace was signed in 1833, the Sultan Mahmud determined to punish his rebellious subjects, and in 1839 started war against Syria. Russia tried to interfere, but England and France, fearing that this would give her predominance, demanded a part in the settlement. By the Convention of London in 1840, Syria was restored to peace and to the Sultan.

The traditional policy of Russia under Peter the Great had been to uphold the Porte, as of all European countries an understanding with Turkey is the most important; at Constantinople, the Turk holds the control of the Black and Ægean Sea, the outlet for Odessa and Sebastopol. But with the creation of a Greece and Servia, and the growing weakness of the Porte, Russia's policy was changed and every effort made to hasten the moment of final dissolution. In 1844, Russia made a suggestion to England for a final partition, England to receive Egypt and Crete, Russia control of the Balkan states, and Constantinople to become a free city. England, suspicious of designs on the "free city," declined.

With Napoleon III, as with the first Napoleon, Turkey, after a few short years, was again drawn into the quarrels of Russia and France. The latter made a demand that the property and rights of Catholics should be restored throughout the Ottoman Empire. After much delay by the Turkish authorities this developed into the famous struggle between France of the Roman Catholic faith and the Czar as the protector of the Greek Catholics for control of the Holy Places. The whole discussion would have been absurd, involving a question of nineteenth-century knight errantry as to which faith should hold the keys of the Holy Sepulcher and make repairs on the Temple at Jerusalem, had it not been that the real issue was the predominance of France or Russia in the Near East. Out of this grew the Crimean War in which Russia was humbled by Turkey, England, France and Sardinia. Again Turkey lost territory in the greater freedom given to the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and

Moldavia, which five years later, in 1861, finally rid themselves of the Turkish sovereignty.

The government of Constantinople showed unexpected strength, in spite of the continued revolts during the sixties, in Servia, Montenegro and Crete. Greece supported the latter, as she always did when subjects of the Sultan protested, and the Powers were again forced to interfere for the cause of peace.

Russian influences had been increasing at Constantinople, and when France had been crippled by her war with Prussia in 1870, the Czar repudiated the treaty which bound him to keep his fleets from the Black Sea; in a convention held at London the following year the violation was allowed.

In 1876, the master of Fabian diplomacy, Abdul Hamid II, ascended the throne, at a time when the Powers were trying to find an answer to the demands of the smaller Balkan states for greater freedom. While apparently more than acceding to the requests of the Powers the Sultan made no reforms, and finally rejected their suggestions. Russia with Rumania began the Russo-Turkish war; inside of a year the Turks had been completely humiliated.

By the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, which Russia dictated, Turkey was to recognize the complete independence of Rumania, Servia and Montenegro; the principality of Bulgaria was formed to extend from the Black Sea to the Ægean; Russia received Bessarabia from Rumania and the Dobrudja from Turkey; the Bulgarian fortresses along the Danube were to be destroyed, and the Dardanelles was to be free to neutral vessels at all times. With Russia on the coast of the Black Sea in the Dobrudja, with a great Bulgaria, the largest of the Balkan states, under Russian control, the Colossus of the North was again overshadowing Constantinople as she had in 1856. The control of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, which was a part of Disraeli's plan to link England with India, was endangered. As the Russian troops were moving on Constantinople, Disraeli made his famous naval demonstration, which, with the threat of a like movement on land by Austria, caused Russia to consent to a convention with Bismarck as president. This was the famous Congress of Berlin.

Its work could scarcely have been considered permanent for it was apparent that the rapid disintegration of Turkey had already begun. It sought rather to make a number of compromises to prevent what otherwise seemed a certain war of England and Austria against Russia. The changes in the map of Europe were the most sweeping that had been made since 1815. Russia received only the Black Sea province of Bessarabia, which had been taken from her and given to Rumania at the close of the Crimean war, and in Asiatic Turkey, Kars, Ardahan and Batum; Austria was satisfied with a protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina and the right to police the Sanjak of Novibazar; the independence of Rumania, Servia and Montenegro was recognized; Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty was cut in the three parts, the autonomous principalities of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, and in the south Macedonia under the direct rule of the Porte; and England for her good offices received the island of Cyprus on the condition that if Turkey lived up to the engagements she had made by the treaty, and Russia gave back to her the provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, England should return Cyprus. Abdul Hamid was the only party whose feelings were not considered; he had to promise to pay an indemnity of 300,000,000 roubles to Russia, begin reforms in Armenia, and make concessions of territory to Greece, and Montenegro. Within a few weeks Turkey had been shorn of half her European possessions. As Abdul Hamid did not trouble to keep his promises, Cyprus was never returned. The Powers were forced to send a fleet to make him turn over control of the new territory to Greece.

The African possessions of Turkey had already begun to drop away. In 1830 France had taken Algeria, and the year after the Congress of Berlin, England and France established a dual control over Egypt to guarantee peace. France quietly annexed Tunis in 1881. Called in Egypt to put down the revolt of Arabia in 1882, England bombarded Alexandria, and France and Italy, having refused to share responsibility, took control of the Egyptian government. From that moment Egypt was lost to Turkey. When Bulgaria, in 1885, in defiance of the Treaty of Berlin, united with Eastern Rumelia, a war with Abdul Hamid

was barely averted. The reforms in Armenia were not carried out, and frightful massacres ensued.

Before 1890, the chief factors in Turkish affairs had been England, France and Russia, but with the ascent of Kaiser William II to the throne, German influence grew, German officers trained the Turkish troops, the Kaiser found it to his interest to oppose Russia, and instead of weakening Turkey to strengthen her. As a sign of the growing favor toward the Germans, in 1899 they were granted the franchise to construct the Bagdad Railway connecting the Dardanelles at Constantinople with the Persian Gulf at Busra.

The interference of the Powers after the massacres in Armenia in 1894, led to further slaughter, and new promises of reform, which were never kept. Again a demand was made, but the wise Abdul Hamid, knowing that the Powers could not agree to interfere jointly, continued to delay. In Crete, during 1896, the laxity of the Porte ended in uprisings, and Greece, finding this another chance to advance Pan-Hellenism, declared war on Turkey in the cause of Crete, but was so badly beaten that again the Powers had to interfere to prevent her complete subjection. This was almost simultaneous with uprisings in Albania, Arabia and Macedonia.

Even under a strong rule it would be difficult to keep peace in Macedonia but under the weak hand of the Sultan riots only increased in violence. If a point in the Balkan states could be selected where racial and religious differences are most numerous and inharmonious, it would be Macedonia, which with Salonika its chief port, a veritable prize, is situated between Servia, Bulgaria and Greece, has been inhabited by the races of all three with an infiltration of Rumanians. The people of Macedonia had never been satisfied with the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, and their Bulgarian neighbors across the border also felt that they had been deprived of a right of union with their own people. Societies were formed on both sides of the frontier to oppose the Turks, and they in turn were met by counter-movements among the Greeks and Servians, who feared Bulgarian supremacy in the peninsula. Austria and Russia intervened in the cause of humanity. Again Abdul Hamid assented

in principle to suggestions, but did not trouble to act until European fleets had made another demonstration off his shores.

In 1908 happened an event that made the stability of Turkey seem more secure than it had been for years. The Young Turk party got control of the government, forced the Sultan to grant a constitution and parliamentary government. Seizing this moment, Bulgaria announced that she was a free and independent kingdom (her second violation of the Treaty of Berlin); Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina (another violation), and Crete declared herself a part of the kingdom of Greece. In the midst of this chaos Abdul Hamid was forced to abdicate in favor of Mohammed V. The new government was soon busy putting down insurrections in Kurdistan, Albania and Armenia, where horrible massacres again occurred. Greece had gone to the aid of Crete, and was only forced to leave it by the warships of the Powers. Turkey and Rumania signed an *entente* against the aggressions of Greece in 1910.

The Young Turk government accomplished little real reform, for it no sooner quieted one part of its narrowing dominions than another arose. Moreover, the great Powers could do little for it, because of growing hostility between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. It was to the interest of the first to strengthen Turkey, and of the latter to maintain the *status quo* or weaken it. The impression had been gradually growing in England that Turkey in Europe must go. Lord Salisbury, after the Treaty of Berlin claimed that "England had backed the wrong horse." Germany on the other hand found through Turkey her sole hope of reaching the East. Greater Europe was deadlocked and powerless to act.

Taking advantage of this fact, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria determined to drive the Sultan out of Europe themselves. The Balkan League was formed; Bulgaria and Serbia signed a secret treaty setting forth a division of Macedonia and Albania between them. Acting singly they might have been defeated by the Turks or cowed by the land and naval demonstrations of one of the great Powers, but united in the League they could defy almost any combination. Their chance came when Italy, without other cause than that she considered the Turk

unfit to rule Tripoli, declared war on the Sultan in 1911. As she had the silent encouragement of all the Great Powers, it was but a short time before the Turk had lost his last remaining African province. With Turkey weakened and defeated, the Balkan League moved against her armies the same year, and completely overwhelmed them, advancing to the very gates of Constantinople. The Turks sued for peace, but while negotiations were being conducted, Servia, Greece and Montenegro, fearing the predominance of Bulgaria, began to fight her, and while the allies were struggling among themselves, the Turks found their chance to reoccupy part of the conquered territory. They regained Adrianople, which had been taken by the Bulgars; but outside of Constantinople the Turk had been practically driven from Europe. By the treaty of peace, Albania, along the shores of the Adriatic, was made an autonomous state, Servia regained part of the lost empire of Stephen Dushan, Greece and Bulgaria divided Macedonia between them. The Turks still held Constantinople, for not one of the six Powers would have permitted a small Balkan state to hold the key to the Eastern Mediterranean. But as long as they continue in Constantinople the Turks are a force to be reckoned with in European affairs.

THE EXTERRITORIAL CAPITULATIONS

The Exterritorial Capitulations which have been revoked by the Porte were first granted to France in the sixteenth century. The Ottoman Empire had always been a refuge for religious exiles of other countries, and with easy tolerance the Turk had granted them special privileges. The sovereignty of the state was held in the middle ages to apply only to its own subjects, and as the Turks would not grant citizenship to aliens, they allowed them to remain under the practical control of their own governments. Until October 1, 1914, foreigners living in Turkey had been given the following privileges: freedom to travel, freedom to trade, inviolability of residence from search, freedom to worship, freedom from local jurisdiction and exclusive competence of the consular courts in litigation between two subjects of the same country.

THE BALKANS

For a century the key to the history of the Balkan States has been the gradual disintegration of the empire of Turkey in Europe. The Balkan peninsula, which the Turks overran from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century contains an active member or a vestige of practically every important race stock which has appeared on the European arena—the Greek, the Ruman, the Bulgar, the Serb, the Albanian, the German, the Magyar, the Turk, the Arab and the Russian—and with the loosening grip of the Sultan, who is kept in Europe by the jealousies of the Great Powers, the dominant races of the peninsula have been engaged in a constant struggle to get the lion's share of the spoils. Gradually, one race has freed itself from the grip of Turkey, found its boundaries unfitted to its ambitions, and driven the Turk further East. The frontiers have been arranged and re-arranged, but quarrels have arisen to which there seems no end.

The Balkans can be best understood by comparing their race mixture to America, where the tides of immigration meet, but whereas America is a melting pot and boils the various stocks down to a common broth, the Balkans are a mixing board where the races are being continually broken up and stirred into some new and surprising mixture—a sort of human gulash, but the mixture is physical, never chemical. There are certain well defined areas around which center the eddying race tides of the Bulgars, the Rumans, the Greeks, the Serbs and the Albanians, but on the outskirts of each are other areas where the races of various ambitions meet in such equal strength that the land they occupy can be peacefully held by no single power. The worst of these is Macedonia, the land of massacres, whence issues the cry "Come over into Macedonia and help us."

The situation is further complicated by the conflict of religious and trade interests. Here meet the discordant factions of the Greek church (including the Orthodox, the Bulgarian

Exarchate), Mohammedanism, Roman Catholicism and the missions of Anglican and American Protestant churches. For commercial reasons England, Germany and Russia find they must have control of the land and water routes to Asia, which can only be obtained through the Balkan peninsula. They have assumed protectorates, and in return for their interference in the purely Balkan quarrels have given the different Balkan states an interest in their greater world jealousies. And so various elements could be cited without end, until the Balkan relations have become a tangle too involved for the human mind to comprehend. No Balkan quarrel can arise without finding a reflex among the other states of Europe, and, conversely, each Balkan State is so bound to the two opposing camps of Europe, that a quarrel among the Great Powers immediately threatens a change of the *status quo* of the Balkans, and divides them into factions for and against the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.

RUMANIA.

Rumania is fortunate in being north of the main body of the Balkan peninsula and having for its frontier the broad river Danube. So, in its comparative isolation from the marching armies it has been free to consult its own interest as to what wars it shall enter. Because of this it has become the largest and most prosperous of all Balkan states.

Rumania was the first state to establish its practical freedom and unity from the Turkish dominion when the principalities of Moldavia and Walachia became autonomous at the close of the Crimean War in 1856. Five years later the two parts joined peacefully and elected Prince Cuza, a Rumanian noble, to rule them. He was compelled to abdicate in 1866, and Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was tendered the office which acting on the advice of Bismarck, he accepted.

Being of German extraction, the sympathies of Charles were always with Germany, though during the Franco-Prussian war many anti-German demonstrations occurred in the capital, which is strongly French in its sympathies.

Rumania's reward for her aid to Russia in the war with the Turk in 1878 was the recognition of her final independence from

Turkish rule, in exchange for which Russia took from her the Black Sea province of Bessarabia.

On account of her proximity to Russia the influence of the Czar has always been strongly felt. Counteracting this was the German military system, which Charles introduced, and which made the Rumanian troops the model for the Balkans.

Rumania, unlike the rest of the Balkans, is composed mainly of one race. The Rumans claim to be the sole descendants of the ancient Roman Empire, which flourished at Constantinople before its fall in 1453. But being surrounded on all sides, there has been a large Slav infiltration to the Roman blood, and the stock is not a pure one. Under the excellent administration of Charles and Queen Elizabeth (the widely known Carmen Sylva), the country grew into a rich and prosperous agricultural region; Bucharest became a miniature Paris of the Balkans. The Jews have been persecuted, and several revolts have occurred among the agricultural class, but otherwise Rumanian history has been one of peace and expansion.

Though Charles was German in sympathy, the interests of Rumania and the Triple Alliance were not entirely consistent, for the Rumans of Transylvania, a part of Hungary, are a detached fragment of the legitimate empire of Rumania, and Rumanian relations with Bulgaria, which is strongly pro-German, have been strained since the late Balkan wars. Since 1898 Russia has made friendly advances.

Rumania entered the Balkan War of 1913 at an opportune moment when Bulgaria was hard pressed, and by the Treaty of Bucharest gained the districts of Silistria and the Dobrudja, which latter includes territory on the right bank of the Danube and has a valuable frontage on the Black Sea.

BULGARIA.

Bulgaria's position in the Balkans corresponds to that of Germany in Central Europe; she is an inland country with little sea frontage, and surrounded on two sides by hostile enemies, who threaten continually to wage war across her territories. To the south is Greece, to the east Servia, both harboring dreams of empire.

The rise of Bulgaria from a small oppressed race of people to the key nation of the Balkans in 1913 is as remarkable as the expansion and unification of the German Empire. Bulgaria is a creation of the Berlin Congress of 1878, when she was first given her own government under the suzerainty of the Porte. It was owing to the fear of Russian aggressions that western powers agreed to divide what was formerly Big Bulgaria into three parts: the principality of Bulgaria on the south side of the Danube, below it Eastern Rumelia inhabited by the same race and on the south Macedonia which was ruled directly from Constantinople. Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a nephew of the Czar, was invited to become the first sovereign.

The influence of Russia, whose interest it was to keep the new state weak, was so detrimental that Alexander was forced to repudiate the rulers sent from St. Petersburg. Relations with the Czar became much strained, and when Servia declared war on Bulgaria after the annexation of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, the Russian officers were suddenly withdrawn from the army. Russia otherwise opposed in every possible way the natural union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, but England's favor permitted Bulgaria to accomplish the necessary violation of the Treaty of Berlin.

When Alexander was forced to abdicate in 1886, Russia attempted to influence the election of a new prince, but the assembly chose unanimously Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, at that time a lieutenant in the Austrian army. Russia declared the new sovereign a usurper, and the other Great Powers refused to recognize him, but a Bulgarian Bismarck arose in Stambuloff, who by his tact at home and abroad greatly raised the prestige of Bulgaria, gaining concessions from Rumania and the Porte. A reconciliation with Russia was effected when the Crown Prince Boris became a member of the Greek Orthodox Church in 1896.

During the first few years of the present century, the race struggles in Macedonia became more acute; the barbarities of the Turk in suppressing them were met by several mobilizations across the Bulgarian frontier, but no war followed.

In 1908 Ferdinand seized an opportune moment when the Young Turks had overthrown the old Sultan Abdul Hamid, and

declared Bulgaria independent of Turkey, assuming the title of Czar of Bulgaria. This again was in violation of the Treaty of Berlin, but as the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina followed shortly after, no European Powers interfered. Later an indemnity of \$24,000,000 was paid the Porte for the violation of its right.

In the Balkan Wars Bulgaria was a prominent member of the Balkan League against Turkey. Her armies, which had been trained by German officers, received most of the glory in the first war, and puffed up by this, she took an arbitrary stand in the division of spoils at the end. She demanded practically all of Macedonia at the expense of her allies Serbia and Greece. While negotiations were in progress, the Bulgarian troops suddenly fell on the Servians, and a second war was begun by the Greeks and Servians against her. Rumania, interested in despoiling the Bulgars of their Danubian and Black Sea territory, joined them. By this second war, Bulgaria lost not only much of the coast territory which she might have annexed at the end of the first war, especially the port of Salonika, but also sea-coast which had always been her own. Since the peace of Bucharest in 1913 a permanent division was created among the Balkan States against Bulgaria. The German extraction of her ruler, and her interests against the aggressions of other Balkan states, incline her to the Triple Alliance, although her population is almost entirely Slav.

GREECE.

Greece was the most fortunate of the states of the Balkan League after the recent wars. At the close of the first, Bulgaria had assumed the leadership, but after Greeks and Servians had decisively beaten her, much of the land which Bulgaria would rightly have obtained by the first treaty fell to the Greeks. By the addition of a large part of Macedonia and Thrace, her area was doubled, and the population under the dominion of the Greek king increased from 2,500,000 to 4,500,000.

Greece is in a fair way to fulfill her dream of Pan-Hellenism. For though the Slav has violent dreams of an All-Slav empire, his ardor to unite all peoples of his own blood under the same banner can in no wise be compared to the enthusiasm of the

Greeks (Hellenes, they call themselves) to restore the empire of classic history. The call of Byron has not gone unheeded, and yearly wealthy Greeks from all parts of the world pour their gifts into the Morean peninsula to restore her groves and temples to their former splendor.

But the dream of the inhabitants of Greece that they are in direct descent from the ancients is a delusion. Since the wane of Athens, successive waves of Roman, African and Turkish invasion have swept over the seacoast and islands and from the interior. Each has left its mark, until today the Greeks that boast the purest blood are still a mixed race. However, ethnologists declare that the main stock is Hellenic.

The idea of a new Athens can be read in almost every occurrence of recent history, since the day in 1829 when the Greater Powers of Europe declared Greece independent. Every uprising in the nearby states has found a response in the lower peninsula by the Greeks who saw in it another hope that part of the still unredeemed Greece would fall into their hands. The hatred of the Turk has been most bitter. When Russia and Turkey went to war in 1854, the Greeks invaded Thessaly, and again in 1877 during the Russo-Turkish war. It was a huge disappointment when the Powers refused to recognize Greek claims for compensation at the Congress of Berlin.

In 1885 when Bulgaria annexed Eastern Rumelia (part of the former Wallachia which once included parts of Rumania, Bulgaria and Macedonia), Greece mobilized, and was invited by the Great Powers with the exception of France to disband her army. Until her ports had been blockaded she refused to obey.

A sore spot between the Greeks and Turkey had been the island of Crete, which played as important a share in the early history of Greece as parts of the peninsula itself. In a riot of Pan-Hellenism during the celebrations of 1897 the clamor for annexation grew, and Greece had a war with Turkey, but again the Great Powers interfered and refused to allow her to annex the island.

Under the rule of King George, who was compelled to invite foreign Powers to intervene and take control of his finances, all quarrels were settled before they succeeded in disrupting his

kingdom. His armies made a remarkable record in the war against Bulgaria, but he did not live to see the fruit of his labors, being assassinated in the early part of 1913, after a reign of fifty years. He was succeeded by his son Constantine, who had become popular in the Greek campaign.

By the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, Greece obtained the port of Salonika. The Greeks are natural sailors, and this opened a way for the realization of their naval ambitions. With every prospect for a great future, they began preparation for the day of settlement against the Turk by the purchase of two battle-ships from the United States in 1914.

Of the Great Powers, the influence of England and France has been strongest in Greece. The English have large interests because they must control the Ægean Sea, as a strategic point on their route to India. They have aided the Greeks to finance their large deficits and have trained the Greek navy. The Greek army has been brought up to its present state of efficiency by French officers, and its triumph over the Bulgarians in the 1913 war was indirectly a victory for the French against the German system of warfare.

MONTENEGRO AND ALBANIA.

Montenegro is a wild, mountainous country inhabited by members of the Serbo-Croatian branch of the Slavs. Being difficult to invade and control, it has been independent since the fourteenth century. It is a natural continuation of Servia, has fought side by side with the Servian armies in many modern battles, and Montenegrins sympathize with the Servians in all their aims. Only the artificial creation of the Austro-Hungarian Sanjak of Novibazar which separated the Servian and Montenegrin frontiers has kept the two governments from a closer union. This barrier was removed by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913. Montenegro was then aggrandized at the expense of Albania.

The Albanians have no apparent connection with any other race stock in Europe. Albania until the close of the recent Balkan wars was a province of Turkey. Containing the important river port of Scutari, the Adriatic ports of Durazzo and Valona,

it was one of the prizes of the Porte which Serbia, Montenegro and Greece had agreed to divide between them. Montenegro was to get the region around Scutari, Serbia was to have her coveted outlet on the Adriatic at Durazzo, and Greece was to receive the southern part. But this was opposed to the interests of Austria-Hungary and Italy, for Valona is the key to the Adriatic. The two Great Powers brought pressure to bear on the peace conference at London, and as no one Power was willing that the other should govern the state, it was made autonomous. Prince William of Wied was invited to govern, and took office March 7, 1914. Two days later the first revolt began when the people of Koritza proclaimed their autonomy. All the mountain tribes which had never been subdued, and cared nothing for the orders of the Great Powers, joined them and began an advance on Durazzo, the capital. In May, Prince William was forced to take refuge on an Italian warship, until Italian marines could be landed to protect him. The rebels were twice repulsed from Durazzo, but William did not receive the financial support he had expected, and on September 3, he suddenly left Albania in a state of anarchy, and went to Venice. The Albanian senate chose Prince Berham Eddin, son of the deposed Abdul Hamid to lead the state armies against the rebels. During the latter part of October, 1914, the Italian government proclaiming Albania in a state of anarchy, seized the port of Valona.

ITALY

In 1850 Austria dominated the Italian states on the south precisely the same as she did the German states on the north. In fact, for the next twenty years there is a great similarity between the history of the gradual accretion of Sardinia and the like movement of Prussia. In both, the diplomatic manipulations of Metternich had encouraged internal wrangles at the expense of national unity; Italy had had its wave of desire for freedom during the eventful year of 1848, but, like Germany, an indecisive leader allowed the critical moment to pass without striking. Ten years later, under Cavour, the first step had been achieved. Italy, in alliance with Prussia, sent her armies to overthrow her hated foe, Austria, in 1866, but before they reached the battlefields, Sadowa had been fought and the freedom of the German states achieved. The lukewarm assurances of France for the completion of Italian unity kept Italy from aiding her in the Franco-Prussian war, and the final steps in the completion of the German Empire and the Kingdom of Italy were practically simultaneous. William I was crowned at Versailles in 1871 and Victor Emmanuel entered Rome in 1872.

Though Italy was a Latin kingdom, and hence her racial inclinations were toward France rather than Germany, her affiliations, both before and since 1870, have been determined rather by her conflict of interests with France than by any real kinship with the two great central powers with which she later became allied. Geographically, she forms with Germany and Austria-Hungary a unified mass known as Central Europe if but two dimensions are considered; but the topography of the land destroys the analogy. The chain of the Alps, flung as a barrier across her northern frontier, almost impregnable to an army, diverts her interests from the North to the South.

So Italy finds herself the one great Mediterranean power with a number of ports and a long coast line. Ambitious to play a large part in European politics, she has gazed across the

Mediterranean, and found there the hope of the future. But her unity was gained too late. France was in Africa before her, and threatened to leave no place for Italy.

Until recently Italy has not been very successful in satisfying her land hunger. What with the frequent changes of her government and the unsettled views of her statesmen, she has never been able to act quickly enough nor to maintain a consistent foreign policy long enough to earn the station due to her. Such was the case when, in 1878, at the close of the Congress of Berlin, it was suggested to her that as compensation for the English accession of the island of Cyprus, England would gladly see Italy in possession of Tunis. Italy had already sent over many settlers, and when in 1881 France announced a *fait accompli*, Italian resentment found concrete expression in the formation of the Triple Alliance.

Italy had taken the place of Russia in the *Dreikaiserbund* and Bismarck who had long considered a closer understanding with her, found that Germany and Italy had common cause against France not only in the fear of her aggressions, but also in the assertion of the monarchical against the republican principle. As for Austria, she still held the unredeemed lands of the Italians, who never abandoned the cry against the Habsburgs, but as a practical matter of statesmanship Italy had to choose against two antagonists—Austria opposing her on the Adriatic and France on the Mediterranean. Africa furnishing the larger field, she enlisted the aid of Austria and Germany against France. To prevent conflict within the alliance, the *Noli me tangere* (Don't touch me) agreement was drawn up by which neither Austria or Italy would attempt to seize important ports in the Turkish province of Albania at the expense of the other, and both states would work jointly to prevent any other Powers from jeopardizing their joint control of the Adriatic.

But Italy's peculiar isolation among the greater Powers has not forced her to bind herself entirely to one alliance, and she immediately became friendly with England to whom the Mediterranean is also an important highway to the Orient. She was invited to take part in the occupation of Egypt, but again her statesmen delayed, and the propitious moment passed. Disap-

pointed a second time, England, still friendly, again gave her to understand that she would not oppose Italian acquisitions on the Red Sea. In 1884, she sent an expedition to occupy Dogali and Massawa, adjoining Abyssinia. But after preliminary successes, the force was overwhelmed by the Africans. After the good will of Menelik of Abyssinia had been purchased a second expedition was sent with more success, and finally, after five years of desultory fighting, a peace was declared in 1889. The continual change of cabinets kept the entire East African situation in a turmoil for ten years more before the Italian hold in the Red Sea country, known as Eritrea, was secure. It was then too late to gain a foothold on the Mediterranean, where France and England had reached an agreement in regard to the partition of Northern Africa. Cordial relations were resumed with France when Victor Emmanuel paid a visit to Paris in 1903, while Italy drew further from Austria as the differences with the French were removed. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 was one of the recent causes for anti-Austrian demonstration, because it disturbed the balance of power among the Balkans, and again threatened the sea coast cities of Albania.

Bismarck recognized the peculiar character of the alliance with Italy, which was made purely defensive; he also saw that, like England, her short and naturally defended land frontiers placed her in a strong strategic position to form a number of loose alliances, which would secure her interests in all directions.

Italy was the last Power to get part of the failing empire of the Turk. England had Egypt; France, Morocco; Russia concessions from the treaty of Berlin, as Austria-Hungary had taken Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1912, she began the war for Tripoli, which at length gave her a front on the Mediterranean, and still further made her interests parallel in North Africa with England and France. She then desired to maintain the *status quo* against the aggressions of Germany and Turkey, for if the latter were to re-take Egypt from England, Italy's hold on Tripoli would be endangered.

The essence of her foreign policy at the opening of the war as expressed by Emile J. Dillon was:

"The Alpha and Omega of Italy's foreign policy in the pres-

ent is the maintenance of her actual position in the Mediterranean, and in the future the seasonable improvement of that position, and in every case the prevention of the shifting of the equilibrium such as would alter it to her disadvantage. To attain these conditions is an essential of Italian national existence, and calls for the constant exercise of vigilance and caution, alternating with push and daring by her responsible rulers. It behooves her therefore to be well affected toward France, friendly with Austria, amicable with Great Britain, to hold fast to the Triple Alliance, and to give no cause for umbrage to the Triple Entente. In a word it is the prestidigitation of statesmanship. And her diplomacy has acquitted itself well of the task. The sum of the efforts of successive governments has been to raise Italy to a unique position in Europe, to make her a link between the two rival groups of Powers, to one of which she herself belongs; to bestow upon her the second place in the Triple Alliance, and to invest her with an enormous influence for peace in the councils of Europe. To grudge her this influence which has been uniformly exerted for the best interests of Europe and her own, implies imperfect acquaintance with those interests or a leaning toward militarism. Every development which tends also to strengthen Italy, diplomatically and politically, tends also to augment safeguards of public peace, and to lessen the chances of a European conflict."

Italian hopes have centered on the lost lands under Austrian control (*Italia Irredenta*) on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, especially the port of Valona, which, lying opposite Italy at the narrowest part, is the key to the whole sea.

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Holland is between two of the combatants, England and Germany, and is in much the same position as Belgium. The river Rhine reaches the sea through Holland, and the port of Rotterdam is a center for German shipping. It would be a very desirable addition to the Kaiser's territory, but a German Rotterdam, like a German Antwerp, would be another "pistol pointed at the heart of England." Holland has no treaty guaranteeing her against invasions, like Belgium, but depends for protection on the threat of opening the dikes, flooding the whole of the Netherlands and drowning an invading army. Her army numbers 175,000.

Denmark, across the Sound from Norway and Sweden, is attached to the Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein, which was taken from her in the war against Austria and Prussia in 1864. The Danish peninsula of Jutland and the adjacent islands would form a valuable strategic addition to the German Empire or Russia. Bismarck desired possession of Schleswig-Holstein because Kiel harbor formed an excellent naval base. He had also in mind the project of a canal cut across Schleswig-Holstein from the North Sea to the Baltic. This was realized when the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal was completed, and German naval efficiency was much increased. By the use of the canal, the German fleet can be used as a unit, and concentrated quickly in either sea. One of the possible results of the war, in case of a German defeat, is the restoration of Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark, and the loss to Germany of Kiel harbor and the canal.

Switzerland is an example of a country where a number of races can abide happily together. Its frontiers abut on France, Germany, Italy and Austria, and its mountains have been settled by peasants from all these lands. It is protected from invasion by the sturdy independence of the people, and the ease with which the mountain

passes could be defended by a comparatively few thousand soldiers. Recruited from men accustomed to outdoor life, her army of 200,000 is remarkably efficient.

Spain, like Italy, is separated from the body of Central Europe by a range of mountains, and has little in common with the Powers at war. Her people are of the Latin race, related by blood to France. To satisfy Spain's colonial craving and give her an interest in the preservation of the balance of power, England and France have granted her a small strip of land along the western coast of Morocco, and this would incline her toward the Triple Entente.

Portugal is situated next to Spain, but her position is slightly different, because her coast is on the Atlantic and not the Mediterranean. She has territories in South Africa, the largest of which, Angola, is immediately north of German Southwest Africa. It is to her interest to aid England in preserving the *status quo* of South Africa.

Norway and Sweden have no land frontiers, save those that adjoin Northern Russia; it would be to the interest of no power to invade them. They face the Baltic Sea on the south, and in going from the North Sea to the Baltic, all vessels must pass through the narrow Sound between the Scandinavian peninsula and Denmark, unless the Kiel Canal is used. The Sound is controlled by heavy batteries.

THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR

Professor Albert Bushnell Hart.

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1. It is possible, though unlikely, that the whole of warring Europe may be brought into the pitiable condition of Germany in 1648, when gaunt and starving bands of men, calling themselves armies, passed to and fro across the country, eating up the scanty supplies of food and leaving the inhabitants to starve. In that time of horror a poor Protestant pastor relates that he was in such misery that he felt sure the good Lord would cause some rich man to die, so that he might have a rix (dollar) for performing the funeral services; and the Almighty answered his prayer.

In such a case the probable result would be that Europe would make peace, restoring as nearly as possible, the conditions of July, 1914. The boundaries would be little disturbed; trade and commerce would be again opened to all nations on about the same terms as before. The surplus of a hundred years' labor would be swept away, and Europe would begin a process of hard work and saving, rebuilding, slow rising in population. That task might not be so long as it was after the Napoleonic wars. The example of France after 1871 shows what a nation can do by "sitting tight" for a few years, earning much and spending little. The control of the forces of nature and the use of machinery would perhaps enable Europe in thirty years to come back to its previous wealth and population.

2. The Allies may win a general and decisive victory; and, on the doctrine of chances, that is the most probable result. For in a wearing down process the maritime nations and Russia have a decided advantage; and if the Allies should be worsted, it is not unlikely that Italy would come to their aid. If the time comes

when resistance by Germany and Austria is no longer possible, what terms will probably be meted out to the vanquished?

Austria by that time would presumably be so crushed and the unity of the empire so affected that no further punishment would be inflicted, except that the Italians might take Trieste and the Trentino; and Servia might take Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a seafront on the Adriatic; probably Montenegro would voluntarily come into this combine. If the Rumanians joined in the war they might perhaps get the Province of Transylvania, which includes so many of their people. The Russians would undoubtedly claim Constantinople with the control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and perhaps Western Asia Minor; they would also probably expect Galicia.

At that point, however, there might well be so much squabbling over fragments of the empire and so much objection on the part of the people of the Austrian provinces to being shuffled out like a deck of cards, that by common consent Austria would be left with a territory not much diminished; but would be compelled to reorganize so as to give the Slavs an opportunity of self-development.

As for Germany, Alsace-Lorraine is practically already mortgaged by the Allies to France; and Russia might claim Posen and perhaps East Prussia. There is just the same objection to taking that territory that there was to slicing off Alsace-Lorraine from France; it would leave a permanent scar in the consciousness of the German people. Neither the Germans nor the Austrian-Germans nor the Magyars can be removed from their land, and they will stay as neighbors, presumably friends and probably more anxious than ever for a political union of all the German-speaking people, to which union the Magyars would have to adhere or be submerged.

Germany would lose in such a peace all or nearly all her colonies; and probably the Allies with their colonies would thereafter lay discriminating duties on German ships for the purpose of keeping down their carrying trade. Such a peace, imposed by the will of conquerors, would probably bind Germany to keep up none but a greatly reduced army. It does not seem probable, in view of the terrible passions of the war, that the Allies

would take the broad and statesmanlike view that a hundred million people of like views and aspirations are bound to occupy a place in the world; and that it is better for the conquerors to treat them as equals rather than as subjects.

One possibility is that the Allies will quarrel over the division of the spoils, and that Germany will be admitted, as France was admitted in 1814, as a power which must be reckoned with in the settlements.

3. The third alternative is that the German-Austrian combination may win a decided victory. If another Frederick the Great should unexpectedly arise, he may double the forces of the country by adding his genius, and there is always the chance of getting complete command of the sea, which would probably mean the invasion of England. That would nearly destroy France's ally, and if France were then conquered there would be more than an equal chance of defeating Russia.

Allowing that Germany comes out possessed of sufficient power to dictate, what would probably be her will? As to European territory, Austria may receive Serbia and Macedonia with the seaport of Salonika; but will hardly wish either German or Russian territory. Germany will certainly annex Belgium and not unlikely Holland, but will probably leave the boundaries of France about as they were. The Scandinavian Powers may be untouched if they have not joined in the war. Germany will probably take such of the English colonies as pleases her fancy, especially any in which Germans might like to settle. This will not include Canada or Australia, but not unlikely will include South Africa.

If England is brought to her knees she will have to give up her chain of fortresses from Gibraltar to India; Hongkong and the Straits Settlements will go; probably not India, for it would be a serious thing for Germany to take on 300,000,000 unwilling subjects. Restrictions and special taxes will be laid on English commerce. England will be obliged to keep down her navy below any danger to the Germans. The Germans will not be likely to keep their hands off Asia Minor, which in climate, productions, and markets, would be a good field for German colonization.

If Europe is wise it will, whoever is the victor, avoid these harsh terms, because they would simply mean a truce. The defeated and humbled party would simply wait for an opportunity to get its revenge, just as Napoleon's cruel and contemptuous treatment of Prussia from 1806 to 1812 led to his overthrow. Passions calm down after the greatest war; nations recognize the right of other nations to be. Slav and Teuton have dwelt side by side without much interference with each other for half a thousand years and they can live in harmony again. The things that ought to be done to make the peace permanent are the following:

1. Europe must recognize the blood kinship of people of the same race, and must cease to try to amalgamate race fragments. Here in the United States we have pursued the other policy with great success because the race elements are so scattered over the whole country that we can make English the common language of courts and commerce; but the Magyars cannot impose their language upon the Slav fractions of their empire. Perhaps the most serious cause of the war is the feeling of wrath due to these attempts to destroy national languages, traditions, and religions. A European peace ought to offer not only toleration of religions but of race existence.

2. Europe must also give up the idea of compelling large racial units to accept a Government which is hateful to them. The German accusation of the Russian finds an echo in other parts of the world because of the stupid cruelty of the Russian Government toward Finland, Poland, and the Baltic provinces. Somewhere there must be a limit to the right of a group within a country to demand independence. The United States has within a half a century compelled a third of its members to remain in the union with the other two-thirds, and there is now no more loyal part of the country than the once hostile section. We have found the solution of our questions in federation. So have Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Perhaps that is the solution for countries like Austria-Hungary and Russia, in which there are large separate racial units.

3. Europe must admit a larger and more effective share of

the whole community to decisions as to their own destiny. It is a fearful thing for any nation to allow half a dozen or half a hundred persons to decide upon peace or war, and to put their country into a position where it must fight without discussion or vote, or the opportunity for public opinion to make itself felt. In England war was decided upon by the Cabinet before Parliament was allowed to discuss it. In Germany the Reichstag acquiesced, with a few negative Socialist votes. In Austria-Hungary there is no federal parliament. In Russia the Duma accepted the war which had already begun. In a sense popular government is on trial in this war. If the British and French armies are beaten the militarists will all assert that it was because their power was not supremely concentrated.

4. Above all no peace can be durable that does not provide in some way against the causes which have brought about the present war. Chief among them is the feeling, fostered by great armaments, that war is a proper and a manly way of settling national differences. War and more war is inevitable so long as there is any Power or group of Powers which keeps war always in the foreground. If you have paid a million dollars for an automobile of the biggest, most complicated, fastest, strongest, most durable type, you will not be satisfied to leave it in the garage year after year. You will want to mount it, ride it, and show the world that you have the unapproachable automobile. No Power with a great army and navy can help thinking that they ought to be used.

5. The only remedy is to prohibit fast death-dealing automobiles and big armies to everybody. The coming on and course of the present war are absolute proofs that war can only be prevented by some sort of world federation in which every nation shall have an armed force upon a fixed proportion, to be used as part of a contingent of a world police force, that must be powerful, for mankind can never be free from two dangers: the first is the possible rise of a barbaric power which recognizes no law, like the hordes led by Attila and Tamerlane; the second is the danger from some highly civilized Power which may suddenly adopt the barbarians' method of ruthless warfare. No human kindness, no treaties, can prevent those dangers; and

unless Europe can find some way of creating a public force which shall in no country be sufficient to destroy a neighbor and yet for all countries shall be strong enough to provide against the ungovernable forces of the world, the greatest war of history will after a few years be followed by a greater one. Perhaps Macaulay's New Zealander may yet have the opportunity to muse over the broken arch of London Bridge.

AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

By the President of the United States of America.

A proclamation.

"Whereas, A state of war unhappily exists between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and between Germany and Russia, and between Germany and France; and

"Whereas, The United States is on terms of friendship and amity with the contending powers and with the persons inhabiting their several dominions;

"And whereas, There are citizens of the United States residing within the territories or dominions of each of the said belligerents and carrying on commerce, trade, or other business or pursuits therein;

"And whereas, The subjects of each of the said belligerents residing within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States are carrying on commerce, trade, or other business pursuits therein;

"And whereas, The laws and treaties of the United States without interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy, or with the commercial manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the contest;

"And whereas, It is the duty of a neutral government not to permit or suffer the making of its waters subservient to the purposes of war;

"Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, in order to preserve the neutrality of the United States and of its citizens and of persons within its territory and jurisdiction, and to enforce its laws and treaties, and, in order that all persons, being warned of the general tenor of the laws and treaties of the United States in the behalf and of the

law of nations, may thus be prevented from any violation of the same, do hereby declare and proclaim that by certain provisions of the act approved on the 4th day of March A. D., 1909, commonly known as the Penal Code of the United States, the following acts are forbidden to be done, under severe penalties, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, to-wit:

“(1) Accepting and exercising a commission to serve either of the said belligerents by land or sea against the other belligerent.

“(2) Enlisting or entering into the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

“(3) Hiring or retaining another person to enlist or enter himself in the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

“(4) Hiring another person to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

“(5) Hiring another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be entered into service as aforesaid.

“(6) Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

“(7) Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be entered into service as aforesaid. (But the said act is not to be construed to extend to a citizen or subject of either belligerent who, being transiently within the United States, shall, on board of any vessel of war, which, at the time of its arrival within the United States, was fitted and equipped as such vessel of war, enlist or enter himself or hire or retain another subject or citizen of the same belligerent, who is transiently within the United States, to enlist or enter himself to serve such belligerent on board such vessel of war, if the United States shall then be at peace with such belligerent.)

“(8) Fitting out and arming, or attempting to fit out and arm, or procuring to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or

vessel with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of either of the said belligerents.

“(9) Issuing or delivering a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States for any ship or vessel to the intent that she may be employed as aforesaid.

“(10) Increasing or augmenting, or procuring to be increased or augmented, or knowingly being concerned in increasing or augmenting the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel, which at the time of her arrival within the United States was a ship of war, cruiser, or armed vessel in the service of either of the said belligerents, or belonging to the subjects of either, by adding to the number of guns of such vessels, or by changing those on board of her, for guns of a larger calibre, or by the addition thereto of any equipment solely applicable to war.

“(11) Beginning or setting on foot or providing or preparing the means for any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from the territory or jurisdiction of the United States against the territories or dominions of either of the said belligerents.’

“And I do hereby further declare and proclaim that any frequenting and use of the waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States by the armed vessels of a belligerent, whether public ships or privateers, for the purpose of preparing for hostile operations, or as posts of observation upon the ships of war or privateers or merchant vessels of a belligerent lying within or being about to enter the jurisdiction of the United States, must be regarded as unfriendly and offensive and in violation of that neutrality which it is the determination of this government to observe; and to the end that the hazard and inconvenience of such apprehended practices may be avoided, I further proclaim and declare that from and after the 5th day of August instant, and during the continuance of the present hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and Germany and Russia, and Germany and France, no ship of war or privateer of any belligerent shall be permitted to make use of any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from which a vessel from an opposing belligerent (whether

the same shall be a ship of war, a privateer, or a merchant ship), shall have previously departed until after the expiration of at least twenty-four hours from the departure of such last-mentioned vessel beyond the jurisdiction of the United States.

"If any ship of war or privateer of a belligerent shall, after the time this notification takes effect, enter any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the United States, such vessel shall be required to depart and to put to sea within twenty-four hours after her entrance into such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters, except in case of stress of weather or of her requiring provisions or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or for repairs; in any of which cases the authorities of the port or nearest port (as the case may be) shall require her to put to sea as soon as possible after the expiration of such period of twenty-four hours, without permitting her to take in supplies beyond what may be necessary for her immediate use, and no such vessel which may have been permitted to remain within the waters of the United States for the purpose of repair shall continue within such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters for a longer period than twenty-four hours after her necessary repairs shall have been completed, unless within such twenty-four hours a vessel, whether ship of war, privateer, or merchant ship, of an opposing belligerent shall have departed therefrom, in which case the time limit for the departure of such ship of war or privateer shall be extended so far as may be necessary to secure an interval of not less than twenty-four hours between such departure and that of any ship of war, privateer, or merchant ship of an opposing belligerent which may have previously quit the same port, harbor, roadstead, or waters.

"No ship of war or privateer of a belligerent shall be detained in any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the United States more than twenty-four hours, by reason of the successive departures from such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of more than one vessel of an opposing belligerent. But if there be several vessels of opposing belligerents in the same port, harbor, roadstead, or waters, the order of their departure therefrom shall be so arranged as to afford the opportunity of leaving alternately to the vessels of the opposing belligerents, and to cause

the least detention consistent with the objects of this proclamation.

"No ship of war or privateer of a belligerent shall be permitted, while in any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters within the jurisdiction of the United States, to take in any supplies except provisions and such other things as may be requisite for the subsistence of her crew and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel, if without any sail power, to the nearest port of her own country, or, in case the vessel is rigged to go under sail and may also be propelled by steam power, then with half the quantity of coal which she would be entitled to receive if dependent upon steam alone, and no coal shall be again supplied to any such ship of war or privateer in the same or any other port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the United States, without special permission, until after the expiration of three months from the time when such coal may have been last supplied to her within the waters of the United States unless such ship of war or privateer since last thus supplied have entered a port of the government to which she belongs.

"Washington, August 4, 1914."

LEADERS OF THE WAR

HEADS OF STATE.

Francis Joseph I, Emperor of Austria-Hungary, was born August 18, 1830. Son of Archduke Francis Karl and of Archduchess Sophia, Princess of Bavaria. He became Emperor, December 2, 1848, on the abdication of his uncle Ferdinand I, and was married April 24, 1854 to the late Empress Elizabeth, daughter of the Duke Maximilian of Bavaria. He is the oldest sovereign in Europe, and his reign has been the longest and most eventful.

Archduke Francis Ferdinand, son of the late Archduke Karl Ludwig and Princess Annunciata, was born December 18, 1863. He contracted a morganatic marriage July 1, 1900, with Countess Sophia Chotek and was forced to renounce the right of his children to succeed to the throne. He and his wife were assassinated at Serajevo, June 29, 1914, by Gavril Princip.

Albert of Belgium, son of Prince Philippe of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha and of Princess Marie of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, was born April 8, 1875. He married, in 1900, Elizabeth, Duchess of Bavaria, and succeeded his uncle Leopold II, to the Belgian throne on December 17, 1909.

Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic since February 18, 1913, was born August 20, 1860, studied law, and was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1887. He served successively as Minister of Education, Finance, and as Premier.

Emperor Wilhelm II, of the house of Hohenzollern, German Emperor and King of Prussia, was born on January 27, 1859. He is the son of Emperor Friederich III and Victoria, Princess Royal of Great Britain, daughter of Queen Victoria. He was married to Princess Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein, February 27, 1881, and ascended the throne June 15, 1888.

Crown Prince Friederich Wilhelm, eldest son of Kaiser Wilhelm II, was born May 6, 1882, married June 6, 1905 to Princess Cecilie, daughter of the late Friederich Francis III of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. He took much interest in military affairs and was placed in charge of the eastern wing of the German army.

King George V, of England, of the House of Hanover, son of King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra, daughter of Christian IX of Denmark, was born June 3, 1865. He married Victoria Mary, daughter of the late Duke of Teck, July 6, 1893, and became king May 6, 1910. He, as well as Emperor William, of Germany, is a grandson of the late Queen Victoria.

Yoshihito, Emperor of Japan, son of Mutsuhito, was born August 31, 1879. He married May 10, 1900, Princess Sadako, daughter of Prince Kujo, and succeeded his father July 30, 1912.

Nicholas II, Emperor of All the Russias, son of Alexander III and Princess Dagmar, daughter of the late King Christian IX of Denmark, was born May 18, 1868. He was married on November 26, 1894, to Princess Alexandra Alix, daughter of Ludwig IV, Grand Duke of Hesse. He became Emperor November 1, 1894.

Peter I, King of Servia, son of Alexander Karageorgevich, was born July 11, 1844. He married, July 30, 1883, the late Princess Zorka, daughter of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro and ascended the throne June 14, 1903.

Mohammed V., Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, the son of Sultan Abdul Mejid, was born November 3, 1844. He succeeded his brother Abdul Hamid II on April 27, 1909. The Sultan is in direct line of descent of the house of Othman, the founder of the Empire in 1299.

DIPLOMATS.

Count Leopold Berchtold, Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, the son of Sigismund, Count of Berchtold, was born April 18, 1863, and married January 25, 1893, to Ferdinandine, Countess

of Károlyi. He served at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. He was ambassador at St. Petersburg during the Austrian crisis of 1908.

M. René Viviani, Prime Minister of France, is a native of Algeria. He became much interested in labor and was created Minister of Labor in 1906. He also served as Minister of Public Instruction and was selected Premier June 13, 1914.

Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, Imperial Chancellor of Germany, was born September 29, 1856. He studied law and became professor at the University of Göttingen. He held various public positions under the Prussian and German Imperial Government and became Imperial Chancellor when Von Bülow resigned in 1909.

Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister of England, was born in Yorkshire, September 12, 1852. He was educated at Oxford and became a practising barrister. He served as Secretary of the State for the Home Department from 1892 to 1895 and as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1905 to 1908, since which time he has been Premier.

Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain since 1905, was born April 25, 1862. He was educated at Oxford, and served under Gladstone in the Foreign Office from 1892 to 1895.

Count Shige-Nobu Okuma, Prime Minister, is known as the "Grand Old Man of Japan." He was born in 1838 and served in the Treasury Department, Foreign Affairs, and became leader of the Japanese Progressive Party. He was created a count in 1887, and became Prime Minister April 16, 1914.

M. Goremykin, Premier of All the Russias, first entered the public service as Minister of the Interior in 1895. He was a strong advocate of peace and served as Premier once previous to his present term. He succeeded Count Witte, May 2, 1906.

Nikola Pashitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, was born in 1846, educated at the Technical Institute in Belgrade, and served as an

engineer in the war against Turkey in 1876. He became leader of the radicals and occupied the posts of Mayor of Belgrade, ambassador to Russia, head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister in 1903. He was one of the leading spirits of the Balkan League.

MILITARY AND NAVAL OFFICERS.

Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the General Staff of the Austrian Army, had been opposed since his appointment at the head of the army in 1906 by the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand and had resigned several times. His training has been according to German military methods.

General Joffre, Chief of the French General Staff, was born in the Pyrénées, January 12, 1852. He was at the siege of Paris during the war of 1870, served in the Formosa and Tonkin campaigns, in the Sudan, Timbuktoo, and Madagascar. He was then appointed military governor of Lille, and Chief of the Staff in July, 1911.

General Paul Pau, of the French Army, was born November 29, 1848. He served in many campaigns, being appointed division commander in 1903. He retired, but was reinstated to his former position before the war of 1914.

General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff at the beginning of the war, was born in Mecklenburg, May 23, 1848. He earned the Iron Cross during the Franco-Prussian war, and later served on the staff of Field Marshal von Moltke, his uncle. In 1891 he was appointed an aid to the Kaiser and in 1906 became Chief of Staff.

Baron von der Goltz, Field Marshal of the German Army, was born August 12, 1843. He served in the Franco-Prussian War and became attached to the German General Staff. He was given leave of absence in 1883 and visited Constantinople, returning to Germany in 1895. He went again to Constantinople in 1908 and reorganized the Turkish Army. He has written a number of books on historical and military subjects.

General Alexander von Kluck, of the German Army, was born May 20, 1846. He served in the Franco-Prussian War and passed through various grades to the rank of general in 1902.

Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz of the German Navy was born March 19, 1849. He was educated at Frankfort and in 1865 entered the Prussian Naval Service. He served in the Pacific and in 1897 entered the Naval Offices in Berlin. When the present Kaiser began to create a new navy in 1899, Von Tirpitz was placed at the head of it with the rank of vice-admiral.

Admiral Hugo von Pohl, Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the German Navy, was born August 25, 1875. He entered the German Navy in 1876. He erected the coast naval stations of Schleswig in 1908 and was appointed a vice-admiral in 1909.

Field Marshal Earl Kitchener, head of the War Office in Great Britain, was born in County Kerry, Ireland, June 24, 1850. He was educated at Woolwich, entered the Royal Engineers, served in Egypt from 1882 to 1898, at which time he made his famous expedition to Khartum and gained the rank of Major General. He was placed in supreme command of the English forces during the Boer War of 1899-1902, transferred to India 1902-1909, thence to Egypt as consul-general.

Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty of Great Britain, was born in 1874. He is the eldest son of the late Rt. Hon. Lord Randolph Churchill, a son of the seventh Duke of Marlborough. He was a war correspondent during the Boer War. He entered Parliament in 1900 and became Secretary of State for the Colonies; Home Secretary in 1910, and head of the Admiralty in 1911.

Admiral Sir Frederick William Fisher, First Sea Lord of the British Navy, was born in Ceylon, October 5, 1851. He joined the navy in 1865, saw service in the Persian Gulf, South America, the Mediterranean, Australia, China and Jamaica. In 1907 he was promoted to the rank of admiral and superintendent of the Malta Dockyard, and in 1911 President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. He was appointed First Sea Lord, October, 1914.

Field Marshal Sir John French, in command of the British land forces, was born September 28, 1852. He entered the navy in 1866, but changed to the army in 1874. He served in the Sudan campaign of 1884, and in Natal in 1899. General von Bernhardi, of the German General Staff, speaks of him as the most capable English cavalry commander during the Boer War. He was appointed Inspector General in 1907, and Chief of the Imperial Staff in 1911.

Sir John Jellicoe, Vice-Admiral and Second Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, was born December 5, 1859. He entered the navy in 1872, served in the Egyptian War of 1882, was in command of the *Victoria* which was wrecked in 1893, commanded the naval brigade in China in 1900, and was appointed Rear Admiral in 1907. He became Commander of the Home Fleet in 1912.

Grand Duke Nikolas Nikolaievich, Commander in chief of the Russian Army served in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. He was given an important cavalry command and for the past few years has been Military Governor of St. Petersburg.

General Radumil Putnik, the Chief-in-Command of the Serbian Army, was born in 1840 in Austria near the frontier at Belgrade. He received a military training in Serbia and studied in France. He was Chief of Staff of the Serbian Army during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

VITAL WAR STATISTICS

Daily Cost of a European War.

An Estimate Made by Dr. Charles Richet, Statistician, University of Paris, at the close of the Balkan Wars of 1913.

Provisioning of troops.....	\$12,500,000
Feeding of horses.....	1,000,000
Pay.....	4,250,000
Wages, arsenals and harbors.....	1,000,000
Mobilization	2,000,000
Transport of foodstuffs, weapons, etc.....	4,000,000
Ammunition—	
Infantry.....	4,000,000
Artillery.....	1,250,000
Ship artillery.....	375,000
Fitting out of army.....	4,000,000
Ambulance service	500,000
Movement of ships.....	500,000
Deficit in taxes.....	10,000,000
Support for population without means.....	6,750,000
Requisitions, damage to towns, bridges, etc.....	2,000,000
Total.....	<u>\$54,125,000</u>

If such a war lasted only as long as the brief Franco-Prussian conflict in 1870, the outlay on this basis would exceed five thousand million dollars, irrespective of war indemnities.

War's Cost in Life and Money.

	Days	Loss of life	Cost in money
	Duration		
Revolution and First Empire, 1793-1815...	10,088	2,100,000	\$6,250,000,000
Crimean, 1854-56.....	678	485,000	1,700,000,000
Civil War, U. S., 1861-65.....	1,505	1,000,000	5,000,000,000
Austro-Prussian, 1866.....	70	330,000,000
Franco-German, 1870-71.....	222	290,000	2,033,400,000
Russo-Turkish, 1877-78.....	326	180,000	950,000,000
Spanish-American, 1898.....	234	2,910	165,000,000
Boer, 1899-1900.....	529	12,000	1,085,330,000
Russo-Japanese, 1904-05.....	565	555,900	2,513,470,000

Armies of the Nations.

The Strength of the Land Forces, Compiled from Authoritative Sources, the Reserves, and their Organization.

	Standing army	First reserve	Second reserve	Total trained men
Great Britain.....	125,000 ^a	206,000	463,000	798,000
France.....	750,000 ^b	700,000	700,000	2,150,000
Russia (Europe).....	{ 949,000 }	1,838,500	2,488,500	5,400,000
Russia (Asia).....				
Germany.....	790,000	450,000	2,600,000	3,850,000
Austria-Hungary.....	424,000	396,000	1,400,000	2,220,000
Italy.....	250,000	450,000	320,000	1,020,000
Belgium.....	58,000	112,000	170,000	340,000
Portugal.....	30,000 ^c	90,000	140,000	260,000
Servia.....	24,000	246,000	80,000	350,000
Montenegro.....	4,000	36,000	40,000
Japan.....	250,000	250,000	1,000,000	1,500,000
United States.....	150,000 ^d	150,000 ^e

(a) Not including army in India, 77,000; army in colonies, 45,000.

(b) Not including 40,000 native soldiers in French colonies.

(c) Not including overseas Portuguese and natives.

(d) Estimate of The Statesman's Year Book.

(e) 60,000 regular troops and 90,000 partly trained. The United States relies mainly on volunteers.

Battle Fleets of European Powers.

	Dread- noughts.	Coast defense ships.	Cruisers.	Torpedo boats and de- stroyers.	Sub- marines.	Total com- pleted.
Great Britain						
Number.....	71	108	216	75	470
Tons.....	1,251,035	789,615	137,338	30,362	2,208,350
France						
Number.....	22	1	29	219	64	335
Tons.....	355,043	8,800	247,819	49,238	27,940	688,840
Russia						
Number.....	7	2	15	105	30	159
Tons.....	98,750	10,380	116,345	38,880	6,506	270,861
Germany						
Number.....	36	2	50	130	21	239
Tons.....	594,319	8,168	244,992	67,094	14,140	928,713
Austria						
Number.....	9	6	7	57	6	85
Tons.....	134,643	41,700	27,195	16,302	1,686	221,526
Triple Entente						
Number.....	101	3	152	540	169	965
Dual Alliance						
Number.....	45	8	57	187	27	324
Triple Entente						
Tons.....	1,704,828	19,180	1,153,779	225,456	64,808	3,168,051
Dual Alliance						
Tons.....	728,962	49,868	272,187	83,396	15,826	1,150,239

Aircraft in the War.

	Dirigibles.	Aeroplanes.
France.....	31	1,200
Great Britain.....	15	500
Russia.....	16	800
Belgium.....	2	40
Servia.....	..	40
Germany.....	35	600
Austria-Hungary.....	10	350

Army and Navy Budgets.

	Army	Navy	Together	Per capita
Great Britain.....	\$141,100,000	\$231,546,500	\$372,646,500	\$8.19
France.....	287,298,300 ^a	104,238,815	391,537,115	9.88
Russia.....	388,000,000	121,247,270	510,147,270	2.98
Germany.....	265,000,000	115,195,970	380,195,970	5.88
Austria-Hungary.....	124,960,000	30,032,755 ^c	154,996,755	3.13
Italy.....	71,110,000	50,789,230	121,899,230	3.66
Japan.....	49,983,035	49,304,560	99,287,595	1.47
Belgium.....	20,219,250	20,219,250	2.67
Portugal.....	11,088,405	11,088,405	1.86
Servia.....	958,835	958,835	.32
Montenegro.....	900,000 ^b	900,000	1.74
United States.....	121,145,361	147,493,335	368,638,696	3.79

(a) Including \$46,779,360 for troops in Morocco.

(b) With an additional \$350,000 from the Czar of Russia.

(c) 1912-13.

EVENTS OF THE WAR*

June 29—Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife assassinated by Gavrilo Princip at Serajevo.

July 23—Austrian ultimatum to Serbia demands satisfaction for murder plot and suppression of pan-Serb propaganda.

July 25—Serbia returns an answer unsatisfactory to Austria.

July 28—Austria declares war on Serbia. Russia moves troops toward Austrian frontier.

July 29—Austrians bombard Belgrade.

July 30—Germany demands that Russia stop mobilization within twenty-four hours. Austrians repulsed at Semendria. Servians lose at Fotcha in Bosnia, but check invaders at Losnitza.

July 31—British fleet leaves Plymouth. Continued fighting on Danube and Drina frontiers of Serbia.

August 1—Germany declares war on Russia after Kaiser orders mobilization. France mobilizes army. Italy announces her neutrality.

August 2—German troops occupy Luxemburg, move on Longwy and invade France near Nancy. Russians invade German Empire at Eydtkuhnen and Eichenried and attack Johannisburg. German fleet engages Russian off Aland Islands and drives it into Gulf of Finland.

August 3—German cavalry repulsed at Petit Croix, on Lorraine frontier. German cruiser bombards and fires Libau, on the Baltic. Germans seize Kalisz and two other cities on Polish frontier, and invade Belgium, taking Arlon. Belgium appeals to England for aid in preserving her neutrality.

August 4—Great Britain declares war on Germany. Germany declares war on Belgium. German Army of the Meuse attacks Liège.

August 5—40,000 Belgians at Liège hold out against 120,000 Germans, who lose 5000 in first three days' fighting. Kitchener becomes War Secretary. "Königin Luise," German nine-layer,

* Based on the compilation of The Independent.

sunk by British and British cruiser "Amphion" sunk by mine in North Sea.

August 6—Austria declares war on Russia. Continued fighting at Liège nets Germans two forts. Parliament votes 500,000 increase in army.

August 7—German losses at Liège total 25,000. Armistice of 24 hours refused to Germans by Belgians. French invade Alsace at Altkirch.

August 8—Germans occupy city of Liège, but some forts are held by Belgians. French occupy Mülhausen in Alsace, and take passes in Vosges Mountains. 20,000 English troops land in France.

August 9—Liège forts still resist Germans. French army in Alsace takes Colmar. British expeditionary force joins French in Belgium.

August 10—Diplomatic relations between France and Austria broken. French advance on Neu Breisach. Austrian bombardment of Antivari, Montenegro's seaport, reported.

August 11—British mobilization complete. Liège forts still hold out.

August 12—French cavalry drives back Germans in a battle at Tongres; the allies take positions protecting Brussels.

August 13—Great Britain in state of war with Austria. The German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" sold to Turkey. Admiralty announces the Atlantic as safe for British commerce.

August 14—French army gains control of Vosges passes to both Alsace and Lorraine. Germans lose in cavalry skirmishes along the Belgian frontier, losing three-fifths of a command at Haelen. Fighting at Diest.

August 15—France announces offensive movement in Alsace in force. Austrians driven back on Servian frontier. Belgians and Germans fight at Tirlemont.

August 16—Japan sends ultimatum to Kaiser demanding German evacuation of Kiaochow, China, and the East by August 23. Czar promises autonomy to Poland.

August 17—Belgian capital removed from Brussels to Antwerp. French advance in Alsace penetrates within fourteen miles of Strassburg. Battle at Jedar, Servia.

August 18—Germans advance on Brussels. Austrians suffer serious defeat on the Servian line near Saboc. Russians announce mobilization complete.

August 19—Germans reach Louvain. Battle raging from Namur to Diest.

August 20—German cavalry occupies Brussels. Belgians retire toward Antwerp. French recapture Mülhausen. Russians occupy Gumbinnen in East Prussia.

August 21—German cavalry occupy Ghent. Allies report victory at Tirlemont. Antwerp prepares for siege. Germany levies tribute of \$40,000,000 on city of Brussels and \$10,000,000 on Liège. Namur partially invested by Germans. French defeated in battle of Saarburg-Lunéville.

August 22—Germans take Namur. French forced back east of Vosges Mountains. Servians defeat Austrians on banks of the Drina.

August 23—Japan declares war against Germany. British and French lines extend from Mons to Luxemburg frontier.

August 24—Germans drive the allies close to the French frontier and left wing enters France, capturing Lunéville and Longwy. Japanese blockade Ts'ingtao. Russians occupy greater part of eastern Prussia beyond the Vistula. Austria abandons Servian campaign.

August 25—French and British massed near Givet. French abandon Alsace campaign. Austria declares war on Japan. Zepelin bombs fall in Antwerp.

August 26—French Ministry resigns and coalition cabinet formed on war lines. Allied forces withdraw to St. Die. Russians sweep over East Prussia, taking Allenstein.

August 27—German army, led by the Crown Prince, captures Longwy. British cruiser "Highflyer" sinks "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" off coast of West Africa.

August 28—British fleet sinks two German cruisers and two torpedo boat destroyers off Heligoland. Germans burn and sack city of Louvain, Belgium. British defeated at Maubeuge. British marines land at Ostend. Austrians win battle of Krasnik, Poland.

August 29—Left flank of Allies repulsed at St. Quentin. Ger-

mans march on La Fère, in the second line of French defenses. Paris prepares for siege. Germans report repulse of Russians.

August 30—German right wing occupies Amiens. German aeroplane flies over Paris. France calls out 1914 reserves. Czar's forces advance to the Vistula, bombarding Thorn and Graudenz.

August 31—Allies again fall back before German advance. Germans report capture of 30,000 Russians.

September 1—British fight a losing battle at Compiègne. Russians defeated at Tannenburg, East Prussia. St. Petersburg becomes Petrograd. German right wing, under Von Kluck, reaches Senlis, 25 miles from Paris.

September 2—French Government removes from Paris to Bordeaux. Fighting at Montdidier and Aincy-le-Château, forty miles from Paris.

September 3—Austrian army in Galicia overwhelmingly defeated by the Russians, who occupy Lemberg and Halicz. Lille occupied by Germans.

September 4—Paris prepares for a siege, but the German right wing passes by to the Marne River on the east. Austrians meet reserves in Russian Poland.

September 5—Allies agree not to make peace separately. Von Bülow captures Rheims. Germans take Termonde near Antwerp.

September 6—German forces from Lorraine effect junction near Chalons-sur-Marne with German left, which went from Belgium to Paris. Battle of the Marne begins.

September 7—The British cruiser "Pathfinder" blown up by a mine in the North Sea. Russians occupy Styri, south of Lemberg, and attack Przemyśl, chief stronghold in Galicia. Russian Government announces annexation of Galicia. Germans take Maubeuge.

September 8—French and English begin to drive back the German right wing. Battle of Meaux.

September 9—French attack the German center along the Marne River. British and Germans fight on Lake Nyassa, Africa.

September 10—Germans retreat over the Aisne River between Soissons and Compiègne. British on the Marne capture 1500 men, four guns, six machine guns and sixty wagons. Serbs capture Semlin. Turkey repudiates the capitulations.

September 11—Germans defeated at Vitry-le-François. Lunéville retaken by the French. Austrians routed in Russian Poland. Serbs and Montenegrins invade Bosnia. Continuous rains in French theater of war.

September 12—Germans attack Verdun forts. Australian navy seizes Bismarck Archipelago. Russians retire before Germans in East Prussia. Germans thrown back at Nancy.

September 13—Belgians harassing German lines of communication. Austrians routed in Russian Poland. Russians claim 280,000 Austrian prisoners. The battle of the Aisne begins at Saissons.

September 14—German armies retreat back of Rheims. Austrians at Rava-ruska, northwest of Lemberg, defeated by Russian forces. Belgians defeated near Antwerp.

September 15—Russians corner the Austrians between San and Vistula.

September 16—General von Hindenberg invades Russian Poland. The French attempt to break through the German centre in the Argonne forest. Belgian commissioners present evidence of atrocities to President Wilson.

September 17—Continuous fighting all along the line from Chalons-sur-Marne to Noyon on the Oise River. Austrians invade Servia.

September 18—Germans begin the bombardment of Rheims. Japanese defeat Germans north of Kiaochow. Russians driven from East Prussia.

September 19—Allies endeavoring to turn flank of General von Kluck at Noyon. Germans take Beaumont. Russians bombarding Przemyśl. Rheims cathedral shelled and burned.

September 20—Russian cavalry raid on the San west of Przemyśl. German cruiser "Königsberg" sinks British cruiser "Pegasus" at Zanzibar.

September 21—Austrians evacuate Jaroslav. Servians approaching Serajevo, capital of Bosnia. French gain in forest of Argonne and on the Oise.

September 22—Russians occupy Jaroslav in Galicia. German submarine U 9 sinks the British cruisers "Aboukir," "Cressy" and "La Hogue" in North Sea.

September 23—French recapture Péronne on extreme German right. Russians driving back German army in Poland north-east of Cracow.

September 24—Germans attack forts between Verdun and Toul.

September 25—Germans invade Russia along the Niemen River. Montenegrins take Mostar, capital of Herzegovina.

September 26—Germans bombard fortress of St. Mihiel on Meuse. Russians take Rzeszow, on railroad between Przemyśl and Cracow.

September 27—Germans cross the Meuse near St. Mihiel. Russians cross the Carpathians and invade Hungary. German aircraft drops bombs in twelve cities.

September 28—Indecisive fighting on Aisne River and in Argonne Forest. Servians approach Serajevo, capital of Bosnia. Germans re-occupy Lassigny.

September 29—Germans destroy the French town of Albert. Indian troops landed at Marseilles. German cruiser "Emden" sinks five more British vessels in Bay of Bengal.

September 30—Three forts of Antwerp's outer ring reduced. Two Italian fishing boats sunk in Adriatic by Austrian floating mines.

October 1—Fighting on German right extends to Arras. Germans fail to cross Niemen River.

October 2—Germans fail to cross the Meuse. British and Japanese attacking German forts at Kiaochow by land and sea.

October 3—Russians defeat Germans at Augustowo near East Prussian frontier. Russians invade Hungary thru Carpathian passes.

October 4—Strong attack on German advance angle at Lassigny. Bosphorus and Dardanelles closed. Japanese squadron in possession of Marshall Archipelago.

October 5—Left wing of Allies falls back in neighborhood of Roye. Japanese seize German railroad in Shantung despite Chinese protest.

October 6—Germans carry Nethe River defenses of Antwerp. Belgian Government removes to Ostend.

October 7—Bombardment of city of Antwerp begins. Ger-

man cavalry fighting with Allies near Lens and Lille. German destroyer sunk by British submarines off mouth of Ems.

October 8—Inner ring of Antwerp fortifications reduced. Russians again invading East Prussia. Japanese take Yap and Jaluit islands.

October 9—Antwerp surrenders. Germans defeated near Arras.

October 10—Besieged fortress of Przemyśl relieved. Hard fight north of Soissons.

October 11—Two German aeroplanes drop bombs in Paris. Russian cruiser sunk by German submarine.

October 12—Germans take Ghent. Ferdinand becomes King of Rumania.

October 13—Germans occupy Ghent. Belgian Government moves from Ostend to Havre, France. Boer revolt in northwest part of Cape Colony.

October 14—Ypres, Belgium, taken by Allies. Germans occupy all Poland west of Vistula. Germans take Bruges. Austrians regain Jaroslav in Galicia.

October 15—Germans occupy Ostend. Russians drive back German lines from Warsaw. Portuguese army mobilized to join the Allies.

October 16—British cruiser "Hawke" sunk by German submarine. Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Foreign Minister, dies.

October 17—British cruiser sinks four torpedo boat destroyers. Japanese cruiser "Takachiho" sunk in Kiaochow Bay by mines.

October 18—Allies holding Germans back at Belgian frontier. Austrians and Russians fight along San River, Galicia.

October 19—Germans preparing for siege of Belfort. Austrian submarine destroyed by French cruiser.

October 20—Cossacks attack Germans in rear and drive them back from Warsaw. Revolutionary rising in Portugal quelled.

October 21—Saxon army forced to retire from Ivangorod on the Vistula. Serbs and Montenegrins defeated near Serajevo.

October 22—Desperate but indecisive fighting on Belgian border near coast. Boer rebels defeated. Japanese begin bombardment of German port of Ts'ingtao.

October 23—British fleet shells German entrenchments along

Belgian coast. Austrian and German forces trying to hold Radom against Russians from Warsaw.

October 24—Fighting centers about La Bassée and Armentières. Austrians recapture Czernowitz, capital of Bukowina.

October 25—Germans cross the Yser River between Dixmude and Nieuport. Germans advance again toward Augustowo.

October 26—Austrians and Russians continue combat along San River in Galicia. Bloody struggle in Flanders continued with no apparent result.

October 27—Germans driven back over Yser in Flanders. Russians defeat Germans north of Pilitza River in Poland.

October 28—Russians pursue Germans beyond Radom, south of Pilitza. Princip and twenty-one conspirators found guilty of assassinating Archduke Francis Ferdinand, June 28, at Serajevo.

October 29—Allies retake Lille, Russians defeat Austrians at Tarlow, Poland. Turkish war ships attack Crimean ports.

October 30—Germans gain on Aisne. Russians again in possession of Czernowitz, capital of Bukowina. Colonel Maritz, leader of Boer rebellion, defeated.

October 31—Germans still retreating from Warsaw. Turkish warships destroy Black Sea merchantmen. Italian Cabinet resigns over war question.

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE*

In the extracts from the Belgian Gray Papers (B. G. P.), the German White Papers (G. W. P.), the English White Papers (B. W. P.), and the Russian Orange Papers (R. O. P.) given below, the following diplomats figure prominently:

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador to Great Britain.

Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at Petrograd.

Sir M. de Bunsen—British Ambassador at Vienna.

M. Cambon, French Ambassador to Germany.

M. Davignon, Belgian Premier.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister.

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London.

Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador at London.

Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at Petrograd.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Diplomatic Service.

M. Sazonof, Russian Foreign Minister.

Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd.

Prince Troubetzky, on Military Staff of Czar of Russia.

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister to Belgium.

M. Viviani, Premier of France.

Von Below Saleski, German Minister to Belgium.

Von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor of Germany.

Von Jagow, German Foreign Secretary.

* From the official correspondence, published by the New York Times.

July 23.

Austria sends note to Servia demanding satisfaction for the death of Archduke Francis Ferdinand within forty-eight hours (B. W. P. No. 4, see page 23). Servia appeals to Russia.

R. O. P. No. 1.

*The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 10-23 July, 1914.

The Austrian Minister has just transmitted at 6 o'clock in the evening to the Minister of Finances Patchou, who is replacing Pachitch, a note in the form of an ultimatum from his Government fixing a delay of forty-eight hours for the acceptance of the demands contained therein. Giesl added verbally that in case the note should not be accepted in its integrity within a delay of forty-eight hours he had orders to leave Belgrade with the Staff of the Legation. Pachitch and the other Ministers, who are absent on electoral campaign, have been recalled and are expected in Belgrade tomorrow, Friday, at 10 o'clock in the morning. Patchou, who communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the aid of Russia, and declares that no Servian Government will be able to accept the demands of Austria.

July 24.

That the Austrian note to Servia endangers the peace of Europe is immediately recognized by all Foreign Offices. Austria explains her position to Russia. Diplomats consider forty-eight hours too short a time for negotiations.

G. W. P. July 24, 1914.

The Russian Government issued an official communiqué on July 24, according to which it would be impossible for Russia

to remain indifferent in the Servian-Austrian conflict. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, made this position known to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtalès.

G. W. P. Annex 3.

*The Imperial German Ambassador in Vienna to
the Imperial German Chancellor.*

(Telegram.)

July 24, 1914.

Count Berchtold today summoned the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Servia. After going over the historical developments of the last few years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy did not wish to appear against Servia in the rôle of a conqueror. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure against Servian machinations; that Austria-Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly behavior of Servia toward the monarchy, that he had no intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who as yet had no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the explanations of the Minister ad referendum, adding that he would immediately transmit them to Sazonof.

G. W. P. Annex 4.

*The Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg.
to the Imperial German Chancellor.*

(Telegram.)

July 24, 1914.

I have just availed myself of the contents of Decree 592 in a long talk with Sazonof. The Minister made wild complaints against Austria-Hungary, and was much excited. What he said most definitely was this: that Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.

B. W. P. No. 6.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for foreign affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Brit-

ain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria.

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably tomorrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Servia by Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war, if it did break out; we

should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped his Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

R. O. P. No. 6.

*His Royal Highness Alexander, Prince Regent of Serbia,
to the Emperor of Russia.*

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 11-24 July, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening handed to the Servian Government a note concerning the *attentat* of Serajevo. Conscious of its international duties, Serbia from the first days of the horrible crime declared that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an inquiry on her territory if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved in the course of the investigation set afoot by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. However, the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. Thus we are called upon in peremptory tones for a declaration of the Government in the official [Gazette] and an order from the Sovereign to the army wherein we should repress the hostile spirit against Austria by reproaching ourselves for criminal weakness in regard to our perfidious actions. Then upon us is imposed the admission of Austro-Hungarian functionaries into Serbia to participate with ours in the investigation and to watch over the execution of the other conditions indicated in the note. We have received a delay of forty-eight hours to accept everything, in default of which the legation of Austria-Hungary will

leave Belgrade. We are ready to accept the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the situation of an independent state as well as those whose acceptance shall be advised us by your Majesty. All persons whose participation in the *attentat* shall be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain among these demands cannot be carried out without changes in our legislation, which requires time. We have been given too short a delay. We can be attacked after the expiration of the delay by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating on our frontier. It is impossible for us to defend ourselves, and we supplicate your Majesty to give us your aid as soon as possible. The precious good-will of your Majesty, which has so often shown itself toward us, makes us hope firmly that this time again our appeal will be heard by his generous Slav heart.

In these difficult moments I interpret the sentiments of the Servian people which supplicates your Majesty to interest himself in the lot of the Kingdom of Servia.

July 25.

Servia, in reply to the Austrian note, agrees to accept all conditions save two, which shall remain open to negotiation (B. W. P. No. 39, see page 173). The reply is not satisfactory to Austria; her ambassador leaves Belgrade. She refuses to grant further time, but explains that her note was a *démarche*, not an ultimatum, and that it implied the beginning of military preparations, not operations, against Servia.

G. W. P. July 25, 1914.

The Imperial and Royal Government set a time limit of forty-eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of her terms. One day after the Austro-Hungarian note had been handed to it, the Servian Government began mobilization. When, after the expiration of the time limit, the Servian Government made a reply which, while satisfying the demands of Austria-Hungary on

certain points, made known emphatically with regard to the essential ones its intention to refuse the just demands of the Monarchy by means of temporizing and the introduction of new negotiations, Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Servia without having recourse to further negotiations or allowing herself to be put off by Servian assurances, the value of which she knows well enough—to her sorrow.

R. O. P. No. 12.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, 12-25 July, 1914.

Sequel to my telegram of today. Have just received from Macchio the negative reply of the Austro-Hungarian Government to our proposal to prolong the delay of the note.

R. O. P. No. 16.

The Russian Ambassador in England to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

London, 12-25 July, 1914.

Received telegram of 11-24 July. Grey has instructed the Ambassador of England at Vienna to support our *démarche* concerning the extension of the delay of the ultimatum. He told me at the same time that the Austrian Ambassador had come to see him and had explained that the character of an ultimatum must not be attributed to the Austrian note—it must be considered as a *démarche* which, in the case of absence of reply or in case of insufficient reply within the term fixed, would have as a consequence the rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure from Belgrade of the Minister of Austria-Hungary, without carrying in its train, however, the immediate commencement of hostilities. Grey added that in consequence of this explanation he had instructed the Ambassador of England at Vienna that in case it should be too late to

raise the question of the extension of the delay of the ultimatum, that of the stay (arrest) of hostilities might perhaps serve as a base of discussion.

R. O. P. No. 17.

*The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the
Ambassador at London.*

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 12-25, 1914.

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of the Great Powers united action (*des actions conformes*), we count that England will not delay in placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France with a view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe in favor of which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.

R. O. P. No. 20.

*The Russian Ambassador in England to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

London, 12-25 July, 1914.

Grey told me that the Ambassador of Germany had declared to him that the German Government had not been informed of the text of the Austrian note, but that it entirely supported the Austrian *démarche*. The Ambassador at the same time asked if England could consent to act in St. Petersburg in a spirit of conciliation. Grey replied that that was completely impossible. The Minister added that so long as the complications only existed between Austria and Servia, English interests were only indirectly engaged, but that he must foresee that Austrian mobilization would have as a consequence the mobilization of Russia, and that from that moment they would be in presence of a situation in which all the Powers would be interested. England reserved in this case a complete liberty of action.

R. O. P. No. 21.

*The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, 12-25 July, 1914.

Despite the extremely conciliatory character of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Minister of Austria has just informed, at half past six in the evening, the Servian Government by note that not having received within the delay fixed a satisfactory response, he is leaving Belgrade with the whole personnel of the legation. The Skuptschina is convoked at Nish for the 14-27 July. The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Corps are leaving this evening for the same town.

July 26.

Sir Edward Grey suggests that the Austrian demands on Servia be laid before a convention composed of England, Italy, France and Germany.

G. W. P. July 26, 1914.

On the afternoon of July 26 the Austro-Hungarian Government again explained through its Ambassador in St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had no plans of conquest, but only wished to have peace at last on her frontiers. In the course of the same day the first reports of Russian mobilization reached Berlin. On the evening of the 26th the Imperial Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were directed to call the attention of the English, French, and Russian Governments energetically to the danger of this Russian mobilization. After Austria-Hungary had officially declared to Russia that she did not seek the acquisition of any territory in Servia, the decision for world peace lay entirely in St. Petersburg. The same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was directed to make the following statement to the Russian Government:

The military preparatory measures of Russia will compel us to take counter-action which must consist in the mobilization of the army. Mobilization, however, indicates war. Inasmuch as we know France's obligations toward Russia, this mobilization would be directed simultaneously against Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia wishes to let loose such a European war. Inasmuch as Austria-Hungary will not impair the continuance of the Servian Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can adopt a policy of waiting. We shall be all the more able to support Russia's wish not to allow the integrity of the Servian Kingdom to be called into question, since Austria does not call this integrity into question herself. It will be easy to find a basis of agreement in the further course of the affair.

On the 26th Sir Edward Grey had suggested that the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia be laid before a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy, with himself presiding over the sessions. To this suggestion we replied that, while we approved his tender, we could not take part in such a conference because we could not call upon Austria to appear before a European court in her controversy with Servia.

France agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, but it was finally brought to naught because Austria, as was to be expected, held herself aloof.

True to our conviction that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair, but would have to take into consideration only the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our efforts to bring about an understanding between these two Powers. We were also willing, after declining the conference idea, to transmit a further proposal by Sir Edward Grey to Vienna, in which he urged that Austria-Hungary either agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations. The Austro-Hungarian Government, in full appreciation of our mediatory activity, replied to this proposal that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, it was too late.

In spite of this we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. Unluckily, all of these mediatory acts were soon overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France.

B. W. P. No. 36.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold,
and Sir R. Rodd.*

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

R. O. P. No. 23.

*The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the
Ambassador in Italy.*

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 13-26 July, 1914.

Italy could play a rôle of the very first order in favor of the maintenance of peace by exercising the necessary influence upon Austria and by adopting an attitude clearly unfavorable to the conflict, for this latter could not be localized. It is desirable that you express the conviction that it is impossible for Russia not to come to the aid of Servia.

R. O. P. No. 24.

The Russian Gerant of the Consulate at Prague to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Prague, 13-26 July, 1914.

The mobilization has been decreed.

R. O. P. No. 25.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Austria-Hungary.

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg 13-26, July, 1914.

I had today a long conversation in a friendly tone with the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary. After having examined with him the tone of the demands addressed to Servia, I pointed out that apart from the scarcely clever form (*la forme peu habile*) under which they are presented, some among them are absolutely inexcusable even in case the Servian Government should declare its willingness to accept them. Thus, for instance, the points (1) and (2) could not be carried out without an amendment of the Servian laws on the press and on associations for which the consent of the Skuptschina could with difficulty be obtained; as for the execution of points (4) and (5) it might produce consequences highly dangerous, and even create the danger of acts of terrorism directed against the members of the Royal House and against Pachitch, which could not enter into the views of Austria. In regard to the other points, it seems to me that with certain changes in the details it would not be difficult to discover a ground of agreement if the accusations contained therein were confirmed by sufficient proofs.

In the interest of the preservation of peace, which, according to Szapary's statements, is precious to Austria in the same degree as to all the Powers, it would be necessary to put a stop as soon as possible to the strained situation of the moment. With this object it would seem to me very desirable that the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary should be authorized to enter with me

into an exchange of private views with the object of an alteration (*remainiement*) in common of some clauses of the Austrian note of 10-23 July. This proceeding would perhaps permit of finding a formula which should be acceptable for Serbia while at the same time giving satisfaction to Austria as to the basis of its demands. Be so good as to have a prudent and friendly explanation in the sense of this telegram with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Communicated to the Ambassadors in Germany, in France, in England, and in Italy.

R. O. P. No. 28.

*The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in France to the
Foreign Minister.*

(Telegram.)

Paris, 13-26 July, 1914.

Today the German Ambassador again called upon the Gérant of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made to him the following declarations:

"Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek territorial acquisitions and that she does not threaten the integrity of Serbia. Her only object is to insure her own tranquillity. Consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. Germany feels herself at one with France in her keen desire to preserve the peace, and strongly hopes that France will use her influence at Petersburg in the direction of moderation." The Minister observed that Germany could on her side take similar steps at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit which Serbia had shown. The Ambassador answered that that was not possible, in view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict. Thereupon the Minister asked if the four Powers—England, Germany, Italy, and France—were not able to take steps at St. Petersburg and Vienna, since the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict between Russia and Austria. The Ambassador pleaded the absence of instructions. Finally the Minister refused to adhere to the German proposal.

July 27.

Germany declines to accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal save with the consent of her ally, claiming that it would in effect be submitting Austria's rights to arbitration, which would require a concert of all Powers. Russia urges England to express herself openly against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Sir Edward Grey says: "The Servian reply involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I have ever seen a country undergo."

G. W. P. July 27, 1914.

On July 27 the Russian Minister for War, Suchomlinof, gave the German Military Attaché his word of honor that no mobilization order had as yet been issued. He said that for the present preparatory measures were being taken, no horses being levied and no reservists being called in. In case Austria-Hungary were to cross the Servian boundary, the military districts facing Austria, those of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, would be mobilized. Under no circumstances would there be a mobilization of the districts lying on the German front: St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. In answer to the Military Attaché's question as to what was the object of mobilization against Austria-Hungary, the Russian War Minister shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. Thereupon the Military Attaché indicated that measures to mobilize against Austria-Hungary were also decidedly threatening to Germany. In the following days reports concerning the Russian mobilization followed each other in quick succession. Among these were reports concerning preparations on the German border, such as the declaration of a state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. On July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived. The Fourteenth Corps discontinued its manoeuvres and returned to garrison duty.

In the meantime we continued to exert our most energetic influence on the Cabinets to insure localization of the conflict.

B. W. P. No. 42.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 27, 1914.

Your proposal as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian and British Ambassadors to do so.

B. W. P. No. 43.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Your telegram of 26th July.*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg

* No. 36.

showed that there was no intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilizing against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

B. W. P. No. 44.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution, seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the

object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. The Austrian Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of his Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant. I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our effort were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the imperial ukase no effective steps toward mobilization could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

B. W. P. No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to

request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

B. W. P. No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concen-

trated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

B. W. P. No. 48.

Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

London, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Servians had refused the one thing—the cooperation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed today, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet, but,

owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

R. O. P. No. 32.

*The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors
in France and England.*

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 14-27 July, 1914.

The Ambassador of England called to ascertain if we thought it useful that England should take the initiative in convoking at London a conference of the representatives of England, France, Germany, and Italy in order to study a solution of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I had opened *pourparlers* with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions that I hope are favorable. However, I have not yet received a reply to the proposal I made for a revision of the note between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna prove impracticable I am ready to accept the English proposal or any other calculated to bring about a favorable solution of the conflict.

R. O. P. No. 33.

*The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in
France, in England, in Germany, in Austria-Hungary, and
in Italy.*

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 14-27 July, 1914.

Have taken note of the reply sent by the Servian Government to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our anticipations by its modera-

tion and its desire to give the most complete satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what more Austria could demand unless the Cabinet at Vienna is seeking a pretext for a war with Servia.

R. O. P. No. 38.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 14-27 July, 1914.

I have requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs to support at Vienna your proposal tending to authorize Szapary to elaborate, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a presentation (*rédaction*) of the Austro-Hungarian demands acceptable to both parties. Jagow replied that he was acquainted with this proposal, and that he shared the opinions of Pourtalès that, since Szapary had begun this conversation, he might very well continue it. He will telegraph in this sense to the Ambassador of Germany at Vienna. I begged him to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.

R. O. P. No. 39.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 14-27 July, 1914.

Today, before my visit to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, this latter had received the visit of the Ambassador of France, who had endeavored to make him accept the English proposal relative to action in favor of peace, action which would be exercised simultaneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by England, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon proposed that these Powers advise Vienna in the following terms: "To abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation at the present hour." By adopting this veiled formula there would be no necessity of mentioning the necessity of abstaining from an invasion of Servia. Jagow opposed to this proposal a categorical

refusal, and that in despite of the insistence of the Ambassador, who laid stress, as a good argument for the proposal, on the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks to which would be avoided the opposition of the Alliance to the Entente, of which Jagow had himself so often complained.

R. O. P. No. 40.

His Imperial Majesty the Russian Emperor to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Servia.

(Telegram.)

14-27 July, 1914.

Your Royal Highness in addressing me in a moment of particular difficulty was not deceived in regard to the sentiments which animate me in his regard and in regard to my cordial sympathy for the Servian people.

My most serious attention is drawn by the present situation, and my Government is devoting itself with all its force to smoothing out the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Government wish to facilitate this task by neglecting nothing to arrive at a solution which would prevent the horrors of a new war while at the same time safeguarding the dignity of Servia.

So long as there is the least hope of avoiding bloodshed all our efforts must tend toward this object. If, despite our most sincere desire, we do not succeed your Highness may be assured that in no case will Russia disinterest herself in regard to the fate of Servia.

July 28.

Austria begins war on Servia, bombarding Belgrade. The efforts are now concentrated in an attempt to prevent a serious engagement which would bring Russia into the conflict, while there is yet hope that the Austro-Servian trouble may be settled. Russia puts her faith in English persuasion with Germany.

G. W. P. July 28, 1914.

From that moment Austria was actually in a state of war with Serbia, which was publicly proclaimed by means of the official declaration of war on the 28th of the month.

From the very beginning of the conflict we took the stand that this was an affair of Austria which she alone would have to bring to a decision with Serbia. We have therefore devoted our entire efforts to localizing the war and to convincing the other Powers that Austria-Hungary was compelled to take justified defensive methods and appeal to arms. We took the stand emphatically that no civilized nation had the right in this struggle against lack of culture [*Unkultur*] and criminal political morality to prevent Austria from acting and to take away the just punishment from Serbia. We instructed our representatives abroad in that sense.

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government informed the Russian Government that her (Austria's) move against Serbia was entirely a defensive measure designed to put a stop to Servian agitation, but that Austria-Hungary was compelled by necessity to demand guarantees of a continued friendly attitude on the part of Serbia toward the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Austria-Hungary, the note to Russia stated, had no intention of bringing about a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans. Both the French and the English Government, replying to our explanation that the German Government wished and was trying to localize the conflict, promised to work in the same interest. In the meantime these efforts did not succeed in preventing Russia's interference in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

G. W. P. Annex 20.

The German Emperor to the Czar.

July 28, 10:45 P. M.

With the greatest disquietude I hear of the impression which Austria-Hungary's action against Serbia is making in your empire. The unscrupulous agitation which has gone on for

years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand was the victim. The spirit which allowed the Servians to murder their own King and his wife still rules in that land. Undoubtedly you will agree with me that we two, you and I as well as all sovereigns, have a common interest in insisting that all those morally responsible for this terrible murder shall suffer deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook how difficult it is for you and your Government to resist the tide of popular opinion. Remembering the heartfelt friendship which has bound us closely for a long time, I am therefore exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia. I earnestly hope that you will help me in my efforts to set aside all obstacles that may yet arise.

B. W. P. No. 56.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador had today a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburg, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Serbia it would be impossible to localize it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crises of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Serbia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce

the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and, in fact, they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behavior. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

B. W. P. No. 70.

Telegrams Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 29, 1914.

(1) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, date July 28, 1914.

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the Imperial Government will announce tomorrow (29th) the mobilization in the military circonscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff.

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Servia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia.

B. W. P. No. 71.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would, in his opinion, have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective cooperation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with

Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to cooperate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided," were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me today that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.

R. O. P. No. 43

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in England.

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 15-28 July, 1914.

My conversations with the Ambassador of Germany confirm my impressions that Germany is rather favorable to the *intransigence* of Austria.

The Cabinet of Berlin, which might have been able to arrest the whole development of the crisis, seems to exercise no action upon its ally.

The Ambassador finds the reply of Servia inadequate.

This German attitude is altogether alarming.

It seems to me that, better than any other power, England would be in a position to attempt still to act in Berlin to engage the German Government to the necessary line of action. It is at Berlin that without doubt is to be found the key of the situation.

R. O. P. No. 44.

The Russian Consul General at Fiume to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Fiume, 15-28 July, 1914.

The state of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and at the same time the reservists of all classes have been mobilized.

R. O. P. No. 45.

*The Russian Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs.*
(Telegram.)

Vienna, 15-28 July, 1914.

I had a conversation today with Count Berchtold on the line of the instructions from your Excellency. I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it was desirable to find a solution which, while consolidating the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, should give to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy serious guarantees for its future relations with Serbia.

I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be brought about by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. He told me that on another side the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Serbia, could now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had been excited to such a degree that the Government, even if it desired, could no longer consent to it, all the less, he said to me, because the very reply of Serbia gave proof of the lack of sincerity in its promises for the future.

R. O. P. No. 46.

*The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Germany to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs.*
(Telegram.)

Berlin, 15-28 July, 1914.

The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian response which was communicated to it. Up to this moment this note has not appeared *in extenso* in any of the local journals, which, according to all the evidence, do not wish to give it a place in their columns, understanding the calming effect which this publication would produce upon the German readers.

R. O. P. No. 47.

The Russian Ambassador in Austria-Hungary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, 15-28 July, 1914.

The decree of general mobilization has been signed.

R. O. P. No. 48.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador at London.

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 15-28 July, 1914.

In view of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia it is necessary that England should urgently undertake mediatory action and that the military action of Austria against Serbia should be immediately suspended, otherwise mediation would only serve as a pretext to delay inordinately the solution of the question and would meanwhile give to Austria the possibility of completely crushing Serbia and occupying a dominant situation of the Balkans.

Communicated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

July 29.

The crisis is becoming very grave. Russia has ordered mobilization against Austria, and Germany fears that it may be directed against her despite Russian assurances. Russia firmly declares that Austrian guarantees of Servian territorial integrity do not satisfy her and that an attack on Serbia will bring on an Austro-Russian war. Germany, recognizing the gravity of the situation, seeks assurances of English neutrality in event of a war against France. All Powers turn to England as the single remaining nation which can tender

good offices. Sir Edward Grey states the English position (B. W. P. No. 87).

B. G. P. No. 8.

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg.

Brussels, July 29th, 1914.

The King's Government has decided to place the army on the reinforced peace footing.

This measure must not in any way be confounded with mobilization.

On account of the small extent of her territory, the whole of Belgium to a certain extent forms a frontier zone.

Her army on the ordinary peace footing only comprises one class of militia under arms. On the reinforced peace footing her army divisions and her cavalry division, owing to the call of three classes, have an effective strength analogous to that of the corps permanently maintained on the frontier zones of the neighboring powers.

These particulars will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you.

G. W. P. July 29, 1914.

On July 29 the Russian Government officially announced in Berlin that it had mobilized four army districts. At the same time additional reports reached us of rapidly progressing military preparations by France on land and sea. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had a conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning which he reported as follows by telegraph:

The Minister tried to persuade me to agree in behalf of my Government to a conversation of four parties to devise means of moving Austria-Hungary to give up those demands touching on the sovereignty of Serbia. While I agreed to a complete transmission of the conversation, I took the stand that, since

Russia had decided on the ominous step of mobilization, it was difficult for me to exchange any opinions on this subject, and it almost seemed impossible to do so. I said that what Russia now demanded of us in respect to Austria-Hungary was the same thing of which Austria-Hungary was accused regarding Serbia—a usurpation of the rights of sovereignty; that Austria-Hungary had promised to be considerate of Russian interests by declaring her territorial disinterestedness, a great concession on the part of a nation waging war. For this reason, I said, an opportunity should be given the Dual Monarchy to settle her dispute with Serbia alone. There would be time enough to come back to the subject of safeguarding Servian sovereignty when peace terms were to be concluded.

I added very earnestly that at the present moment the Austro-Servian affair was secondary to the danger of a European conflagration, and I made every effort to show the Minister the greatness of this danger.

It was impossible to change Sazonof's mind on the point that Russia could not desert Serbia now.

Similarly the Military Attaché at St. Petersburg reported by telegraph on the 29th as follows, regarding an interview with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army:

The Chief of the General Staff asked me to call and informed me that he had just come from his Majesty. He stated that he had been instructed by the Minister for War to assure me again that everything had remained the same as it had been explained to me by the Minister two days ago. He offered me a written confirmation and gave me his word of honor in the most formal manner that mobilization had begun nowhere, that is to say, not a single man or horse had been levied up to that hour, three o'clock in the afternoon. He stated that he could not answer for the future, but he could declare most emphatically that no mobilization was desired by his Majesty in the districts touching on our boundary. However, many reports have reached here and also Warsaw and Vilna of the levying of reservists in various parts of the empire. I therefore told the General that I was confronted with a riddle as the result

of his announcements to me. On his word as an officer he repeated, however, that such reports were untrue; that a false alarm may have been raised here and there.

In view of the positive, numerous reports before me of actual levying, I am compelled to consider the conversation as an attempt to mislead us with regard to the extent of the measures that have already been taken.

Inasmuch as the Russian Government, in reply to the several inquiries regarding the reasons for its threatening attitude, several times alluded to the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had not yet begun any conversations in St. Petersburg, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, at our request, was directed on July 29 to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof. Count Szapary was authorized to make known to the Russian Minister the contents of the note to Servia which had been, as it were, overtaken by the declaration of war, and to receive any suggestions that might still come from the Russian side, as well as to discuss with Sazonof all questions touching directly on the Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we continued to work without cessation for mediation, and supported every suggestion in Vienna which we believed showed hope of the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

G. W. P. Annex 21.

The Czar of Russia to the Emperor of Germany.

Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1 P. M.

I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you urgently to help me. A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation; the indignation at this, which I fully share, is immense in Russia. I foresee that soon I can no longer withstand the pressure that is being brought to bear upon me, and that I shall be forced to adopt measures which will lead to war. In order to prevent such a calamity as a European war I ask you, in the name of our old friendship, to do all that is possible to you to prevent your ally from going too far.

G. W. P. Annex 22.

The Emperor of Germany to the Czar of Russia.

I have received your telegram and share your wish for the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless—as I said to you in my first telegram—I cannot consider Austria-Hungary's action "disgraceful war." Austria-Hungary knows by experience that Servia's promises, when they are merely on paper, are quite unreliable. According to my opinion, Austria-Hungary's action is to be looked upon as an attempt to secure full guarantees that Servia's promises shall also be turned into deeds. I am confirmed in this view by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary contemplates no acquisition of territory at the expense of Servia. I think, therefore, that it is quite possible for Russia to remain in the rôle of a spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war, without dragging Europe into the most terrible war that it has ever seen. I think that a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna is possible and desirable, an understanding which—as I already telegraphed you—my Government is endeavoring to help with all its power. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which Austria-Hungary might take as threatening, would hasten a calamity that we both wish to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, which I have willingly assumed after your appeal to my friendship and help.

B. W. P. No. 72.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram* to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached his Majesty's Government. I said it was important that

* See No. 46.

we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect to Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangements for averting a European war would be welcomed by his Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked, Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilization against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

B. W. P. No. 75.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was sent for again today by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, dispatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guar-

antees that Serbia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

B. W. P. No. 76.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I found Secretary of State very depressed today. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He sub-

sequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave.. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under Secretary of State in course of conversation that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned today and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilizing in four southern governments.

B. W. P. No. 78.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

Partial mobilization was ordered today.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilization which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilization, he explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views

between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors, either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realized by the British public that it was not fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections, if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of 27th July, which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers, provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me today. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colors; that Austria had already partially mobilized, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crises, she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for

Russia to submit to. Had not Russia, by mobilizing, shown that she was in earnest? Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.

B. W. P. No. 85.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor tonight. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his

Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was, of course, at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of today to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

B. W. P. No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

London, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

After telling M. Cambon today how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador today that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that the public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the

difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honor and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance, France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

R. O. P. No. 49.

*The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chargé
d'Affaires in Germany.*

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 16-29 July, 1914.

The Ambassador of Germany informs me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise in Vienna a moderating influence, and that she will continue this action even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there was no news that the Austrian armies had crossed the Servian frontier. I requested the Ambassador to transmit to the Chancellor my thanks for the friendly tenor of this communication. I informed him of the military measures taken by Russia, none of which, I said to him, was directed against Germany. I added that they did not indicate aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, these measures being explained by the mobilization of the greatest part of the Austria-Hungarian Army. The Ambassador pronouncing himself in favor of direct explanations between the Cabinet of Vienna and us, I replied that I was quite in favor of that provided the counsels of the Cabinet of Berlin, of which he spoke, should find an echo in Vienna.

At the same time I drew attention to the fact that we were altogether in favor of accepting the plan of a conference of the four Powers, a plan with which it seemed Germany was not entirely in sympathy.

I said that, in my opinion, the best means of taking advantage of all the methods likely to produce a pacific solution would consist in a parallel action of the *pourparlers* for a conference of four of Germany, France, England, and Italy and of direct contact between Austria-Hungary and Russia, somewhat similar to what had taken place during the most critical moments of the crisis of last year.

I told the Ambassador that after the concessions made by Servia, a ground of compromise on the questions that remained open would not be difficult to find on condition, that is, of a certain good-will on the part of Austria and on condition that all the Powers use all their influence in the direction of conciliation.

Communicated to the Ambassadors in England, in France, in Austria-Hungary, and in Italy.

R. O. P. No. 50.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in England and in France.

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 16-29 July, 1914.

At the time of my conversation with the Ambassador of Germany of which my preceding telegram treats, I had not yet received the telegram of 15-28 July of M. Schebeko.

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal on the part of the Cabinet of Vienna to proceed to a direct exchange of ideas with the Imperial Government.

Consequently it only remains with us to leave ourselves entirely in the hands of the British Government for the initiation of *démarches* which it will judge useful to provoke.

Communicated to Vienna, Rome and Berlin.

R. O. P. No. 55.

The Russian Ambassador in France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Paris, 16-29 July, 1914.

Viviani has just confirmed to me the full determination of the French Government to act in accordance with us. This resolution is supported by the most extended circles and by all parties, including the Radical Socialists, who have presented to him a declaration expressing the absolute confidence and the patriotic dispositions of the group. Upon his arrival in Paris Viviani telegraphed urgently to London that, in view of the cessation of direct *pourparlers* between Petersburg and Vienna, it was necessary that the Cabinet of London should renew as soon as possible under one or another form its proposal for the mediation of the Powers. Before seeing me Viviani received today the Ambassador of Germany, who renewed the assurance

of the pacific tendencies of Germany. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany desired peace she should hasten to adhere to the British proposal of mediation, Baron Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitration" frightened Austria. Viviani replied that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find another form of mediation. According to Baron Schoen, in order that the negotiations between the Powers should succeed it would be necessary to ascertain what Austria was going to demand from Servia. Viviani replied that the Berlin Cabinet might very easily inquire about this from Austria, but that in the meanwhile the Servian note of reply might serve as a basis of discussion; he added that France was still sincerely desirous of peace, but that she was at the same time determined to act in full harmony with her allies and friends, and that he (Baron Schoen) could have convinced himself that this resolution would meet with the liveliest approval of the country.

R. O. P. No. 57.

*The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Servia to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs.*

Nish, 16-29 July, 1914.

I communicated to Pachitch the text of the telegraphic reply of his Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander. Pachitch, after reading it crossed himself and said: "Seigneur, the Czar is great and clement." Then he embraced me, unable to restrain the emotion which had taken possession of him. The heir is expected at Nish in the course of the night.

R. O. P. No. 58.

*The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the
Ambassador in France.*

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 16-29 July, 1914.

Today the Ambassador of Germany communicated to me the resolution taken by his Government to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now we did not begin these latter except as a consequence of the mobilization to which

Austria had already proceeded, and in view of the evident absence on the latter's part of any desire to accept any method whatever of a pacific solution of its conflicts with Serbia.

Since we cannot accede to the desire of Germany, it only remains for us to accelerate our own armament and to take measures for the probable inevitability of war. Be so good as to notify the French Government and express to it at the same time our sincere gratitude for the declaration which the Ambassador of France made me in its name to the effect that we can count entirely upon the assistance of our ally France. In the present circumstances this declaration is particularly precious to us.

Communicated to the Ambassadors of England, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.

July 30.

Germany claims that her position as mediator is untenable on account of Russia's mobilization against Austria. Germany reported to have brought pressure to bear on Austria to reopen negotiations with Russia. Russia makes definite proposals to Austria-Hungary through Berlin. Berlin newspapers announce that German mobilization has begun.

G. W. P. July 30, 1914.

As late as the 30th we transmitted an English proposal to Vienna which established this basis of negotiation, that Austria-Hungary, after succeeding in marching into Serbia, should dictate her terms there. We had to assume that Russia would accept this basis.

While these efforts of ours for mediation, supported by English diplomacy, were being continued, with increasing urgency in the time from July 29 to the 31st, there constantly came new and increasing reports concerning Russian mobilization measures. The assembling of troops on the East Prussian border and the declaration of a state of war in all important places

on the Russian western boundary no longer left any doubt of the fact that Russian mobilization was actively going on against us, while at the same time all such measures were denied anew on word of honor to our representative at St. Petersburg. Even before the reply to the last English-German mediation proposal, the basis of which must have been known in St. Petersburg, could reach Berlin from Vienna, Russia ordered a general mobilization. On the same day an exchange of telegrams took place between his Majesty the Kaiser and King and Czar Nicholas in which his Majesty called the Czar's attention to the threatening character of the Russian mobilization and to the continuance of his own activity as mediator.

G. W. P. Annex 23.

The Emperor of Germany to the Czar of Russia.

July 30, 1 A. M.

My Ambassador has been instructed to call your Government's attention to the dangers and serious consequences of mobilization; I said the same thing to you in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary mobilized only against Serbia, and at that she mobilized only a part of her army. If Russia, as appears from what you and your Government say, is mobilizing against Austria-Hungary, the position of mediator, which you intrusted to me in a friendly manner and which I accepted at your urgent request, is jeopardized if not rendered untenable. The whole weight of the decision now rests on your shoulders; they must bear the responsibility for war or peace.

G. W. P. Annex 18.

*The German Military Envoy in St. Petersburg to the
Emperor of Germany.*

(Telegram.)

July 30, 1914.

Yesterday Prince Troubetzki told me, after he had caused your Majesty's telegram to Emperor Nicholas to be delivered at once: "God be praised that a telegram from your Emperor has come." He told me a little while ago that the telegram had

made a deep impression on the Emperor, but since mobilization against Austria had already been ordered, and Sazonof had doubtless convinced his Majesty that it was no longer possible to recede, his Majesty unfortunately could do nothing to alter matters. I then said to him that the responsibility for the unmeasurable consequences lay on the early mobilization against Austria-Hungary, who was involved after all in a purely local war with Servia, that Germany's answer thereto was just and that the responsibility lay with Russia, as it had ignored Austria-Hungary's declaration that she contemplated no acquisition of territory from Servia. I said that Austria-Hungary had mobilized against Servia, not against Russia, and that there was no cause for Russia to plunge into the question. I added that in Germany we were unable, after the frightful crime of Serajevo, any longer to understand Russia's words to the effect that "we cannot leave our brothers in Servia in the lurch." I told him in conclusion that he must not be surprised if Germany's forces were mobilized.

G. W. P. Annex 23a.

The Czar of Russia to the Emperor of Germany.

Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1:20 P. M.

I thank you from my heart for your prompt answer. I am sending Tatisheff this evening with instructions. The military measures now being taken were decided upon five days ago for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any way your position as mediator, which I highly esteem. We need your strong pressure on Austria in order that an understanding may be brought about with us.

B. W. P. No. 97.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador

had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A. M., when former completely broke down on seeing that was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of which following is translation:

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that if Austria refuses to make a concession Russia cannot hold back, and, now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilization.

B. W. P. No. 98.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation

with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilization against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilized against Serbia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilized they would have to mobilize on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.*

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.

B. W. P. No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

Your telegram of 29th July.†

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain

* See No. 101.

† See No. 85.

the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object his Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan

crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

B. W. P. No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

London Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further while Powers endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would, of course, be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, as quoted in your telegram of July 30,* and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advances were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also con-

* See No. 97.

sent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

R. O. P. No. 59.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Nish, 17-30 July, 1914.

The Prince Regent published yesterday a manifesto signed by all the Ministers on occasion of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia. The manifesto finishes with the following words: "Defend with all your strength your homes and Serbia." At the solemn opening of the Skupshtina the Regent read in his name the speech from the throne, at the beginning of which he stated that the place of convocation would show the importance of the present events. Follows the *exposé* of the facts of the last days—the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Royal Government to do everything compatible with the dignity of the State to avoid war, and finally the armed aggression of the more powerful neighbor against Serbia, on whose side is found Montenegro. Passing to the examination of the attitude of the Powers in presence of the conflict, the Prince laid stress first of all on the sentiments which animate Russia, and on the very gracious communication of his Majesty the Emperor saying that in no case will Russia abandon Serbia. At each mention of the name of his Imperial Majesty and of Russia a formidable and feverish "jivio" shook the session hall. The marks of sympathy on the part of France and England were also taken note of separately and provoked "jivios" of approbation on the part of the Deputies. The speech from the throne concludes with the declaration of the opening of the Skupshtina and with the expression of the wish that all measures will be taken to facilitate the task of the Government.

R. O. P. No. 60.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, England, and Italy.

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, 17-30 July, 1914.

The Ambassador of Germany, who has just left me, asked me if we could not content ourselves with the promise that Austria could give—of not infringing the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia—and indicate on what condition we could still agree to suspend our armaments. I dictated to him, to be transmitted urgently to Berlin, the following declaration:

"If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of a European question, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which are an infringement of the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to cease her military preparations."

Be so good as to telegraph urgently what will be the attitude of the German Government in presence of this new proof of our desire to do everything possible for the pacific solution of the question, for we cannot admit that similar pourparlers should only serve to give time to Germany and Austria for their military preparations.

R. O. P. No. 61.

The Russian Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 17-30 July, 1914.

I learn that the decree of mobilization of the German Army and fleet has just been promulgated.

R. O. P. No. 62.

The Russian Ambassador in Germany to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Berlin, 17-30 July, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has just telephoned me to communicate to me that the news just given of the mobilization

of the German Army and fleet is false; that the newspaper slips were printed in advance in view of all eventualities and put on sale at midday, but that now they are confiscated.

(Signed) SWERBEEW.

July 31.

Germany hears of order for Russia's complete mobilization, and delivers an ultimatum allowing her twelve hours to cease military preparations. Austria-Hungary implies readiness to begin negotiations with Russia. England inquires what the German position with respect to Belgian neutrality will be in case of war with France.

B. G. P. No. 10.

*Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to All the Heads of
Legations Abroad.*

(Telegram.)

Brussels, July 31, 1914.

The Minister of War informs me that mobilization has been decreed and that Saturday, August 1, is the first day of mobilization.

G. W. P. July 31, 1914.

On July 31 the Czar directed the following telegram to his Majesty:

I thank you from my heart for your mediation, which permits a gleam of hope that everything can yet be settled peacefully. It is a technical impossibility for us to halt our military preparations which became necessary through Austria's mobilization. We are far from desirous of war. So long as the negotiations continue with Austria concerning Serbia, my troops will not

undertake any challenging action. I solemnly pledge you my word as to that. I am trusting in the grace of God with all my might and hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe.

To this his Majesty the Kaiser replied:

Upon your appeal to my friendship and your plea for my help, I have undertaken a mediatory action between your Government and the Austro-Hungarian Government. While this negotiation was under way your troops were mobilized against Austria-Hungary, which is allied with me, as a consequence of which my mediation was almost made illusory, as I have already informed you. Notwithstanding this, I continued it. Now I am in receipt of reliable reports of serious preparations for war on my eastern boundary also. Responsibility for the safety of my empire compels me to take counter defensive measures. I have carried my efforts for the maintenance of world peace to the utmost limit. It is not I that bear the responsibility for the calamity that now threatens the entire civilized world. Yet at this moment it lies in your power to stave it off. No one threatens the honor and might of Russia, which might have awaited the result of my mediation. The friendship for you and your empire which was bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed has always been sacred to me, and I have been faithful to Russia when she was hard pressed, especially in her last war. It is still possible for you to maintain the peace of Europe if Russia will decide to put a stop to the military measures that threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Even before this telegram reached its destination the mobilization of the entire Russian fighting force, which had been ordered in the forenoon of the same day, openly directed against us, was in full swing. The Czar's telegram, however, was sent at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

After the mobilization became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was ordered on the afternoon of July 31 to advise the Russian Government that Germany had declared a state of war as a countermove to the mobilization

of the Russian Army and Navy, which would have to be followed by mobilization unless Russia ceased her military preparations against Germany and Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and so advise Germany.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador at Paris was directed to request an explanation from the French Government within eighteen hours as to whether, in the case of a Russo-German war, France would remain neutral.

G. W. P. Annex 24.

The Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

(Telegram.)

July 31, 1914.

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also. By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding of the empire, to announce that danger of war threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization. Mobilization, however, must follow unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all war-like measures against us and Austria-Hungary and gives us definite assurance thereof. Kindly communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of its communication to him.

G. W. P. Annex 25.

The Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in Paris.

(Telegram.)

July 31, 1914.

Important!

In spite of our still pending mediatory action, and although we ourselves have adopted no steps toward mobilization, Rus-

sia has mobilized her entire army and navy, which means mobilization against us also. Thereupon we declared the existence of a threatening danger of war, which must be followed by mobilization, unless Russia within twelve hours ceases all war-like steps against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably means war. Kindly ask the French Government whether it will remain neutral in a Russian-German war. Answer must come within eighteen hours. Wire at once hour that inquiry is made. Act with the greatest possible dispatch.

B. W. P. No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)

London Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilizing eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learned that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to sus-

pend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.

B. W. P. No. III.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

London Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; that otherwise I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above.

B. W. P. No. 112.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

According to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whole Russian Army and Fleet are being mobilized. Chancellor tells me that *Kriegsgefahr* will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed. Mobilization would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that *Kriegsgefahr* signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburg, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

B. W. P. No. 113.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Serbia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

B. W. P. No. 120.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.* He trusted it would meet with your approval:

Translation.—“If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude.”

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, his Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier; it was, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilization which was already in progress.

M. Sazonof said that undoubtedly there would be better pros-

* See No. 97.

pect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere was far more favorable and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to his Majesty's Government who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

B. W. P. No. 121.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Your telegram of 31st July.*

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war.

He expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of today; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization was only directed against Austria.

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favor-

* See No. 111.

able consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.

B. W. P. No. 122.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency tomorrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to me today the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.

August 1.

Germany declares war on Russia. Austria finally agrees to discuss with Russia the ultimatum to Servia. Germany suggests that England agree to maintain neutral in the war if Germany guarantees the neutrality of Belgium.

G. W. P. August 1, 1914.

The Russian Government destroyed the painstaking mediatory work of the European State Chancelleries, shortly before its successful outcome, by her mobilization, which endangered the safety of the German Empire. The mobilization measures, concerning the seriousness of which to the Russian Government no doubt was allowed to arise from the beginning, together with her continued denial, show clearly that Russia desired the war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered the message that had been given to him for Mr. Sazonof on July 31 at midnight.

After the expiration of the time limit set for Russia without the receipt of an answer to our inquiry, his Majesty the Emperor and King ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and the Imperial Navy at 5 P. M. on August 1. In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to hand a declaration of war to the Russian Government in case no favorable reply was issued before the expiration of the time limit. However, before a report regarding the execution of this order arrived, Russian troops crossed our border and advanced on German territory, namely, as early as the afternoon of August 1.

By this move Russia began the war against us.

In the meantime the Imperial Ambassador at Paris put the question that he had been ordered to present before the French Cabinet at 7 P. M. on July 31.

To this the French Prime Minister made an ambiguous and unsatisfactory reply at 1 o'clock in the afternoon of August 1. This does not give a clear picture of the French position, since

it was limited to the statement that France would do what her interests seemed to warrant. A few hours later, at 5 in the afternoon, the complete mobilization of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered.

On the morning of the following day France opened hostilities.

B. W. P. No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

London, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I told the German Ambassador today that the reply* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise

* See No. 122.

to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

B. W. P. No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

B. W. P. No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

M. De Etter came today to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated July 31, which are as follows:

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declares the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that

Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

B. W. P. No. 138.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

Your telegram of today.*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

* See No. 131.

R. O. P. No. 74.

*The Russian Ambassador in France to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

Paris, 19 July-1 August, 1914.

On the reception here of the telegram of the Ambassador of France at St. Petersburg, containing the communication made to you by the German Ambassador concerning the resolution of Germany to order today the general mobilization, the President of the Republic signed the decree of mobilization. In the streets they are posting up the orders calling in the reservists. The Ambassador of Germany has just paid a visit to Viviani, but made no fresh communication to him, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he had received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the decree of mobilization in reply to the German mobilization, and spoke to him of his astonishment that Germany should have taken such a measure at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still proceeding between Russia, Austria, and the Powers; he added that the mobilization did not necessarily mean war, and that the Ambassador of Germany might remain in Paris as the Ambassador of Russia had remained in Vienna and the Ambassador of Austria in St. Petersburg.

R. O. P. No. 76.

Note Handed in by the Ambassador of Germany at St. Petersburg the 19 July. (Aug. 1,) 1914, at 10 Minutes Past 7 in the Evening.

The Imperial Government has endeavored from the opening of the crisis to lead it to a pacific solution. In accordance with a desire which had been expressed to him by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in accord with England, had applied himself to filling a mediator rôle with the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the result of this, proceeded to the complete mobilization of her forces on land and sea. As a consequence of this threatening measure, motivated by no military *présage*

on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself in face of a grave and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed to safeguard herself against this peril, it would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. Consequently, the German Government saw itself forced to address to the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias an insistence on the cessation of the said military acts. Russia having refused to accede to (*not having thought it should reply to) this demand, and having manifested by this refusal (*this attitude) that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honor to make known to your Excellency the following:

His Majesty the Emperor, my August Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, taking up the challenge, considers himself in a state of war with Russia.

August 2.

Luxemburg invaded by the Germans. Belgians notified of German intention to march across Belgian territory to France.

B. G. P. No. 18.

M. Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.)

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

I have the honor to bring the following facts to the knowledge of your Excellency: Sunday, August 2, very early, according to information which reached the Grand Ducal Government at this moment, German troops have entered Luxemburg territory by the Wasserbillig and Remich bridges, proceeding more especially toward the south of the country and toward the town of Luxemburg, capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armored trains with troops and ammunition have been

* The words between parentheses are in the original. It is to be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance and that by error they were both inserted in the note.

forwarded by the railway from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where they are expected to arrive at any moment. These facts imply acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government has not failed to protest energetically to the representative of his Majesty the German Emperor in Luxemburg against this aggression. An identical protest will be transmitted to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Berlin.

B. G. P. No. 20.

Note handed in on August 2, at 7 o'clock P. M. by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Imperial German Legation in Belgium.
Brussels, August 2, 1914.

Highly confidential.

The German Government has received reliable information according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France of marching on Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial German Government cannot avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed French march without aid. In this fact there is sufficient certainty of a threat directed against Germany.

It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy.

The German Government would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian territory.

In order to dissipate any misunderstanding the German Government declares as follows:

1. Germany does not contemplate any act of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium consents in the war about to commence to take up an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the

German Government on its part undertakes, on the declaration of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their whole extent.

2. Germany undertakes under the condition laid down to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.

3. If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to buy against cash all that is required by her troops, and to give indemnity for the damages caused in Belgium.

4. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner toward the German troops, and in particular raises difficulties against their advance by the opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse, or by destroying roads, railways, tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has a justified hope that this contingency will not arise and that the Belgian Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the two neighboring States will become closer and more lasting.

August 3.

Belgium refuses to allow German troops to pass over her soil.

B. G. P. No. 22.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

(7 o'clock in the morning.)

By their note of August 2, 1914, the German Government has made known that according to certain intelligence the French

forces intend to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur and that Belgium, in spite of her good will, would not be able without help to beat off an advance of the French troops.

The German Government felt it to be its duty to forestall this attack and to violate Belgian territory. Under these conditions Germany proposes to the King's Government to take up a friendly attitude, and undertakes at the moment of peace to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and of her possessions in their whole extent. The note adds that if Belgium raises difficulties to the forward march of the German troops Germany will be compelled to consider her as an enemy and to leave the later settlement of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms.

This note caused profound and painful surprise to the King's Government.

The intentions which it attributed to France are in contradiction with the express declarations which were made to us on August 1, in the name of the Government of the Republic.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium would fulfill all her international duties, and her army would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and particularly of the Government of his Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it respected.

The attempt against her independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies the violation of the law.

The Belgian Government would, by accepting the propositions which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe.

Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than

eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the expense of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her rights.

August 4.

Germans invade Belgium and the German Minister is given his passports. Belgium appeals to the Powers for aid and England declares war on Germany.

B. G. P. No. 31.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I have the honor of acquainting your Excellency that from today the King's Government can no longer acknowledge your diplomatic character, and must cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency will find inclosed the passports which are necessary for your departure, and that of the staff of the legation.

B. G. P. No. 38.

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

I have the honor of informing you of the order of successive events which have during the last few days characterized the relations of Belgium and certain other Powers which are guarantors of her neutrality and of her independence.

On July 31 the British Minister made a verbal communication to me, according to which, in anticipation of a European

war, Sir Edward Grey had asked the German and French Governments separately whether each of them was resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided the said neutrality was not violated by any other Power.

By virtue of existing treaties, Sir Francis Villiers was instructed to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that Sir Edward Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her neutrality and that she expected that the other Powers would respect it.

I informed the British Minister that we greatly appreciated this communication, which was in accordance with our expectations, and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who are guarantors of our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm intention to maintain our neutrality; this neutrality, however, did not appear to us to be menaced by any of the States, with whom we are on the most cordial and the most confidential terms. The Government, I remarked, had given a proof of this resolution by immediately taking all the military measures which the situation appeared to them to require.

In his turn, the French Minister stated on August 1 in a verbal conversation that he was authorized to make known to the Belgian Government that in case of an international conflict the Government of the Republic, in conformity with its constant declaration, would respect the territory of Belgium, and that they would only be led to modify their attitude in case of the violation of Belgian neutrality by another Power.

I thanked his Excellency and added that we had already taken all the necessary measures to assure our independence and our frontiers being respected.

On August 2 in the morning I had a further interview with Sir Francis Villiers in the course of which he informed me that he had on Saturday at an early hour transmitted by telegraph to his Government our conversation of July 31, taking care to reproduce faithfully the solemn declaration which he had obtained of the determination of Belgium to defend her frontiers from whatever side they might be invaded. He added: "We know that France has given us express assurances;

but England has not yet received any reply on this subject from Berlin."

This last fact did not provoke any particular emotion in me, because the declaration of the German Government might appear to be superfluous in view of the existing treaties. Moreover, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had affirmed at the sitting of the Reichstag Committee on April 29, 1913: "That the neutrality of Belgium is conventionally established and that Germany intends to respect this treaty."

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 P. M. and handed me the annexed note.* The German Government granted the Belgian Government a time limit of twelve hours to communicate their decision.

There could be no hesitation shown on the subject of the reply called for by the surprising proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy thereof inclosed herewith.†

The ultimatum was to expire on August 3, at 7 A. M. As at 10 o'clock no act of war had taken place, the Council of Ministers decided that for the moment there was no occasion to make an appeal to the guarantor Powers.

Toward noon the French Minister questioned me on this point and said to me:

"Although in view of the suddenness of the events I am not yet instructed to make any declaration, I think, nevertheless, judging by the well-known intentions of my Government, that I can say that if the Belgian Government should appeal to the French Government as a Power guaranteeing her neutrality they would immediately respond to the appeal. If this appeal were not formulated, it is probable, unless, of course, the anxiety about their own defense should lead them to take exceptional measures, that they would wait before intervening until Belgium had performed an act of effective resistance."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government would presumably be good enough to offer, and I

* See B. G. P. No. 20.

† See B. G. P. No. 22.

told him that the Belgian Government were not at the moment making an appeal for the guarantee of the Powers, and reserved to itself the right to decide later on what it would be best to do.

Finally, on August 4, at 6 o'clock in the morning, the German Minister made me the following communication :

I have been instructed, and have the honor to inform your Excellency, that in consequence of the Government of his Majesty the King having declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out—if necessary by force of arms—the measures of security which have been set forth as indispensable in view of the French menaces.

The Council of Ministers is deliberating at the present moment on the subject of the appeal to the Powers who are guarantors of our neutrality.

B. G. P. No. 40.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia.

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

The Belgian Government regrets to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory, violating the engagements which they have undertaken by treaty.

The Belgian Government are firmly decided to resist by all the means in their power.

Belgium appeals to England, to France, and to Russia to cooperate as guarantors in the defense of her territory.

There should be a concerted and common action, having as its object to resist the measures of force employed by Germany against Belgium and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium for the future.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defense of the fortified places.

B. W. P. No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

London Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to his Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

B. W. P. No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(Telegraphic.)

London, Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be

compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning* be received here by 12 o'clock tonight. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

August 6.

Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.

R. O. P. No. 79.

Note Handed by the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the 24th July, at 6 o'clock in the Evening.

By order of his Government the undersigned Ambassador of Austria-Hungary has the honor to notify his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia the following:

Seeing the menacing attitude taken by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia and in presence of the fact that following this conflict Russia, according to a communication from the Cabinet of Berlin, has deemed it advisable to open hostilities against Germany, and that this latter consequently finds herself in a state of war with the said Power, Austria-Hungary considers herself equally in a state of war with Russia from the present moment.

* See No. 153.

SECOND BRITISH "WHITE PAPER."

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.

London, August 8, 1914.

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant,* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of his Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,† and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night

* See No. 153.

† See No. 159.

that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than

to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I. . . .

SECOND GERMAN WHITE PAPER.*

The following documents refer to the exchange of views between Germany and England immediately before the war broke out. It will be perceived from these documents that Germany was prepared to spare France in case England should remain neutral and would guarantee the neutrality of France.

Telegram of His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to H. M. King of England of July 30th, 1914.

Am here since yesterday; have informed William of what you kindly told me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday, who gratefully received your message.

William, much preoccupied, is trying his utmost to fulfil Nicky's appeal to him to work for maintenance of peace and is in constant telegraphic communication with Nicky, who today confirms news that military measures have been ordered by him equal to mobilization, measures which have been taken already five days ago.

We are furthermore informed that France is making military preparations, whereas we have taken no measures, but may be forced to do so any moment, should our neighbors continue, which then would mean a European war.

If you really and earnestly wish to prevent this terrible disaster, may I suggest you using your influence on France and also Russia to keep neutral, which seems to me would be most useful.

This I consider a very good, perhaps the only chance, to maintain the peace of Europe.

I may add that now more than ever Germany and England should lend each other mutual help to prevent a terrible catastrophe, which otherwise seems unavoidable.

Believe me that William is most sincere in his endeavors to maintain peace, but that the military preparations of his two

* This paper contains the intimate Royal Messages of Emperor William, King George V. and Prince Henry (the "Willy," "Georgie" and "Nicky" correspondence) and other documents. With notes by the German Government.

neighbors may at last force him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenseless.

I have informed William of my telegram to you, and hope you will receive my informations in the same spirit of friendship which suggested them.

(Signed) HENRY.

Telegram of H. M. the King of England to Prince Henry of Prussia of July 30th, 1914.

Thanks for your telegram. So pleased to hear of William's effort to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed, I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparation. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in My power to preserve peace of Europe.

(Signed) GEORGE.

Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of England of July 31st, 1914.

Many thanks for your kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with My ideas and with the statements I got this night from Vienna, which I have had forwarded to London. I just received news from Chancellor that official notification has just reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even awaited the results of the mediation I am working at and left Me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take measures for insuring safety of My eastern frontiers, where strong Russian troops are already posted.

(Signed) WILLY.

*Telegram of the King of England to His Majesty the Emperor
of August 1st, 1914.*

Many thanks for Your telegram last night. I sent an urgent telegram to Nicky expressing My readiness to do everything in My power to assist in reopening conversations between Powers concerned.

(Signed) GEORGIE.

*Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the
Chancellor of August 1st, 1914.*

Sir E. Grey just asked me by telephone whether I believed to be in a position to declare that we would not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France should remain neutral. I declared I believed to be able to give such an undertaking.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

*Telegram of His Majesty the Emperor to H. M. the King of
England of August 1st, 1914.*

I just received the communication from Your Government offering French neutrality under guarantee of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. On technical grounds My mobilization, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so late. But if France offers Me neutrality which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall, of course, refrain from attacking France and employ My troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.

(No signature published.)

*Telegram of the Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London
of August 1st, 1914.*

Germany is ready to accept British proposal in case England guarantees with all her forces absolute neutrality of France in

Russo-German conflict. German mobilization has been ordered today on account of Russian challenge before English proposal was known here. It is, therefore, now impossible to make any change in strategical distribution of troops ordered to the French frontier. But we guarantee that our troops will not cross the French frontier before 7 P. M. on Monday the 3d inst., in case England will pledge herself meanwhile.

(Signed) BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

Telegram of H. M. the King of England to His Majesty the Emperor of August 1st, 1914.

In answer to Your telegram just received, I think there must be some misunderstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon when they were discussing how actual fighting between German and French armies might be avoided while there is still a chance of some agreement between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will arrange to see Prince Lichnowsky early tomorrow morning to ascertain whether there is a misunderstanding on his part.

(Signed) GEORGE.

Telegram of the German Ambassador in London to the Chancellor of August 2nd, 1914.

Sir E. Grey's suggestions were prompted by a desire to make it possible for England to keep permanent neutrality, but as they were not based on a previous understanding with France and made without knowledge of our mobilization, they have been abandoned as absolutely hopeless.

(Signed) LICHNOWSKY.

The essence of Germany's declarations is contained in Emperor William's telegram to the King of England of August 1st, 1914. Even if there existed a misunderstanding as to an English proposal, the Kaiser's offer furnished England the opportunity to prove her pacific disposition and to prevent the Franco-German war.

Sir Edward Grey's Reply to the Lichnowsky Dispatches.

Sir Edward Grey, answering a question addressed to him by Sir Robert Cecil in the House of Commons, made the following statement on the Lichnowsky dispatches:

"It was reported to me one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria, and also engage not to attack France, if we would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that, if the German Government thought such an arrangement possible, I was sure we could secure it.

"It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, and, as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible with the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance, it was not in my power to promise to secure it.

"Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private secretary and told him that as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he had sent a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the first telegram he had sent on the subject."



BEST BOOKS ON THE WAR

Compiled by Corinne Bacon.†

WAR—PEACE—MILITARISM

Angell, Norman, pseud. (Ralph Norman Angell Lane.) *Arms and industry, a study of the foundations of international polity.* *\$1.25. Putnam. 1914.

Also published under title: "Foundations of international polity."

Angell, Norman, pseud. (Ralph Norman Angell Lane.) *The great illusion: a study of the relation of military power in nations to their economic and social advantage.* 3d rev. and enl. ed. *\$1. Putnam. 1911.

Enlarged edition of his "Europe's optical illusion."

"That the commercial and industrial well-being of any nation depends on its comparative armament and that a state ever reaps a real benefit from a victorious war, is the 'illusion' the author sets out to dispel." A. L. A. Booklist, 1911.

Aston, Sir George. *Sea, land and air strategy.* maps and diagrams. *\$3.50. Little. 1914.

Bernhardi, Friedrich von. *Cavalry, a popular edition of "Cavalry in war and peace."* *\$1. Doran. 1914.

Billington, M. F. *Red cross in war.* *50c. Doran. 1914.

Butler, Nicholas Murray. *International mind.* *75c. Scribner. 1913.

An argument for the judicial settlement of international disputes.

Jordan, David Starr, and Jordan, H. E. *War's aftermath.* *75c. Houghton. 1914.

"Short authoritative study of the effect of war on the quality of manhood for generations after." Publisher.

Illustrated by the Civil War in the United States and the late wars in the Balkans. Introduction deals with the European war.

See also D. S. Jordan's *Human harvest*, 1907; *Unseen empire: a study of the plight of nations that do not pay their debts*, 1912; *War and waste*, 1913.

* An asterisk (*) before the price indicates those books sold at a limited discount and commonly known as net books.

† The compiler acknowledges indebtedness to the lists on the war in the bulletins of the Minneapolis, New York City, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Salem Public Libraries; in the *Literary Digest* for September, 1914; in the *American Review of Reviews*, September, 1914, and to the list issued August, 1914, by Charles Scribner's Sons.

Lamszus, Wilhelm. Human slaughter-house (scenes from the war that is sure to come). *50c. Stokes. 1913.

"One of the most remarkable and powerful indictments of war ever written. In realism it ranks with Zola's *The downfall*." *Independent*, 1913.

Mahan, Capt. Alfred Thayer. Armaments and arbitration. *\$1.40. Harper. 1912.

Chapter 6 criticizes Angell's "Great illusion."

Reely, Mary Katharine, comp. Selected articles on world peace, including international arbitration and disarmament. (Debaters' handbook series.) *\$1. The H. W. Wilson Co. 1914.

Royce, Josiah. War and insurance. *\$1. Macmillan. 1914.

Develops a plan for securing peace through international insurance.

Spaight, J. M. Aircraft in war. *\$2. Macmillan. 1914.

Spaight, J. M. War rights on land. *\$3.50. Macmillan. 1911.

"Scholarly and practical treatise." *Annals of American Academy*, 1911.

EUROPE

Cambridge modern history. Vol. 12. The latest age. *\$4. Macmillan. 1911.

See chapters on Modern Europe and Great Britain, The French Republic, The German Empire, Austria-Hungary, United Italy, Reaction and revolution in Russia and the Reform movement in Russia.

Crispi, Francesco. Memoirs. 2v. *\$7. Doran. 1912.

v.2. The Triple Alliance.

"Based on documents collected by a nephew of the Italian statesman (1819-1901). For the most part Crispi's own account of events, forming an important source for the history of the period." *Pittsburgh Bulletin*, O. 1914.

Fullerton, William Morton. Problems of power: a study of international politics from Sadowa to Kirk-Kilissé. *\$2.25. Scribner. 1913.

Traces the crises that have menaced the nationality of France and Germany since the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.

"The best account we have seen of the understandings and misunderstandings between the great powers during the last half-century." *Spec-tator*, 1913.

Gooch, George Peabody. History of our time, 1885-1911. *50c. Holt. 1911.

First six chapters trace the development of the European powers and explain their relations to one another.

Bibliography, p. 251-53.

Hazen, Charles Downer. Europe since 1815. maps. *\$3; Library edition, *\$3.75. Holt. 1910; 1911.

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"Comes down to, 1909. . . . For the last 25 years, it is almost without a competitor." Harvard Graduates Magazine.

Hooper, George. Campaign of Sedan, August-September, 1870. maps. *50c. Doran. 1914.

Introduction and first two chapters on the causes of the war and on mobilization are of special interest in connection with the present war.

Johnston, Sir Harry Hamilton. Common sense in foreign policy. il. *\$1.25. Dutton. 1913.

"Study of the problems which affect British relations with France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Portugal, America and the East. Pittsburgh Bulletin, O. 1914.

Lyde, Lionel William. Continent of Europe. il. *\$2. Macmillan. 1913.

"A work at once descriptive, statistical, geographical, social and political." Book Review Digest, Je. 1914.

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Ogg, Frederic Austin. Governments of Europe. *\$3. Macmillan. 1913.

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Rose, John Holland. Development of the European nations, 1870-1900. 2v. *\$5. Putnam. 1905.

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To 1896.

Bibliographies at the end of each chapter.

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Usher, Roland Greene. Pan-Germanism. *\$1.75. Houghton. 1913.

Contains bibliography.

A revised and enlarged edition will be published early in 1915.

"The author is of those who believe it is Germany's intention to dominate Europe and the world. His book is an attempt to describe the progress already made toward the realization of that ambition." Pittsburgh Bulletin, O. 1914.

EUROPE—ARMIES AND NAVIES

"Ex-Trooper." The French army from within. *\$1. Doran. 1914.

The German army from within, by a British officer who has served in it. *\$1. Doran. 1914.

Henderson, Ernest Flagg. Germany's fighting machine. il. *\$1.25. Bobbs-Merrill. 1914.

Hurd, Archibald S. The fleets at war. il. map. *50c. Doran. 1914.

Gives statistics of the navies at war, summary of the naval events that preceded the outbreak of the war, brief biographies of Sir John Jellicoe and of Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, some account of the German naval bases and of the Kiel Canal.

Hurd, Archibald S., and Castle, Henry. German sea-power, its rise, progress and economic basis. maps. *\$3.50. Scribner. 1913.

Clear and sympathetic explanation of Germany's naval expansion during the past 15 years. Tells why Germans in authority want a big navy.

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History of the English navy from the earliest times to the present day.

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Stevani, W. Barnes. The Russian army from within. *\$1. Doran. 1914.

By a London special correspondent resident in Russia for 27 years.

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141 maps of Europe from 1490 to 1910.

Introduction traces "the territorial changes by which the existing political systems of Europe came into being." Spectator, 1912.

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Includes first-hand stories of fighting told by wounded British soldiers.

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"Undertakes to show how Prussian tradition, starting with Frederick the Great, has succeeded in corrupting the Germany of today." Publisher.

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Case of Belgium in the present war: an account of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and of the laws of war on Belgian territory. pa. 25c. Macmillan. 1914.

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Author is Professor of history at Harvard University. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, he spent many months investigating conditions in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. He discusses the direct and indirect causes of the war, neutrality, modern methods of warfare, possible terms of peace, the military unfitness of America, the effect of the war upon the United States, etc.

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Swing, Raymond E. How Germany was forced into war.

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Francke, Kuno. Germany's fateful hour.

McDonald, James G. German "atrocities" and international law.

Simonds, Frank H. The great war. maps. *\$1.25. Kennerley. 1914.

Based on articles written for the New York Evening Sun. Covers events from the assassination of the Austrian Archduke to the fall of Antwerp.

Sladen, Douglas. Real "Truth about Germany": facts about the war. *\$1. Putnam. 1914.

"Reprint of the text of a pamphlet recently issued in Germany (in English) under the authority of a committee of representative citizens, with analyses and refutations of the statements therein made, from the English point of view. An appendix by A. Maurice Low discusses the evidence on the causation of the war and the relative responsibilities of England and of Germany." Publisher.

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Issued under the patronage of the most prominent Germans of today, and reprinted in this country under the auspices of an American Committee.

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Colquhoun, Archibald Ross, and Colquhoun, Mrs. E. M. C. Whirlpool of Europe, Austria-Hungary and the Habsburgs. *\$3.50. il. maps. Dodd. 1907.

"As regards political personages and living issues, such as Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, etc., the volume is instructive and interesting." Literary Digest, 1907.

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"Covers ably every phase of modern life in each of the two countries." Pittsburgh Bulletin, O. 1914.

Rumbold, Sir Horace. Francis Joseph and his times. il. *\$4. Appleton. 1909.

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Steed, Henry Wickham. Hapsburg monarchy. *\$2.50. Scribner. 1914.

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Author was for ten years Vienna correspondent of the London Times.

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Wagner, Lieut. Hermenegild. *With the victorious Bulgarians.*

*\$3. Houghton. 1913.

"Contains a graphic picture of the Balkan States and their recent war, and of the campaigns of the great Bulgarian general, Radko Dimitrieff, 'The Napoleon of the Balkans,' whose enlistment in the Russian service may be a dominant factor in the present conflict." Publisher.

BELGIUM

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Special chapters are devoted to places of particular importance, such as Liège, Antwerp, Brussels.

Edwards, George Wharton. *Some old Flemish towns.* il. *\$4. Moffat. 1911.

Accounts of Alost, Lille, Bruges, Ghent, and other cities.

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Holland, Clive. *Belgians at home.* il. *\$3.50. Little. 1911.

"Outline of Belgian history, followed by descriptions of the people and accounts of the more interesting places—Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, Waterloo, Louvain, Malines and others." *Pittsburgh Bulletin*, O. 1914.

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Author has lived 12 years in Brussels and has had access to state and family archives of Belgium never before accessible to a historian.

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Author was sent to Paris as correspondent of the London Times in 1876, lived there over 30 years, and was instrumental in bringing about the Anglo-French alliance.

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Cramb, John Adam. *Germany and England.* *\$1. Dutton. 1914.

Lectures delivered at Queen's College, London, 15 months before war was declared, which tell "in the smallest possible space what Germany is fighting for, and what Britain is resisting." Spectator, Ag. 22, 1914.

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Cross, Arthur Lyon. *History of England and Greater Britain.* maps. *\$2.50. Macmillan. 1914.

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"Approaches, on the whole, in arrangement, fulness of information, matter-of-factness, accuracy, and emphasis on purely political history, more nearly than any other textbook we happen to know, to S. R. Gardiner's Student's history." Nation, S. 10, 1914.

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Wilkinson, Spenser. Britain at bay. *\$1.50. Putnam. 1909.

"Makes a strong plea for compulsory military service in England, pointing out that only by thus strengthening the army can the nation escape defeat in the inevitable conflict with Germany which he sees approaching." Pittsburgh Bulletin, O. 1914.

FRANCE

Bracq, Jean Charlemagne. France under the republic. *\$1.50. Scribner. 1910.

"Survey of political, commercial, educational, cultural, and social changes in French national life." Publisher.

Dimnet, Ernest. France herself again. *\$2.50. Putnam. 1914. Traces the development of France from 1870 to the present and contains one chapter on the present war.

Guérard, Albert Léon. French civilization in the 19th century. *\$3. Century. 1914.

Working bibliographies at ends of chapters.

"Brilliant and satisfactory explanation of modern France, and of the foundations upon which it is based." Outlook (London), 1914.

Jerrold, Laurence. The real France. *\$1.50. Lane. 1911.

"One of the lightest-handed and keenest studies of national character produced by an English brain in our day. . . . Mr. Jerrold explains France." Pittsburgh Bulletin, O. 1914.

Jerrold, Laurence. French and the English. *\$2.50. Dodd. 1913.

Paris correspondent of a London newspaper contrasts the two nations with a view to bringing about a better understanding between them.

Poincaré, Raymond. How France is governed. *\$2.25. McBride. 1914.

"An admirable account of the essential features of the French government and well-proportioned to the needs of the average intelligent reader." Am. Political Science Review, My. 1914.

Chapter on military service already out of date.

Tardieu, André. France and the alliances: the struggle for the balance of power. *\$1.50. Macmillan. 1908.

Vizetelly, Ernest Alfred. My days of adventure; the fall of France, 1870-71. *7s. 6d. Chatto and Windus, London. 1914.

"Of real value as an impartial historical record by an eye-witness." *Pittsburgh Bulletin*, O. 1914.

Vizetelly, Ernest Alfred. Republican France; 1870-1912; her presidents, statesmen, policy, vicissitudes and social life. il. *\$4. Small. 1913.

"By an Englishman who displays a remarkable understanding of French institutions and French life." *Am. Historical Review*, Jl. 1913.

Wendell, Barrett. France of today. *\$1.50. Scribner. 1907.

"Makes for a better understanding of the French people." *A. L. A. Booklist*, 1907.

GERMANY

Bernhardi, Friedrich von. How Germany makes war. *\$1.25. Doran. 1914.

"Uncompromising statement of Germany's ideals, the training of her army and her military tactics. A condensed version of the author's 'On war of to-day,' written for experts." *Publisher's Weekly*, O. 24, 1914.

Bernhardi, Friedrich von. Germany and the next war. map. *\$3. Longmans. 1912.

By the chief interpreter of the ideals of Prussian militarism. Anticipates the aims and strategy of the present war. Suggests that France must be wiped out, that England must be beaten and that Belgium has sacrificed her rights of neutrality by her African annexations.

Longmans has issued a popular edition at \$1, an authorized American edition at 75c. and a paper-covered edition at 25c. Charles A. Eron, New York, has issued a paper-covered edition at 50c.

See Bryce and Doyle for answers to Bernhardi's arguments.

Bülow, Bernhard, fürst von. Imperial Germany. *\$3. Dodd. 1914.

Bismarck's successor writes of the making of modern Germany. About one-third of the book is taken up with a discussion of foreign policy. *Book Review Digest*, Je. 1914.

Burgess, John W. The German Emperor and the German government, an address delivered Jan. 5, 1909. Germanistic Society of America, N. Y.

To be obtained from the Corresponding Secretary, Deutsches Haus, 419 West 117th St., N. Y.

Collier, Price. Germany and the Germans from an American point of view. *\$1.50; *75c. Scribner. 1913; 1914.

Graphic picture of present day Germany. Includes a chapter on the Kaiser.

Dawson, William Harbutt. Evolution of modern Germany. *\$4; *\$1.50. Scribner. 1908; 1914.

"A valuable granary of fact for every student who would understand political and economic Germany." *Dial*, 1909.

Dillon, E. J., and Kennedy, J. M. A scrap of paper. *50c.

Doran. 1914.

"A secret history of Germany's long preparatory diplomacy and her violation of Belgium's neutrality." Publisher.

Francke, Kuno. German ideals of today and other essays on German culture. *\$1.50. Houghton. 1907.

Fried, Alfred Hermann. The German Emperor and the peace of the world. *\$2. Doran. 1912.

"Sets forth the German emperor as the well-convinced friend of peace." New York Times, 1912.
Nobel prize essay.

Helffferich, Karl. Germany's progress and national wealth, 1888-1913. Germanistic Society of America, N. Y. 1914.

See note under Burgess.

Holland, A. W. Germany. il. *\$2. Macmillan. 1914.

"A notably valuable book because it is the first to recount German history from the earliest times to the close of 1913." Outlook, Jl. 18, 1914.
"Mr. Holland is admirably impartial." Athenæum. 1913.

James, Herman Gerlach. Principles of Prussian administration. *\$1.50. Macmillan. 1913.

Mach, Edmund von. What Germany wants. *\$1. Little. 1914.

Said to have been written to present the convictions of the German nation rather than the contentions of the militarists.

Perris, George Herbert. Germany and the German Emperor. *\$3. Holt. 1912.

"One of the best accounts in brief compass of political parties and political problems under the Empire that has come to the attention of the reviewer." Am. Political Science Review, 1913.

Reich, Emil. Germany's madness. *\$1. Dodd. 1914.

Published also under title: "Germany's swelled head."

Written in 1907 by a Hungarian resident in England for many years. Some irrelevant matter has been omitted and an epilogue added to bring the book up to date.

Sarolea, Charles. Anglo-German problem. *\$1. Nelson. 1912.

"Mainly an investigation of Germany's home and military policy directed towards the long pre-conceived dream of world empire." Saturday Review (London), Ag. 22, 1914.

Predicts that the next European war will be long, inexorable, universal, and that Belgium will be once more the "Cockpit of Europe."

The book has been highly praised by King Albert of Belgium.

Shaw, Stanley. William of Germany. *\$2.50. Macmillan. 1913.

Schierbrand, Wolf von. Germany—the welding of a world power. *\$1. Doubleday. 1902.

"Author states frankly that his point of view is American, not German." Pittsburgh Bulletin, O. 1914.

Topham, Anne. *Memories of the Kaiser's court.* il. *\$3.

Dodd. 1914.

Miss Topham was teacher of English to the Princess Victoria from 1902, when she was nine years old, until her marriage.

"Written with much ability and a charming lightness of touch." *Spectator*, S. 5, 1914.

Tower, Charles. *Germany today.* *50c. Holt. 1913.

Gives a clear account of the power of the Kaiser, the Bundesrath, the Reichstag and the state parliaments.

White, Andrew Dickson. *Seven great statesmen.* p. 391-535,

Bismarck. *\$2.50. Century. 1910.

Chapters on Bismarck give a clear idea of modern Germany and tell the story of his suggestion to France that she should take Tunis, and the resulting formation of the Triple Alliance.

Wile, Frederic William. *Men around the Kaiser: the makers of modern Germany.* il. *\$1.25. Bobbs-Merrill. 1914.

Thirty-one biographical sketches by the Berlin correspondent for the *New York Times* and *London Daily Mail*.

The J. B. Lippincott Company issued an edition in 1913 at *\$1.75.

William II. *German emperor. The Kaiser's speeches: tr. and ed. by Wolf von Schierbrand.* *\$2.50. Harper. 1903.

Speeches; tr. by L. Elkind. *\$5. Longmans. 1904.

Wylie, Ida Alena Ross. *Eight years in Germany.* *10s. 6d.

Mills and Boon, London. 1914.

Author holds a brief for Germany.

LUXEMBOURG

Renwick, George. *Luxembourg: the Grand Duchy and its people.* il. map. *\$3. Scribner. 1913.

Combines history and description.

RUSSIA

Alexinsky, Gregor. *Modern Russia.* *\$3.75. Scribner. 1914.

"Apart from minor points . . . an able and comprehensive survey of the political and economic position of modern Russia." *Athenæum*, 1913.

Baring, Maurice. *Mainsprings of Russia.* *\$1. Nelson. 1914.

Baring, Maurice. *Russian people.* maps. *\$3.50. Doran. 1911.

"Clear, unbiased and comprehensive outline of the history of Russia, and an intimate study of Russian character." *A. L. A. Booklist*, 1912.

Graham, Stephen. *Changing Russia.* il. *\$2.50. Lane. 1913.

Author sees in Russia a power more eager for conquest than any other country.

Mavor, James. Economic history of Russia. 2v. *\$10. Dutton.

1914.

"Gives a notion of the Russian empire, of its origins and its characteristics, of its problems and its possibilities, well calculated to make the reader ashamed of his prejudices and his criticisms." *Boston Transcript*, Ag. 12, 1914.

Wallace, Sir Donald Mackenzie. Russia. New and enl. ed. \$5.

Holt. 1905.

"A book of extreme value on a remarkably difficult subject . . . indispensable for those who wish clearly to understand present conditions and future possibilities in the land of the Tsar." *Pittsburgh Bulletin*, O. 1914.

Williams, Harold Whitmore. Russia of the Russians. il. *\$1.50.

Scribner. 1914.

Description of Russian life by the former Petrograd correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian and Morning Post*. Includes a historical chapter and an account of the political situation.

Winter, Nevin Otto. Russian empire today and yesterday. il.

map. *\$3. Page. 1913.

"The most comprehensive of recent books on Russia, but it lacks the literary quality and deep insight of Baring's Russian people." *A. L. A. Booklist*, 1913.

Bibliography, p. 477-80.

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Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich, Prince. The Servian people, their past glory and their destiny. 2v. *\$3. Scribner. 1910.

Scholarly and encyclopedic. The second volume is a complete historical survey.

Stead, Alfred, ed. Servia by the Servians. map. 12s. 6d.

Heinemann, London. 1909.

"Comprehensive estimate of Servia and the Servian race from the pens of representative Servians." *Pittsburgh Bulletin*, O. 1914.

FICTION

Bilse, Oswald Fritz (pseud. Fritz von der Kyrburg). Life in a garrison town. *\$1.25. Lane. 1904.

"Severe arraignment of the German military system. Cost its author a term of imprisonment and dismissal from the service." *Pittsburgh Bulletin*, O. 1914.

Also translated under title: "A little garrison."

Bloem, Walter. The iron year. *\$1.25. Lane. 1914.

"Has had a large circulation in Germany and is said to have been much appreciated by the German Emperor. . . . Story of a German general's daughter who falls in love with a French staff officer just as the Franco-German war breaks out. . . . Excellently translated." *Athenæum*, F. 21, 1914.

Chesney, Sir George T. *Battle of Dorking.*

First published in Blackwood's in 1871 and reprinted in pamphlet form. Imagined invasion of England by the Germans who had just conquered France.

Le Queux, William. *Invasion of 1910*, with a full account of the siege of London. *7d.; *6s. Everett; Nash. London. 1906.

Munro, Hector H. *When William came.* *\$1.25. Lane. 1914.

A satirical account of what takes place after a supposed German conquest of England.

Newton, W. Douglas. *War.* *\$1.20. Dodd. 1914.

An imaginary invasion of England described with a grim realism that strips war of its traditional glamour. Introduction by Rudyard Kipling.

Oppenheim, Edward Phillips. *Vanished messenger.* *\$1.30. Little. 1914.

Deals with the mysterious disappearance of an American bound on a mission to a conference of the powers at The Hague which is likely to result in the invasion of England.

Palmer, Frederick. *Last shot.* *\$1.35. Scribner. 1914.

"War as it actually would be if two first-class European nations turned their guns upon one another. The scenes of the story are not localized." *Book Review Digest*, Je. 1914.

Stuttner, Bertha (Kinsky) baroness von. "Ground arms!"

"A crusade against war. . . . The influence of the book in Austria and Germany has been compared to that of 'Uncle Tom's Cabin' in this country." *Pittsburgh Bulletin*, O. 1914.

Published also under title: "Lay down your arms."

Wells, Herbert George. *War in the air.* *\$1.50. Macmillan. 1908.

"Realistic description of a terrible world-war, carried on with aeroplanes and balloons, which finally destroys our present civilization." *Pittsburgh Bulletin*, O. 1914.

Wells, Herbert George. *The world set free.* *\$1.35. Dutton. 1914.

The discovery of how to use the explosive power in atoms has revolutionized industry. The economic upheaval is followed by war in which England, France and the Slavic powers are lined up against the Germanic races. Atomic bombs end the war and a world federation is formed.

DRAMA AND POETRY

Brownell, Atherton. *Unseen empire: a peace play in four acts.*

*\$1.25. Harper. 1914.

Owner of the Stahl gun works is the heroine and brings about European peace.

Galsworthy, John. *The mob: a play in four acts.* *60c. Scribner. 1914.

Hero defends the little nations in Parliament against the greed of England, and opposes war. A fine portrayal of mob psychology.

Noyes, Alfred. Rada, a drama of war. *60c. Stokes. 1913.

Scene laid in a Balkan village just taken by the enemy.

Noyes, Alfred. The wine-press; a tale of war. *60c. Stokes. 1913.

Suggested by the atrocities of the Balkan war.

Songs and sonnets for England in war-time . . . inspired by the great war. *75c. 1914.

Verses by Bridges, Watson, Newbolt, Kipling, Hardy and others.

PERIODICALS

Magazine articles are too numerous to list here. Consult the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, published monthly by the H. W. Wilson Company, White Plains, N. Y.

Fatherland, a new magazine, gives the German point of view.

The London Times is publishing an illustrated History of the war, in weekly parts, 7d. each.

The New York Sun has purchased the exclusive rights of reproduction in English of the war pictures of the illustrated "Zeitung" of Leipsic and other high class German art periodicals. These are appearing in the Sunday Sun, which has also purchased the right to reproduce articles from the leading German reviews.


The New York Times publishes a midweek pictorial war extra.

Another good source for pictures is the Illustrated London News.

F. L. Huidekoper's How to read the war news (World's Work, October, 1914) explains the A B C of military science so that the technical language of newspaper reports is made plain.

PAMPHLETS

Among the many pamphlets issued, special note should be taken of the Oxford pamphlets, to be obtained from the American Branch of the Oxford University Press, 35 West 32d St., New York, and of those issued by the Germanistic Societies of Chicago and New York.



the 1990s, the number of people with a mental health problem has increased by 50% (Mental Health Foundation 1999).

There is a growing awareness of the need to address the needs of people with mental health problems, and a number of initiatives have been developed to improve the lives of people with mental health problems. The Mental Health Act 1983 was amended in 1997 to give people with mental health problems more control over their own lives. The Mental Health Act 1997 was introduced to give people with mental health problems more control over their own lives. The Mental Health Act 1997 was introduced to give people with mental health problems more control over their own lives.

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